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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to provide a critical re-evaluation of politics and ideology in the work 
of D.H. Lawrence. The thesis brings a number of authors (including the Marquis de 
Sade, Robert Louis Stevenson, H. G. Wells and Raymond Chandler) into dialogue 
with Lawrence - fIrstly in order to interrogate Lawrentian assumptions, but also to 
relocate a writer often seen as being eccentric to literary circles and to society 
generally. 
My Introduction surveys two broad schools of Lawrence criticism: first, the 
'Lawrentian' kind, which inspects Lawrence's fiction through an often uncritical 
appreciation of the non-fictional writings - his 'philosophy' - and consequently is 
often reduced to an echo of the primary material. While recognising, in the manner of 
my second, socialist school of criticism, Lawrence's philosophy as ideology, a 
challenge is also made to the conventional left-wing judgement that such ideology 
indicates Lawrence's political 'failure'. 
Chapters One and Two provide extended analyses of, respectively, the 
novels Women in Love and Kangaroo: the first of these novels sees Lawrentian 
individuals attempting to 'solve' the problem of an oppressive industrial society by 
escaping it; the second shows the shortcomings of the 'freedom' won by such a 
supposed escape. Examining the contradictions of Lawrence's individualism, I argue 
the case that these texts present a rich commentary upon the economic and social 
contradictions of capitalism. 
My third chapter takes a broader view of Lawrence's shorter, ironical and 
satirical works, and argues that an openly satirical mode allowed Lawrence to break 
free from his contradictory 'philosophy' and engage in a critical dialogue with his 
own work that is much more penetrating than any critique by his Lawrentian admirers. 
Finally, the conclusion looks at the persisting problem of the 'Lawrentian' 
attitude in Lawrence studies, and at the enduring significance of Lawrence to our 
postmodem world. 
INTRODUCTION 
REPRESENTATIONS AND RE-APPROPRIATIONS: SANCTIONING 
UNAUTHORISED VERSIONS OF LAWRENCE 
The interests of a writer and the interests of his readers are 
never the same and if, on occasion, they happen to coincide, 
this is a lucky accident. 
We often derive much profit from reading a book in a different 
way from that which its author intended but only (once 
childhood is over) if we know that we are doing so. 
W.H. Auden[l] 
In an essay first published two weeks after Britain's entry into the Great War, 
Lawrence queries the prevailing mood of outwardly cocksure patriotism and offers a 
more subdued anticipation of what European war in the modem industrial age may 
actually involve. 'With the Guns' shows that Lawrence is already well aware of the 
deceit and illusions necessary to prosecute the war, as he describes reserve troops 
('some of them drunk') boarding the train for London: 'When you see 'em let 'em 
have it', a woman urges her departing lover: 'Ay, no fear', he replies with bravadoP] 
Lawrence then draws upon his experience of the previous year, of German military 
manoeuvres in Bavaria, in order to confront 'what it would really be like, ''when he 
saw 'em'" (81). People's unwillingness, as Lawrence perceives it, to face the potential 
horrors of the war is, he concludes, understandable: for the war 'is so unnatural as to 
be unthinkable. Yet we must think of it' (84). This closing exhortation reiterates the 
nub of the essay's argument: Lawrence sees it is a matter of huge importance that 
people think about and comprehend what they are doing in making and contributing 
to this war; and all the more so, because this type of warfare so readily vitiates any 
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consciousness of human responsibility. The activities of the Bavarian soldiers suggest 
to Lawrence how human individuality will be annihilated by a military organisation 
adapted to contemporary developments in the armaments industry: remembering 
seeing a group of soldiers taking cover from artillery-fire by the roadside, Lawrence 
perceives their degeneration into a 'mass': 
If one of the shells that were supposed to be coming had 
dropped among them it would have burst a hole in the mass. 
Who would have been tom, killed, no one would have known. 
There would just have been a hole in the living shadowy mass; 
that was all. Who it was did not matter. There were no 
individuals, and every individual soldier knew it. He was a 
fragment of a mass, and as a fragment of a mass he must live 
or die or be tom. He had no rights, no self, no being. (82) 
The war will be a war of machines, Lawrence conjectures, 'with men attached to the 
machines as the subordinate part thereof, as the butt is the part of a rifle' (81). The 
deindividuation and brutalisation which Lawrence anticipates are most strikingly 
represented in his account of the operation of the long-range field-guns. So far as the 
gunners' involvement goes, the enemy troops, invisible in the distance, cease to exist 
as human beings; and the gunners themselves, unable to tell whether or not they have 
killed people, are dehumanised also: removed from observing the consequences of 
their actions, they have nothing to feel responsible for. The arresting quality of the 
essay lies in this perception of what war, near the end of a European industrial 
revolution, may mean for the common soldier: 
What work was there to do? - only mechanically to adjust the 
guns and fire the shot. What was there to feel? - only the 
unnatural suspense and suppression of serving a machine 
which, for ought we knew, was killing our fellow-men, whilst 
we stood there, blind, without knowledge or participation, 
subordinate to the cold machine. This was the glamour and the 
glory of the war: blue sky overhead and living green country 
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all around, but we, amid it all, a part in some iron insensate 
will, our flesh and blood, our soul and intelligence shed away, 
and all that remained of us a cold, metallic adherence to an 
iron machine. There was neither ferocity nor joy nor exultation 
nor exhilaration nor even quick fear: only a mechanical, 
expressionless movement. 
And this is how the gunner would 'let 'em have it.' He 
would mechanically move a certain apparatus when he heard a 
certain shout. Of the result he would see and know nothing. He 
had nothing to do with it. (82) 
Lawrence's consideration of the gunners' lack of emotional involvement 
with their work strangely echoes the socialist concerns of William Morris: as Morris 
recognised that capitalist mass-production meant increasingly dull work, tantamount 
to slavery,[31 so does Lawrence similarly identify how soldiers, too, are reduced to 
another part of the machinery, unthinking and alienated from the repetitive work they 
'produce', without any substantial appreciation of the purpose or results of their 
labours. It is true that, despite its general perceptiveness towards the nature of the 
approaching conflict, the essay does reveal some eccentric notions about the war - that 
it could be tolerable if not for its mechanisation: 'Let us see our enemy and go for 
him. But we cannot endure this taking death out of machines ... without any enemy to 
rise against' (83). Lawrence, in fact, readily acknowledges his bewilderment at the 
war: 'But what is it all about? I cannot understand' (83-4). And it may seem rather 
perverse to write of the 'work' of killing in the way that he does (although he is 
perhaps suggesting that if soldiers were more closely engaged in their 'work' they 
might not be so ready to kill in the first place: the gunners are 'blind' in a literal sense, 
blind to the damage they cause miles away, but also 'blind' in failing to comprehend 
the slaughter they are involved in))41 All the same, the overriding quality of the essay 
is its antipathy for the narrow, debilitating employment of human labour. Lawrence 
generally remained appalled by the war and, when threatened by the possibility of 
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conscription, reiterated his opposition to such compulsion: 'I will go to prison. I will 
not be compelled: that is the whole of my feeling. '[5] 
It is all the more striking, then, that when Lawrence asked 'what work was 
there to do' on the home front he could appear so at odds with the efforts of working 
people to improve their conditions of work. Seeming to forget the point that you have 
no choice about being 'compelled', his description of the working class, compelled to 
subordination to the industrial machine as soldiers are subordinated to the guns, is, to 
a large degree unsympathetic, to some degree openly hostile. The apparently passive 
colliers in The Rainbow's Wiggiston, for example, appear as 'spectres', 'Like 
creatures with no more hope';[6] while the militant colliers in Women in Love, who 
force a lockout by refusing a wage-cut, loom in 'Seething mobs', driven by the 
'passion of cupidity', before they too submit and 'even [get] a further satisfaction' out 
of the new management's severe conditionsP] It seems that workers are contemptible, 
or at best pitiable, while submissive, and horrifying when they rebel. 
The strike featured in Women in Love, Macdonald Daly suggests, is mostly 
informed by the 1915 Welsh miners' strike, as digested by Lawrence through the 
right-wing Morning Post.[S] Daly notes how, despite Lawrence's criticism of the war 
itself, he nevertheless 'displayed a demonstrable ideological affinity on certain crucial 
counts with those prosecuting the war'[9] - the Welsh strike being one instance. This 
was no 'ordinary' strike: under the 1915 Munitions of War Act, strikers were now 
liable to pay large fines or face criminal prosecution; with 200,000 men 'out', here 
was a strike which directly tested the logistics of the new legislation and threatened to 
destroy the government's credibility in prosecuting the war generally; such being the 
case, the dispute was inextricably tied to the military campaign itself. Lawrence's 
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opinion of matters was in stark contrast, though, to his earlier understanding of the 
'suppression' of the Bavarian soldiers. Writing to Bertrand Russell, he asks: 
Can't you see the whole state is collapsing? Look at the Welsh 
strike. This war is going to develop into the last great war 
between labour and capital. It will be a ghastly chaos of 
destruction, if it is left to labour to be constructive. 
In the same letter he recommends government not by democracy but by patricians, 
headed by 'an absolute Dictator, and an equivalent Dictatrix' .[10] And yet the Welsh 
strike provides a clear example of labour's ability to organise itself constructively (to 
defend wages and the closed shop). No less than the soldiers described by 'With the 
Guns', these workers could be seen as having been ordered against their interests into 
a 'shadowy mass' with few 'rights, ... no being' (82), but as now organising 
themselves as an active, autonomous collective: these people are thinking about and 
comprehending their situation in the way Lawrence calls on people to think about the 
war, and they are determined to improve it, instead of remaining 'blind, without 
knowledge or participation' (82). Such social conflict is about human beings taking 
control of the industrial machine they have been made subject to, as the soldiers are 
subjected to the machinery of war - yet here Lawrence flinches from it. Albeit fiercely 
opposed to the war in the field, he simultaneously favours authoritarian methods of 
prosecuting the wider war campaign. The empathy Lawrence shows in the case of the 
soldiers is almost entirely absent from his views of industrial labour. Lawrence 
himself would, in 1914, have little fear of ever being called up, but he nevertheless 
identifies more closely with the soldiers ('we, amid it all' [82]) than with the miners 
in an industry he had long since escaped. This personal victory {an early ticket to the 
'professional' classes via a scholarship to Nottingham High school, which meant he 
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would never 'go down pit') would have left him with a rather elementary knowledge 
of what it meant to work as a collier; but whereas, in 'With the Guns', Lawrence is 
ready to acknowledge his perplexity at the war, he is often content to offer forthright 
opmlOns upon more narrowly domestic issues of which he patently has little 
comprehension. 
Indeed, any study of Lawrence's political thought has to accept that, 
however vociferously he makes his exhortations, Lawrence often demonstrates a 
disregard for the realities of contemporary politics - as his call for patrician 
government, a 'Dictator' and 'Dictatrix', suggests. Why, then, should we pay much 
attention to his political statements? One answer would be that, even though the 
political attitudes frequently appear confused and confusing, they are important 
because, for Lawrence, literature is not merely an intellectual diversion, but a serious 
attempt to push society in the right direction. Writing in 1918 of his play, Touch and 
Go (another representation of industrial conflict, adapted from Women in Love), he 
remarks: 
I believe the world yet might get a turn for the better, if it but 
had a little shove that way. And this is my attempt - I believe 
the last I am capable of - or the fITSt, perhaps - at a shove.lll ] 
It is this kinetic quality which politicises Lawrence's work, in a broader manner than 
its engagement with particular contemporary political theories and events. And while 
it is fair enough to pull apart the absurdities and contradictions apparent in his more 
directly political comments, we should bear in mind that, as regards Lawrence the 
imaginative writer, evidence of sound political reasoning is no sufficient criterion for 
judgment. Indeed, it often may be the case that logically coherent literary works prove 
less interesting than contradictory ones, the latter possibly providing larger windows 
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upon the usually complex and antagonised social conditions prevailing at any given 
time and place. This being the case, the interrogation of such works' contradictions 
constitutes an effort to appreciate their richness, rather than merely to expose their 
'flaws'. We are moving here from the matter of Lawrence's attempted political 
proselytising to questions of his ideological context and the ideological kaleidoscope 
of his work: a move from what Lawrence patently wants to say to what his work is 
compelled actually to mean. It is hardly anything new to say that Lawrence's work is 
contradictory, indeed it is fast becoming a cliche; yet the work's articulation of the 
desperate paradoxes of early twentieth-century society is often underrated or obscured 
by the general opinion of a deterioration in Lawrence's art; a decline consequent upon 
his estrangement from his native milieu, originating somewhere between his 
holiday-cum-'elopement' with Frieda Weekley in May 1912 and their leaving 
England after the war. It is one of my contentions that Lawrence's work remained 
vivified by a persistent (albeit cantankerous) relation to English industrial society, by 
his deep awareness of its tragedies and his assimilation of its contradictions. He was, 
in a sense, an odd man in very odd times: the sum bizarreness is perhaps indicated by 
Lawrence's remarkable career as an imaginary secret agent: having been arrested in 
the German garrison town of Metz, in 1912, on suspicion of being an English spy, and 
subsequently portraying it in an account rejected by the Westminster Gazette as 'too 
violently anti-German' ,P2] Lawrence attracted persecution throughout the war in 
England as a possible German sympathiser, and, in 1917, was forced to leave his 
home in Cornwall as a suspected spy for Germany. 
This kind of excitement was probably not quite what Lawrence would 
have had in mind when beginning his literary career. However, writing many years 
after Lawrence's first introduction to London's literary scene. Jessie Chambers 
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suggests something of the exotic attraction that this new world held for an Eastwood 
provincial: 
A new and immensely larger life was opening out before him. 
A kind of transfiguration from obscurity and uncertainty had 
taken place. Thanks to the kind offices ofFord Madox Hueffer 
his chance of a hearing was assured. And it had all come about 
so simply, almost without effort. There was a glamour about 
those days, even something of a glitter.l13] 
Lawrence's own retrospective accounts regarding the period tend to play down this 
strangeness, and certainly the 'glamour', assuming instead a breezy nonchalance, 
which may suggest Lawrence's subsequent disillusion with literary society, as well as 
the distance between the elder autobiographer and his younger self when he first 
confronted that world. What Lawrence's accounts do tend to share with that of 
Chambers, though, is an emphasis upon the ease with which someone from a 
working-class background, who has gained a job as an elementary schoolteacher, 
could make the transition to professional writer: 
They ask me: 'Did you find it very hard to get on and to 
become a success?' And I have to admit that if I can be said to 
have got on, and if I can be called a success, then I did not find 
it hard. 
I never starved in a garret, nor waited in anguish for the post 
to bring me an answer from editor or publisher .... [14] 
This somewhat jars with what we know of the many difficulties with which his 
origins presented him, economic and otherwise, [IS] but such retrospection's suave 
erasure of the problems with which Lawrence contended inevitably tempts any critical 
appreciation which must 'look back' at the life - and now from much further distance 
than Lawrence's own versions from the late 1920s or Jessie Chambers's in the 1930s. 
Lawrence's achievements as a writer - including, besides his artistic accomplishment 
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the fact that (bar his most desperate period during the Great War) he did succeed in 
making his living from writing - have become so familiar as almost to breed contempt 
for the struggles necessarily involved in realising those achievements. In this respect, 
Raymond Williams's insistence upon the 'real importance' of Lawrence's early life 
provides an increasingly salutary guide to Lawrence studies: 
the real importance of Lawrence's origins is not and cannot be 
a matter of retrospect from the adult life. It is, rather, that his 
fIrst social responses were those, not of a man observing the 
processes of industrialism, but of one caught in them, at an 
exposed point, and destined, in the normal course, to be 
enlisted in their regiments. That he escaped enlistment is now 
so well known to us that it is difficult to realize the thing as it 
happened, in its living sequence. It is only by hard fighting, 
and, further, by the fortune of fighting on a favourable front, 
that anyone born into the industrial working class escapes his 
function of replacement. Lawrence could not be certain, at the 
time when his fundamental social responses were forming, that 
he could so escape)16] 
I wish to incorporate this recognition of the uncertainty of Lawrence's life 
'in its living sequence' in my own study, in order to avoid the retrospective fallacy of 
which Williams forewarns us, but also, hopefully, to show how such uncertainty 
informs Lawrence's work: for it is worth adding to Williams's observation that, once 
having become a professional writer, certainty was by no means a new condition of 
life for Lawrence. Despite Jessie Chambers's assessment above, the 'uncertainty' and 
'effort' which had marked Lawrence's earlier life remained significant features of 
later years, because, just as his nascent 'genius' could provide no guarantee of his 
escape from the regiments of the industrial working class, so too his 'mature genius' 
could not assure him of unbroken success in a glittering literary world. Indeed, this 
'new and immensely larger life' which Chambers saw to be on offer to Lawrence was 
not one that he felt himself easily able or willing to plunge into. It was an alien world 
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of publishers, agents and readers that he often found at odds with himself. Raymond 
Williams again, writing of Richard Jefferies, asserts: 'we must see also, as in 
Lawrence, the gifted young man who was writing his way out of [the insecurities of 
his lower-middle-class] situation, necessarily through readers who were placed 
socially above him, and on whom the complex pressures were severe and lasting' . [l7) 
One such lasting pressure was Lawrence's continual need to revise his 
work in order to make it publishable for a 'genteel' public, and another was, once 
published, his work's relative lack of success in selling. Compared, for instance, to 
the commercial popularity of H.G. Wells (another 'serious' novelist with 
less-than-bourgeois origins), that of Lawrence was small indeed. At much the same 
time as Lawrence was on the threshold of the 'larger life' of a full-time writer (he 
resigned his teaching post on 28 February 1912), Wells described what the previous 
eighteen years as a professional writer had meant for himself: 
The literary life is one of the modem forms of adventure. 
Success with a book, even such a commercially modest 
success as mine has been, means in the English-speaking 
world not merely a moderate financial independence, but the 
utmost freedom of movement and intercourse. One is lifted out 
of one's narrow circumstances into familiar and unrestrained 
intercourse with a great variety of people. One sees the 
world. ll8) 
Naturally, Wells had had his own difficulties to overcome, but at the time of writing 
the above he had achieved a level of financial security and a degree of social status 
that Lawrence would never be rewarded with by his own career; and the comparative 
ease with which Wells moved from the lower classes into the literary world is 
reflected in the different manner in which each of the writers would subsequently see 
'the world' at large: when Wells travelled the globe he consorted with statesmen such 
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as Lenin, F.D. Roosevelt and Stalin; Lawrence's journeying was more akin to the 
restless wanderings of a vagrant. 
In saying this, I merely intend to give some acknowledgement of the 
excentric pressures upon Lawrence's writing, generated by his origins on the margin 
of 'Society' and by his succeeding displacement from England altogether: I do not 
present a preface to arguing that such conditions inevitably proved debilitating to his 
work. Indeed, it is puzzling why Terry Eagleton, in Exiles and Emigres, perceives that 
Lawrence, being a kind of internal exile owing to his working-class experience, is 
therefore able to write the better about society in its totality, and yet regards 
Lawrence's actual emigration from England and subsequent 'isolation' as having such 
negative consequences for his art.[I9] Against Eagleton, I would argue that Lawrence's 
leaving England did not mean a corresponding disintegration of psychological ties to 
it, nor that Lawrence's understanding of the realities of industrial society atrophied 
because of 'his years of rootless exile';[201 and it is worth asking why the actual emigre 
whom Lawrence later became was not the more advantageously equipped to depict 
Australian and Mexican society in their totality in Kangaroo (1923) and The Plumed 
Serpent (1926) respectively (as Eagleton's thesis may suggest, but which the cursory 
mention of Lawrence's failure to 'fmd an adequate foreign alternative' [211 would 
apparently deny). 
Undoubtedly, Lawrence was at severe odds with English and industrial 
society for much of his adult life, and felt a similar antagonism for his potential 
reading public which only tended to harden as the years passed; but this should not be 
seen as a final rejection of society per se by an increasingly isolated individual. It is 
true that his letters, especially those of the 1920s, are punctuated with bitter 
recriminations against what he takes to be an unworthy, misunderstanding readership: 
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'Why write books for the swine, unless one absolutely must[?]'; 'I get such a distaste 
for committing myself any further into "solid print," 1 am holding off. Let the public 
read what there is to read.'[22] And yet Lawrence's fundamental attitude appears to 
bear less outright contempt than it does incomprehension. Lawrence was never 
wilfully obscure, intending to perplex his readers a la Finnegans Wake, but rather the 
opposite occurred: it was often the public reaction to his work that left him at a loss: 
'the public is an ass 1 don't understand' )23] But Lawrence persisted in trying to recruit 
the public conscience, and his frustration perhaps made him all the more determined 
to hammer home his message (as critics often charge him with doing in what they see 
as the violent didacticism of The Plumed Serpent and Lady Chatterley's Lover, a 
charge which seems implicit in Eagleton's assumption of the 'isolation' that later 
spoiled Lawrence's art). 
Lawrence's frequent expressIons of vituperation also suggest how 
awkwardly placed he often felt in his chosen career: never entirely comfortable with 
the metropolitan literary world (,from the outset a critical stranger in middle-class 
aesthetic society' in Frank Swinnerton's opinion)[24] and neither ever genuinely 
popular with the public, it is perhaps only natural that Lawrence should occasionally 
prove offensive while on the defensive, as it were. Lawrence himself, in 
'Autobiographical Sketch', asserts that the reason for his 'breach' with society 'has 
something to do with class' , and concludes: 
And now 1 know, more or less, why 1 cannot follow in the 
footsteps even of Barrie or of W e l l s ~ ~ who both came from the 
common people also and are both such a success. Now I know 
why 1 cannot rise in the world and become even a little popular 
and rich. 
1 cannot make the transfer from my own class into the 
middle class. I cannot, not for anything in the world, forfeit my 
passional consciousness and myoid blood-affinity with my 
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fellow-men and the animals and the land, for that other thin, 
spurious mental consciousness which is all that is left of the 
mental consciousness once it has made itself exclusive. [25] 
It is doubtful whether Wells ever saw his own success in such a manner, but we need 
not accept this retrospective account unquestioningly to allow that class did play a 
crucial role in the difficulties Lawrence faced as a professional writer. Rather than 
talking of Lawrence's more 'passional' attachment to the 'common people', though, it 
is surely more accurate simply to point out that Lawrence was more 'common' than 
Wells to begin with. Wells might not have come from a wealthy family, but being the 
son of shopkeepers living on the outskirts of London, whose father was also a 
professional cricketer, and whose mother became housekeeper at Uppark country 
house, provided a decidedly different formative environment to that of a collier's son 
in a provincial pit town. Wells's own retrospective biographical writing quite 
definitely asserts - despite Lawrence's view of Wells's origins - his early perception 
of his difference from the 'common people': 'So far as the masses went I was entirely 
of my mother's way of thinking; I was middle-class, - "petty bourgeois" as the 
Marxists have it.' And, furthermore, Wells goes on: 
my conception of a scientifically organized class-less society is 
essentially of an expanded middle-class which has 
incorporated both the aristocrat and plutocrat above and the 
peasant, proletarian and pauper below. [26] 
Much of Wells's work is ingrained with this idea of a progressive middle class 
providing the solution to social contradictions; similarly, a characteristic of 
Lawrence's work is often a variation of the polarisation of class evident m 
'Autobiographical Sketch' (the working class is 'still fairly deep and passionate' but 
'narrow in outlook, in prejudice, and narrow in intelligence'; whereas the middle class 
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is 'charming and educated', but 'broad and shallow and passionless'. [27] Wells sees his 
own class as the resolution to social conflict, whereas Lawrence's class-identity is 
itself fraught with such discord, giving on to a view of the irreconcilableness of social 
contradictions. This contrast perhaps partly explains why much of Wells's 
(particularly later) work lacks the ideological tensions and provisionality so readily 
found in Lawrence's writing, and suggests also the correspondingly fewer difficulties 
that Wells faced in securing a place among London's literary establishment. Indeed, 
m i d d l e ~ c l a s s s Fabian socialism, becoming increasingly influential in contemporary 
literary and intellectual circles, had provided a natural connection for Wells to that 
society; it may also have attracted Lawrence himself, having previously partaken in 
'discussing social problems'[28] at the home of Eastwood socialist Willie Hopkin, and 
subsequently having entered the professional classes as a schoolteacher; but 
Fabianism would not necessarily have established solid foundations upon Lawrence's 
experience as one born into the working class and who, as Williams puts it, 'only by 
hard fighting' could escape 'his function of replacement'.[29] Fabianism's belief in 
leadership by an educated ruling class as best serving the needs of the working class 
(which Wells maintained, despite breaking with the Fabian Society itself)[30] may not 
have wholly convinced someone who had made his own social progress through 
Nottingham University College, professing little but disappointment with his 
middle-class educators.[3}] Lawrence's distrust of middle-class radicalism, however, 
deprived him of one of the few political affiliations with the Labour movement that 
was available to him as a f u l l ~ t i m e e novelist. Thus the issue of class cut him off two 
ways: from the intelligentsia of both Eastwood and London, and from the interests of 
the "common people'. In a sense, therefore, it could even be said that Lawrence's 
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working-class origins pulled him further away from working-class concerns once he 
had begun the 'larger life' of the professional writer. 
But, as we know, it is far from the case that Lawrence's upbringing was 
straightforwardly working-class. His mother had petit-bourgeois aspirations and the 
social status of Lawrence's family was changing as he grew up: his elder brothers 
before him had escaped their father's lifetime of going down the mines - the eldest 
being apprenticed to a picture-framer, the other becoming a successful clerk in 
London; and Lawrence himself was encouraged by his mother through high school 
and college en route to a teaching post in Croydon. And yet such a transfer to the 
'respectable' professions still did not attain the development personally sought by 
Lawrence, that of becoming a writer: it represented a step up the ladder of orthodox 
social discrimination valued by his mother, whereas the profession of novelist and 
poet rather amounted to stepping off it. Lawrence was not simply a working-class 
person who happily found his literary niche with no particular effort, as his later 
autobiographical writings would have us believe;[321 and neither was he simply 
working-class, period. While faced with the very real obstructions to such a person 
who wants to make their living by writing, Lawrence also had to contend with the 
petit-bourgeois values inculcated in him by his mother and consider the option of a 
'respectable' teaching career. Well before he took to writing full-time, his 
class-identity was considerably divided, and in becoming a professional writer and so 
side-stepping easily assignable working-class or middle-class social functions, he 
would find no final answer to the conflicting values of his early life: rather his writing 
would provide a forum in which to represent and refashion these values and 
class-identities in ways which, I will argue, both enriches his work and permeates it 
with the difficulties through which Lawrence had to live. 
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Therefore, to see Lawrence's art in the terms of F .R. Leavis, as an instance 
of 'classless truth' which conveys 'essential humanity ... pure and undeflected' ,[33] is 
wholly inappropriate; it is a neat method with which a critic may purge explicit 
discussion of the real issues of class from his analysis, but misses altogether the 
impossibility of Lawrence - or of anyone who must exist within a stratified industrial 
society - ever so nicely purifying himself. However, Leavis's classless model has been 
challenged by what has now become another, alternative received wisdom which, if 
not rejecting outright, I wish to at least qualify: namely, the view that the younger 
Lawrence, sympathetic to his working-class origins and thereby enabled to produce an 
exceptionally rich depiction of his society, is superseded by a writer whose break with 
his own class, and subsequently with England itself, causes a critical deterioration in 
the later work. There are different ways as to how this break may be formulated: there 
is the reasonable observation that Lawrence did indeed become disillusioned with 
socialist politics and felt increasingly frustrated by English society, prompting his 
departure in November 1919 - although it is a matter for argument whether or not this 
lead to a significant deterioration in his writing; the more explicitly political appraisal 
of this decampment, favoured by critics broadly of the Left, is to view it as some form 
of betrayal of the working class, seeing it as an indication of Lawrence's indifference 
to working-class interests, and in conjunction with the right-wing sentiments that 
Lawrence expressed during the war and throughout the 1920s: and thus, in 
consequence, from the ideological perspective of these critics, Lawrence's work 
suffersY4] Although approaching Lawrence from a left-wing position myself, and 
acknowledging the increasingly right-wing drift of Lawrence's thought from the war 
years onward, I do not see this as necessarily spoiling Lawrence's work - it merely 
presents us with a different set of ideological values with which to engage, that may 
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be, after all, more fruitful in what it tells us about its historical moment, and in its 
significance for us today, than any ossified left-wing polemic. 
And furthermore, there is no systematic, or systemic, replacement of 
left-wing attitudes with ones from the Right: as Michael Bentley comments upon the 
political agenda of Rawdon Lilly in Aaron's Rod (1922): 
It is a square circle, a dictatorship which is not only libertarian 
but which forces the individual to be free without using force. 
In this respect, Tiverton's observation that Lawrence has a 
streak of anarchism is an aperfu worth developing. It has as 
much relevance to Lawrence's utopian visions as his supposed 
'fascism' and adumbration of Auschwitz. [35] 
The fact that Lawrence's thought at most given moments incorporates such streaks of 
conflicting ideology tends to confuse notions of a final, decisive break with 
working-class interests; and a further complication arises when we consider that 
Lawrence's 'life was so patently a succession of crossed thresholds' (Bentley again, 
who goes on to reiterate such decisive moments as the 'arrival of Frieda' and the 
war).[36] Faced with a succession of possible watersheds, the critic may either accept 
the continuing, complicated course of Lawrence's orientation towards the working 
class, or plump for what he considers to be the crucial turning point which occasions a 
deterioration in Lawrence's work. Certain critics have said, or implied, that the seeds 
of destruction were sown as early as Lawrence's leaving for Europe in May 1912. in 
the company of Frieda. Raymond Williams, for example, diagnosing Lawrence's 
critical problem as 'a crisis of separation' ,[37] asserts that the difficulty begins in Sons 
and Lovers (which Lawrence rewrote in Europe in 1912), about halfway through, with 
the 'characterisation of Clara': it has 'a certain functional quality - she is a function in 
the growth of another rather than a person in herself - and this is a world away from 
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all the earlier people' .[38] And 'the crucial problem in Lawrence's later fiction', writes 
Williams, is the extent to which the representation of primary human relationships 
'can be affected by being isolated from a wider and continuing life, to say nothing of 
being abstracted in a more conscious way, or of being as it were theoretically 
composed' )39] Williams view of Clara may be very percipient (much of Clara's 
relationship with the hero Paul Morel probably was written, essentially as new, after 
Lawrence's first 'separation' from England); [40] it is not difficult, however, to see 
Lawrence's incipient break with England in a different, more positive light. True 
enough, it foreshadowed his later, more enduring removal from England,[4I] but this 
does not necessarily indicate his isolation from Williams's 'wider and continuing 
life': it did mean, though, an opportunity to free himself from aspirations to the 
narrowly defined world of literary circles: for, despite Lawrence's dislike of London's 
middle-class literary cliques, his first two novels, The White Peacock (1911) and The 
Trespasser (1912), very consciously adopt an aesthetic style and ostentatious 
literariness typically identified with an 'artistic sensibility' ,[42] and both novels suffer 
in consequence from the dead hand of increasingly stale conventions and a jejune 
pretentiousness. 
Sons and Lovers (1913), in which Lawrence re-acknowledges the 
industrial world and working-class life that were for the most part omitted from the 
earlier novels, perhaps shows the effects of being rewritten at some remove from the 
English literary scene. Lawrence's third novel, rather than producing a world to the 
design of aesthetic ideology, places that aesthetic sensibility in the character of the 
developing artist, Paul Morel, rendering it especially through Paul's relationship with 
Miriam Leivers, and so contextualises both relationship and artistic creed within a 
"wider and continuing life'. Therefore, while it is obviously the case that Sons and 
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Lovers was completed at a material distance from the English working class, it is 
surely more significant to point out its production outside of the bourgeois literary 
world. From the external view of an emigre from that world, Lawrence was able to 
confront and begin to deal with an element of England that had hitherto cramped his 
writing. Lawrence, after all, did not write from Germany that he hated England itself, 
but the 'lot that make up England today' - in particular, the more prim contingent 
among the reading public (see note 41). A short time later, not long before beginning 
the final version of Sons and Lovers, Lawrence again wrote from Icking of his 
revulsion at 'the idea of England' : 
Here, in this tiny savage little place, F[rieda] and I have got 
awfully wild. I loathe the idea of England, and its enervation 
and misty miserable modernness. I don't want to go back to 
town and civilisation. I want to rough it and scramble through, 
free, free .... I feel I've got a mate and I'll fight tooth and claw 
to keep her. She says I'm reverting, but I'm not - I'm only 
coming out wholesome and myself. Say I'm right, and I ought 
to be always common. [43] 
During this period, Frieda received a volley of letters from her husband, Ernest 
Weekley, and his relatives in England, entreating her to leave Lawrence; the crisis 
arrived with Ernest's offer of more generous terms for settling their marriage, without 
divorce or her giving up her children, if she should return to England alone. Such 
circumstances would be reason enough for Lawrence's reluctance to think too much 
about his native country; but perhaps, besides the idea of England, Lawrence's letter 
also signifies his aversion to English ideas, specifically those which he saw as being 
central to England's artistic culture: it is perhaps not too much to construe England's 
'miserable modernness' as suggesting, besides urban life, the urbane, 'modem' 
attitude expressed by, and satirised in, the upper-class characters of Oscar Wilde, Saki 
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et al.: the social elegance, fastidiousness and aristocratic insouciance of the best 
aesthetic sophisticates. In contrast to the 'enervation' and (over-)'civilisation' 
long-identified with such aesthetic types by their critics, Lawrence projects himself in 
an altogether more robust guise: he is 'savage' and 'wild', he will fight 'tooth and 
claw' for his 'mate', he is 'wholesome' and 'common'. This may simply be another 
artistic pose, but circumstances were compelling him to live up to its professed 
independence and resoluteness, and it would feed into his work, enabling him to resist 
slavishly following the mores of what he now saw as a suffocating English literary 
culture: on one side, the stolid gentility of the middle-class readership, and, on the 
other, the writer's equally effete, 'modem' (even if now old-fashioned) aesthetic 
sensibility. And even if this new independence was somewhat curtailed by Edward 
Garnett (reader for Lawrence's publisher, Duckworth) subsequently cutting nearly one 
tenth of Sons and Lovers prior to publication, what remained was still a healthier 
animal than the books before: Paul Morel's final, determined walk towards the 
community of the town illustrates the novel's general determination to engage with 
the realities of life and decay (the town is 'glowing' but with a cold 
'phosphorescence,);[44] this replaces The White Peacock's Cyril Beardsall's detached, 
aesthetic contemplation, and Siegmund's choice of suicide and the role of the tragic 
artist in the death-obsessed The Trespasser. 
A simultaneously more explicit and more crude notion as to the crucial 
development of 1912 is offered by David Craig, who perceives a deficiency in 
Lawrence's representation of society; this 'lack', opines Craig, is a consequence of 
Lawrence's relationship with Frieda: it 'belongs with that childlessness, and that 
social functionlessness of Frieda, whose spoiling effect on his art Leavis defines with 
firm delicacy at one point but tends to forget in his particular critiques' .(45) Besides the 
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familiar readiness of critics to blame the women in Lawrence's life for supposed 
failings in his work (recall Arnold Kettle upon the tragedy of Lawrence having a 
petty-bourgeois mother [note 34]) we may also note a recurring lament for 
Lawrence's failure to measure up to his critics' preferred social and political norms, 
or to deliver a programme for improved social organisation - as if such utilitarian 
considerations are what justifies the artist's business. Thus, quoting Lawrence's 
rejection of the social ideal of 'Fraternite' for the personal ideals of 'Fierte, Inegalite, 
Hostilite' (from a letter, after all, to the aristocratic Ottoline Morrell, whom Lawrence 
was about to meet for the first time and may have wished to gratify),[46) Craig starchily 
asseverates: 'We should feel, I believe, sorry for the man who is so driven to repudiate 
human togetherness. '[47] This reflects much of the condescending superiority which 
literary criticism often assumes in respect to texts that happen to be at odds with the 
ideological norms of the critic. Instead of seeing a 'lack' in Lawrence's view of the 
world, though, why not simply identify a difference, and, rather than summarily 
condemning it, attempt to analyse how and why his understanding of society differs 
from supposedly more legitimate formulations? It is surely more productive to see, in 
what Craig considers to be Lawrence's 'lack' of a normal family unit, a different 
relation to society which allows something different to be articulated about the 
individual's relation to society: something like this is attempted in my chapter upon 
Women in Love, below, which seeks to show how, notwithstanding Lawrence being 
childless with a 'functionless' wife, his novel repeatedly points up the dead end of an 
isolated individualism, even as it tries to make supportable the idea of such an 
alternative to social life. 
But just as the romantic idea of Lawrence, the solitary rebel, holds fast in 
the popular imagination,[48] so is the inverted image of an irremediably alienated, even 
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misanthropic, Lawrence writ deep in supposedly more acute critical perception. 
Generally remaining implicit, it is made emphatically explicit in W.H. Auden's 
account of Lawrence. Remarking that the status of a modem novelist or poet is 
'something between that of a rentier and a gypsy', Auden suggests that 'Lawrence, 
who was self-employed after the age of twenty-six [that is to say, 1912, again], 
belonged to [the City] less than most' )49] But however accurate Auden's portrait of 
the artist in the twentieth century may prove as a self-assessment, it certainly appears 
inadequate as a general appraisal, and so too as concerns the specific case of 
Lawrence: 'He has no frrsthand knowledge of all those involuntary relationships 
created by social, economic and political necessity. Very few artists can be engage 
because life does not engage them' .[50] Since Auden wrote this, of course, Cambridge 
University Press's publication of Lawrence's letters has underlined his 'firsthand 
knowledge' of frequently tortuous and torturous associations imposed by necessity -
his relations with literary agents, editors, publishers and so on; and, similarly, the 
Cambridge Edition of his novels reminds us, by detailing the myriad revisions 
Lawrence made, or allowed to be made, to his work, often in order to ensure its 
commercial viability and thereby his livelihood, of Lawrence's place and function 
within the inevitably social and economic context of the market. It is to be hoped that, 
with such material now readily to hand, Lawrence will be reintegrated with the society 
that he has often been set apart from or left hovering metaphysically above, for, once 
the idea is instilled of an artist not properly belonging to his society, it requires little 
further effort to banish him entirely to the remote region of matters everlasting and 
numinous: 
if, like Lawrence, the only aspects of human beings which you 
care for and value are states of being, timeless moments of 
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passionate intensity, then social and political life, which are 
essentially historical - without a past and a future, human 
society is inconceivable - must be, for you, the worthless 
aspects of human life. You cannot honestly say, 'This kind of 
society is preferable to that,' because, for you, society is 
wholly given over to Satan.£51] 
And so Auden follows a path well trod by critics since. To be fair, though, Auden is at 
least arguing the 'defect' of art that shows a complete disregard for social life, 
whereas the more pervasive critical procedure has been silently to accept Lawrence's 
own recurrent silences concerning politics, economics, class, and so on, as the natural 
consequence of a mind bent on more important, universal matters: hence the paucity 
of writing upon Lawrence's political and ideological significance in comparison to 
that upon his 'philosophy'. 
We need only remind ourselves that Lawrence wrote a relatively 
successful history textbook for schools (Movements in European History [1921]) and, 
in The Plumed Serpent, an account of a revolutionary reconstruction of society, to see 
the inadequacy of such formulations as Auden' s ahistorical, anti-societal Lawrence. It 
is true, nevertheless, that Lawrence's presentation of historical forces and his ideas of 
social organisation are often idiosyncratic, contradictory and confused, and this has 
hamstrung his critical reception by other commentators who would like Lawrence to 
be a political writer but do not like the politics he seems most readily to evince. This 
is most discernible in the disappointment felt by left-wing critics, such as Craig, at 
Lawrence's failure to follow or propagate a socialist programme. Thus, Craig asserts 
that Lawrence, once removed from his native mining town, 'could not conceive of 
there being anything else properly called "community" to take its place'. [52] The 
keyword here is 'properly': it is not the case that Lawrence permanently abandons the 
idea of 'community', but that his conceptions of it simply fail to count. Here, Craig 
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expresses that normative criticism, so close to a priggish puritanism, which assumes 
possession of the 'correct' (although rarely explicated) standards of life, morality, and 
art, and can only shrink away from real critical engagement with such deviants as 
LawrenceY3] Craig's concluding words to his chapter on 'Lawrence and Democracy' 
expose the underlying nub of much that has preceded. The problem with Lawrence is 
his failure 'to ally [his] precious distinctiveness with anything collective', because: 
'Unless the writer can do so, in the age of what has been called mass civilisation, his 
solidarity with his species will be impaired or broken, and his art will suffer. '[54] Age 
of mass civilisation or not, this assertion simply does not ring true: there appears no 
necessary reason why a writer, in order to be successful, must demonstrate his unity 
and common feeling with the rest of humanity: Swift's Gulliver's Travels could be 
said to do just the opposite, but that is a source of its power, not a weakness. Craig's 
final judgment seems a rather mealy-mouthed way of saying that if a writer is not 
socialist then he will produce flawed art. He is again judging Lawrence by a 
normative process which implicitly assumes its legitimacy to prescribe its own 
conceptions of 'solidarity' and the 'species'. On the other hand, Swift, for instance, 
famously made his own defInition of humankind, at odds with the 'animal rationale' 
of his Enlightenment contemporaries, and no more agreeable with the 
humanist-Marxist model of a critic like Craig, and in so doing, believed, after all, to 
have established the better understanding of his species. [55] In a not dissimilar manner, 
Lawrence frequently offers a vision of human beings and human society which is 
bound to upset anyone requiring a benign, humane account of human relationships or, 
in Craig's case, a recognition of the way people 'strive together to change an 
unbearable way of life' .£56] The only option for such a reader is to dispose of the 
offending material directly. as Craig does with Lawrence's anti-collectivist position, 
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without apparently considering that evidence for Lawrence's 'solidarity with his 
species' may lie in his very disgust for the 'mass civilisation' (or, as Lawrence might 
have said, the 'mob-civilisation') of industrial-capitalist society. As for Auden, he can 
recognise Lawrence as 'the greatest master who ever lived' in his capacity as 'an 
analyst and portrayer of the forces of hatred and aggression', though only by 
adjudging him to be a misanthrope: 
about human affection and human charity, for example, he 
knew absolutely nothing. The truth is that he detested nearly 
all human beings if he had to be in close contact with them; his 
ideas of what a human relationship, between man and man or 
man and woman, ought to be are pure daydreams because they 
are not based upon any experience of actual relationships 
which might be improved or corrected. [57] 
So it is that a writer, pitied by others for his intense but supposedly 
artistically detrimental relationships with his mother and wife, may also be confirmed 
as having no real relationships whatsoever - that is, relationships approved by Auden 
as assisting in our edification. It may be, for Auden' s Lawrence, that 'society is 
wholly given over to Satan' ,[58] but this is largely because, like Craig's, Auden's 
criticism is itself given over to normative judgments which tend to berate texts for 
what they are not, rather than appraise them for what they are: it discards what 
Lawrence does say about society and human relationships because this fails to match 
the critic's idea of society and is therefore rendered invalid. But a writer who may be 
deeply pessimistic as to what society potentially offers, and who may even try to keep 
it at a distance, nevertheless still belongs to society in some way, and recognising that 
relation may help to explain the way that the world is represented in his work. And 
while much of Lawrence's work is non-socialist, even anti-societal, in its various 
advocacy of libertarianism, neo-aristocracy, and separatist colonies in a period of 
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oppressive monopoly capitalism, it offers much that should be of interest to any 
criticism interested in the interrelationship of art and wider society, not least socialist 
criticism. If we accept Lawrence's writings for what they are, in their own historical 
moment, as well as asking what we can make of them that is meaningful to us today, 
then we may go some way towards extricating Lawrence criticism from the impasse 
of a left-wing criticism which baulks at Lawrence's attitude to society and a liberal 
humanism (unlike Auden's) that is usually happiest to gut Lawrence of his frequently 
illiberal, inhumane moments. 
Although Craig and Auden are by no means considered major authorities 
on Lawrence, they are representative of a broad consensus that has cast Lawrence in 
the role of societal alien, whether in the form of heroic rebel or embittered pariah. 
Paul Delany's vivid biographical account of Lawrence during 1914-18 draws upon 
both of these elements, the latter progressively prevailing over the former until, at the 
end of the war, 'those who four years before had acclaimed Lawrence as a genius now 
dismissed him ... as a gull and a crank. Lawrence, for his part, would willingly have 
dismissed all his countrymen. '[59) In Delany's opinion, Lawrence's debilitating 
division with English society ('his deracination after 1912,Y60) is critically exacerbated 
by the savagery of the war: 
As the level of violence and ruthlessness at the front increased 
from month to month, so did Lawrence's expressions of hatred 
for mankind, and even for many of his acquaintances, rise to a 
higher and higher pitch. (61) 
Delany's recounting of this period of Lawrence's life serves to outline his many shifts 
in perspective during this time, particularly illuminating the 'radical break between 
The Rainbow and Women in Love,;(62) but there is also the suggestion of an even more 
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significant break between the general quality of Lawrence's earlier work and that of 
the post-war writer: 
[Lawrence] had already begun to slough off his English origins 
before the war; but what started as a positive project of sexual 
and cultural emancipation degenerated, in the bitterness of the 
war years, into a savage hacking at his own roots. 1 disagree 
with much of F .R. Leavis' s interpretation of Lawrence, but 
share his regret that Lawrence's quarrel with England should 
have led him to a posture of contemptuous dismissal; and 1 
cannot help feeling that Lawrence's artistic achievement might 
have been greater, and more useful to his successors, if that 
dismissal had been less harsh and complete. [63] 
Just as 1 am unconvinced by the view of Lawrence's general forsaking of 
society, 1 disagree too as to the conclusiveness of this break with England - it is never 
so simple to eliminate entirely one's social and cultural origins (as Lawrence wrote in 
1922, 'I feel England has insulted me, and 1 stomach that feeling badly. Pero, son' 
sempre inglese [But, I am always English],);[64] and just how 'harsh and complete' a 
rejection is it which involves Lawrence returning to England (if infrequently in real 
life) habitually in his work? It is a plain fact that many of the essays and articles, 
together with a significant proportion of the characters and, to a lesser extent, the 
settings of the fiction after 1918, are drawn from and relate to England. Presumably, if 
Lawrence had written more about English people living in England, he would now be 
disparaged for having too narrow a scope. It must be said, though, that the common 
complaint about Lawrence's later work is not so much with the quantity of its 
'English' material, as with the quality of its representations of England and of society 
generally (although, similarly common, critical antipathy rarely elaborates beyond 
bare statements as to the work's right-wing drift, or to its increasingly attenuated view 
of social life ). Yet, while acerbically condemning certain elements of Englishness, it 
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seems evident to me that, for example, such poems as 'The English are so Nice!' and 
'Innocent England' (both written in 1929) equally suggest Lawrence's lasting 
connection to wider society, his inevitable commitment to it as a professional artist 
who needs a market for his work. During this time, the social authorities were busier 
than ever in preventing the transmission of this work due to their deeming it to be 
neither 'nice' nor 'innocent' (in 1928 there were several attempts to seize the 
supposedly indecent Lady Chatterley's Lover; in 1929 the typescript of the poetry 
collection, Pansies, was impounded and an exhibition of his paintings was raided by 
the police). Lawrence's immediate riposte through yet more work surely points to it 
being the case that society, as represented by the 'beastly bourgeois' ,[65] was turning its 
back on Lawrence, rather than it being he who was abandoning society. And if 
Lawrence had been more 'loyal' to his English roots, we may again presume, he 
might now be condemned all the more as obnoxiously right-wing. It is Delany and 
other critics who presume the most, however, shooting in the dark as to Lawrence's 
unfulfilled potential, what his 'artistic achievement might have been', if only he had 
not quarrelled with England, socialism, or any number of factors through which and 
against which his thought was after all shaped. 
The truth of the matter is that the Lawrence which we do have is, in the 
first instance, the writer of The Plumed Serpent just as much as he is the author of 
Sons and Lovers, and, second, through criticism, 'Lawrence' becomes what we 
choose to make of this material - and criticism which tends to see it largely as a 
corruption of an ideal Lawrence that never existed is unlikely to make much of it 
whatsoever. The period covered by Delany's account precludes any detailed 
consideration of the late work, but his implication that an increasingly deracinated 
Lawrence fell short of his earlier promise seems to me problematical. Lawrence's very 
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expression of his most profound social p e s s i m i s m ~ ~ Women in Love, is, as Delany 
acknowledges, 'probably his greatest novel' ;[66J and while it is true that Lawrence's 
ambivalent feelings for England and humanity in general posed real difficulties for his 
later work, such problems often create tensional energies which those dead retreads of 
English literariness, The White Peacock and The Trespasser, almost entirely lack. 
Anyone wishing to complain of the representation of politics in Kangaroo, for 
instance, should glance beforehand at the use of socialism and conservatism in 
Lawrence's fIrSt novel. In The White Peacock, with George Saxton's flirtation with 
socialist activism and the desultorily recorded progress of Leslie Tempest becoming a 
Tory MP, political loyalties function little more than to characterise and polarise the 
rival suitors of the heroine, Lettie Beardsall. George's and Leslie's political 
opposition is incidental to their more fundamental contest for Lettie's attentions. In 
agreement with her own judgment, the novel suggests that Lettie is 'the only real 
thing' and politics are merely 'frivolous' .£67] Such marginalisation of overt politics 
may seem attractive to a reader appalled by Kangaroo's sympathies with the fascistic 
'Diggers', and George and Leslie may appear no more crude approximations of 
political beings than Kangaroo's Willie Struthers, into whose otherwise vacuous 
character the novel's socialist alternative is somewhat shoehorned. Yet, in contrast to 
The White Peacock, Kangaroo shows rival political creeds themselves (or, at least, 
Lawrence's understanding of them), through the nominal characters of Benjamin 
Cooley and Struthers, competing for the allegiance of the hero, Somers; rather than, 
and indeed at the expense of, the actual characters, the novel's protagonist is the 
ideological black hole which engulfs Somers, its antagonists the political and spiritual 
ideologies that futilely attempt to fill the void. Lawrence is prepared to deal with 
politics of a disturbing content and, complementarily, presents them in an unsettling 
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form: political ideologies appear, despite all the entreaties to be 'mates', stripped of 
the typical humanising packaging with which they usually facilitate their 
consumption, their more problematic features not enveloped and obscured in the 
construction of 'well-rounded' characters: in this much, Kangaroo does just the 
opposite of The White Peacock, in which conservatism and socialism are merely 
tagged on to Leslie and George - politics themselves reduced to ornaments of 
characterisation, as superficial as Lettie's 'Woman's League' badge, which may be 
worn or discarded at her convenience. [68] Similarly, any critic who, attesting to the 
superiority of the earlier Lawrence, complains of the various forms of oppression at 
work within The Plumed Serpent, should be reminded of The Trespasser's 
preoccupation with death: whereas the later novel's underlying threat of violence 
exists in tandem with the impulse to create a new and more vigorous society, 
oppression in the earlier novel merely takes the form of the hero's morbid 
self-obsession and gradual self-corrosion. 
Delany's suggestion of a crucial break in the quality of Lawrence's work 
reproduces a long-standing and pervasive attitude in Lawrence criticism, whose 
commendation of certain texts coincides with an attempt to bury others: a process 
which, in effect, seeks to distinguish the 'good' Lawrence whom we should revere 
from the 'bad' Lawrence whom we should revile or, more to the purposes of 
'favourable' critics, conveniently forget. (I should stress that my own censure of 
elements in Lawrence's first two novels, above, by no means indicates my assent to 
their critical neglect.) While I hope to show that such critical bifurcations of 
Lawrence's work tend to miss its rich complexities (besides often shaping a startlingly 
reduced Lawrentian canon), the predilection for a simplifying division is readily 
understandable. One reason why Lawrence appeals to such a diverse readership seems 
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to be his endless contradictions and the multifarious responses his work is able to 
elicit; but individually we feel a need to impose some order upon this hotchpotch, to 
'make sense' of it, to render its mutability satisfyingly stable and personally coherent. 
Katherine Mansfield felt such was necessary when formulating the man himself, 
describing, during a rapprochement with Lawrence, how: 
For me, at least, the dove brooded over him too. I loved him: 
He was just his old merry, rich self, laughing, ... -We simply 
did not talk about people. We kept to things like nuts and 
cowslips & fIres in woods, and his black self was not. [69] 
As for criticism though, or, at least, for criticism which aspires beyond the limitations 
of assessing Lawrence's work by how closely it approximates the qualities of a 
personable companion, such contrary qualities are too intricately connected for their 
extrication to be practical or useful. The antagonism to the industrial-capitalist world, 
for example, which sees Paul and Clara lamenting the ugliness of Nottingham in Sons 
and Lovers, and which has Ursula vociferating against the brutality of the collieries in 
The Rainbow, remains an essential factor in The Plumed Serpent and Lady 
Chatterley's Lover, albeit delivered at a pitch which has antagonised many a reader 
too. Put crudely, the 'bad' Lawrence is the necessary price paid for the 'good' 
Lawrence; and this is nowhere more apparent than in Women in Love, where, I will 
argue later, its alienated and occasionally misanthropic ideology allows a radical 
criticism of society's mean destructiveness and a debunking of those ideologies 
implicated in the murder on the Western Front. 
We have seen this type of paradox above, in the discrepancy between 
Lawrence's empathy with the Bavarian soldiers in 'With the Guns', and his hostility 
to British industrial labour during the war; and it is again apparent in his attitude to 
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the ending of the war. As Delany summarises: 'Lawrence, characteristically, refused 
either to celebrate with the victors or to commiserate with the vanquished. '[70J Here, it 
would seem, is ample testimony to Lawrence's detachment from society, his complete 
aloofness to the emotional and psychological impact of the Armistice, whether upon 
his countrymen or his German wife. And yet, this lack of sympathy belies a 
penetrative understanding of how society can dupe itself - or, put in non-Lawrentian 
terms, how dominant ideologies control national behaviour. Like many opponents of 
the war, Lawrence saw little reason for celebration after a pointless slaughter, and, 
unlike H.G. Wells and many others, he had never believed this was 'The War That 
Will End War':[71J by the end of October 1918 he could write, 'I feel as if this war 
were [near?]ly over' ,[72] but he had determined long before that, whoever were the 
victors, 'I don't care either way, now. It is when this affair is over we must do 
something. '[73J Of course, it is the perceived omission of Lawrence to do this 
'something' which has above all contributed to the notion of his giving up on a 
society 'wholly given over to Satan';[74J but such a suggestion of Lawrence's active 
wish to sever social connections is discounted when seen as a misleading 
simplification of the very circumstances identified and problematised by Kangaroo. 
This novel, although expressing the desire to escape society, nonetheless shows the 
self-destructive futility of attempting to do so. After Somers is finally extricated from 
the Diggers' fascism and Australian socialism, he finds there is nothing to do but to 
say 'farewell'[75J to Australia and, potentially, to all future social congress: for 
although Somers sails for America, we are forewarned of his status as a perpetual 
vagabond, who, without spiritual or ideological commitment to the world outside his 
marriage, will be cast ashore as human jetsam: 'To America - the United States, a 
country that did not attract him at all, but which seemed to lie next in his line of 
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destiny .... People mattered so little. People hardly mattered at all. '[76] This promises 
no resolution to Somers's crisis, however - on the contrary, it is such reluctance to 
commit himself, either to place or people, that has blighted Somers's inchoate 
friendships, plagued his marriage, and left him at sea politically throughout the novel. 
It is certainly true that Lawrence's own entrenched individualism, and 
later scepticism of overtly political revolutionary ideologies, restricted his 
participation in organisations which sought to remedy the social malaise he 
diagnosed. Even so, it is one of my contentions that his articulation of the only 
ideology which seemed available to him, namely right-wing libertarianism, in fact 
provides for a much more rigorous interrogation of industrial-capitalist society than 
might be supposed of an ideology which was itself a formative element of that world. 
This will not, though, mean the passive and wholesale consumption of such ideology, 
nor entail crediting Lawrence's explicit politics with a shrewdness they rarely possess; 
rather, my interest in this study is less with Lawrence, the man we no longer have, as 
with 'Lawrence', the textual body which we do, and with subjecting it to a critical 
reprocessing that may, besides establishing its historical significance, avoid slipping 
into mere antiquarianism by ascertaining the interest and importance of 'Lawrence' 
for us today. 
Indeed, a concern with Lawrence as our contemporary is made all the 
more compelling by the weight of previous cultural and political reprocessings: the 
texts are hardly knowable 'as themselves', but arrive before us marinated in earlier 
interpretations. Any sense of a 'real', 'original' Lawrence is lost amongst a frequently 
bewildering inheritance of derivatives. John Middleton Murry's arraignment of 
Lawrence as 'the outlaw of modem English Literature,[77] supplies an apt appellation 
for the persona that emerges from many subsequent assessments. These have, on one 
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hand, denounced Lawrence according to the orthodoxy of the time: thus, in 1929, 
Wyndham Lewis could give no better expression of his distaste for Lawrence than in 
designating him as a 'natural communist and a born feminist' ,£78] while, by 1948, 
Lawrence's one-time friend (and one-time fascist), Cecil Gray, found it more 
appropriate to condemn him as a 'potential Hitler';[79] on the other hand, Lawrence's 
outlaw status was precisely the reason for his popular celebration by the dropout 
culture of the 1960s, raising a toast to 'ole D.H. Lawrence' along with Jack 
Nicholson's lawbreaking lawyer in the film, Easy Rider;[80] and the most prevalent 
academic defence of Lawrence, that of Leavis' s construction of an essentially liberal 
writer of the moral mainstream, in fact only defends the favourable front of Lawrence 
as a critic of oppressive industrialism, and has largely to banish Lawrence's sexism 
and authoritarian impulses from the field of critical engagement. 
Arguments as to whether or not Lawrence is a social-outsider, or whether 
that outsider-status is indicative of his social degeneracy or of some romantic 
adventure, suggest the final recalcitrance of the Lawrence corpus for much 
conservative and liberal criticism; they perhaps point to the very contradictoriness 
which, presumably, might be handled with least qualms by Marxist critics, who 
recognise the fundamental contradictions of the industrial-capitalist society which 
produced Lawrence. However, materialist criticism, along with the insights it has 
provided into the conflicting impulses within Lawrence's work, has often followed 
the crude but expedient splitting of Lawrence into 'good' and 'bad' categories. Terry 
Eagleton has remarked how, in Leavis, 'extreme right-wing features which Lawrence 
shared with Eliot and Pound - a raging contempt for liberal and democratic values, a 
slavish submission to impersonal authority - were more or less edited OUt';[81] yet 
Eagleton himself is not beyond suasive selectivity when constructing a 
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complementarily reductive, rightist Lawrence, as in Criticism and Ideology, where his 
proto-fascist writer proves a fiasco at least equal to that of Leavis' s liberal version. [82] 
In fact, materialist criticism has frequently edited Lawrence as severely as 
Leavis did, developing two contrasting Lawrentian canons. Generally, texts of the 
1920s, after Women in Love, have predominantly formed the corpus for critics who 
adjudge Lawrence a political failure, whether or not an outright fascist. Not entirely 
uncompelled by the unavailability of sundry earlier texts, leftist critics of the 1930s 
particularly emphasise the later work. [83] One of the less grotesque summations of 
Lawrence advanced from this quarter provides an early example of the notion of a 
crucial break in Lawrence's work, discussed previously: 
after the brilliant beginning of 'Sons and Lovers' and 'The 
Rainbow,' he abandoned novel writing altogether for those 
strange, beautiful and mystical poems in prose which are the 
bulk of his stories and tales. Here are no men and women of 
flesh and blood, but simply moods. Compare, for example, 
'The Rainbow' with its deplorable sequel 'Women in Love.' 
Who would ever believe that the abstractions of the latter 
novel had any relation at all to the passionate sisters in the first 
book? ... Something happened to Lawrence after writing 'The 
Rainbow' which completely destroyed his creative ability.[84] 
This formulation has been essentially repeated by much leftist criticism since, which 
has tended to invert the canon favoured by many critics of the 1930s in an attempt to 
reclaim a Lawrence more conducive to working-class interests (or, perhaps, to the 
interests of left-wing literary critics): predominantly focusing upon earlier texts, up to 
and including Women in Love, later novels, such as Aaron's Rod, Kangaroo and The 
Plumed Serpent, tend merely to be mentioned when summary condemnations of 
Lawrence" s supposedly sinister side are required. [85] The consequence, though, is a 
reduction both of 'Lawrence' and of the potential of socialist criticism. 
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Central to such criticism in Great Britain is Raymond Williams, whose 
writing upon Lawrence largely predates his conversion to Marxism, marked by 
Marxism and Literature (1977).[86] Much of the earlier work remains constrained by a 
Leavisite heritage of humanist ideology and the notion of Lawrence, if not as 'a 
recorder of essential English history' ,[87] then still as an essentially 'English 
novelist';[88] thus The Rainbow and Women in Love remain canonical centrepieces, 
which Williams then sandwiches between Sons and Lovers and Lady Chatterley'S 
Lover. Graham Holderness's valuable book-length study, D.H Lawrence: History, 
Ideology and Fiction, roughly follows the Leavis-Williams template in concentrating 
upon 'the essential novels' 'which directly address [Lawrence's] native society'[89] -
what amounts to another essentially English Lawrence. To his credit, Holderness 
provides uncommonly substantial and illuminating accounts of The White Peacock 
and The Trespasser, before his subsequent trajectory pursues that of Williams's The 
English Novel, dealing with Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow, and fmding in Women 
in Love, as Williams puts it, 'a kind of conclusion' [90] (although not the actual 
'conclusion', Holderness's analysis of Women in Love forms his book's last extensive 
section, which contextualises the novel in light of the war that precipitated 
Lawrence's departure from England). After this, neither Williams nor Holderness 
discusses the other works, bar Lady Chatterley's Lover. In this novel, Williams sees 
Lawrence resuming what 'he never quite finished in Women in Love',[9I] a sort of 
postscript to Lawrence's social philosophy and, so too, to Williams's a c c o u n t ~ ~
Holderness similarly uses Lady Chatterley's Lover as a brief epilogue. Of the 
intervening novels, Williams's essay makes only the general comment that they are 
'willed and abstract';[92] Holderness only explicitly (and briefly) refers to The Lost 
Girl, remarking on its Forster-like detachment.[93] Much the same sequence operates in 
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Eagleton's chapter on Lawrence in Exiles and Emigres: the recognition of the 
achievements of Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow is followed by acknowledgement 
of the significance of Women in Love, notwithstanding its 'often wild disproportion 
between event and response, public culture and private experience'.[94] (Compare 
Williams on Women in Love as 'a radical simplification of the novel' in its 
'concentration on isolated relationships [and] the dropping of other people and of the 
texture of ordinary life as irrelevant';[95] and Holderness's view that, instead of 
focusing 'on a tragic struggle between working class and bourgeoisie ... the novel opts 
for the simpler ... tragedy of entrepreneurial capitalism'. )[96] And again, with no room 
to discuss what we are told is the 'frustrated exploration' of the years in between, 
Eagleton deals with the fag end that is Lady Chatterley's Lover.[97] It is intriguing as to 
why a study of 'emigres' so completely ignores The Lost Girl, Aaron's Rod, 
Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent, all of which were written by an expatriate and 
feature central characters in similar circumstances. The suggestion that, like 
Holderness, Eagleton is concerned with those works 'which directly address 
[Lawrence's] native society', is as unsatisfactory as it is in accounting for 
Holderness's omissions, considering that The Lost Girl, Aaron's Rod, and Kangaroo 
all contain, however obliquely or fragmentarily, commentary upon England which is 
surely significant in itself, besides possibly better illuminating the development of 
Lawrence's responses to England in Lady Chatterley's Lover. 
An explanation for these lacunae can be found, perhaps, in Williams's and 
Holderness's tendency to favour socially realist fonns: Sons and Lovers is a strong 
favourite for its 'reality of community' (Williams), [98] and 'the realist method [in 
which] Lawrence reaches an understanding of that ideology of individualism which 
becomes dominant (and damaging) in The Rainbow and Women in Love' 
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(Holderness); [99] hence, possibly, their disinclination for more 'experimental' 
adumbrations of society, such as those found in Kangaroo or The Plumed Serpent. As 
for Eagleton, although he professes that it 'is not a question of "social realism" 
against "symbolism'" , he rather imitates Williams and Holderness when he disfavours 
Women in Love for its 'pervasive thinness of social texture'; complains that it 
represents 'society' only in 'the vague, abstracted, flippant or earnest philosophising 
of a self-consciously lost generation'; and remarks, 'the sense of an objective world 
existing in its own substantial terms, is now almost entirely lacking' .[100] This seems a 
somewhat pro-realist argument for adjudging the novel 'decidedly inferior to both 
Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow' .[lOI] And it is a very surprising judgment, because 
Eagleton's thesis is that the war years and sense of imminent social disintegration 
spurred writers such as Lawrence to capture that decay, and Women in Love seems so 
much more about that breakdown, and a product of it, than either The Rainbow or 
Sons and Lovers (written before the war, anyway).lI02] Eagleton's antipathy for Women 
in Love's 'abstracted' quality corresponds with Williams's dismissal of the 
succeeding novels as 'willed and abstract', and with Holderness's attenuated interest 
in the native society of The Lost Girl, described from the viewpoint, 'not ... of a 
participant, but of an observer. '[103] The fact that similar preferences are at work in the 
above assessment from the 1930s, expressing distaste at Women in Love's substitution 
of 'abstractions' for The Rainbow's 'passionate sisters', suggests how long-standing 
are the difficulties which leftist critics have had with Lawrence's cooler, socially 
splintered works.[l04] Replacing Leavis's canonisation of those works which 
supposedly manifest his arbitrary concept of 'Life', these critics canonise Lawrence's 
works according to an arbitrarily realist representation of 'society', and marginalise 
the more oblique societal presences and insouciant social observation. 
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This is not to say that my own study aims to make a contrasting claim as 
to the superior value of such 'modernist' works. Rather, I wish to reintegrate the 
alternative 'good' and 'bad' Lawrences, and attempt to show how the 'bad', socially 
dislocated works may be seen to produce meaningful commentary upon their 
historical world and ours today, and this involves taking into account their different 
conditions of production to that of the more accepted work. However, while 
acknowledging the difficulties posed to Lawrence's work by his geographical and 
ideological displacement from Eastwood, I hope to challenge the implication of much 
materialist criticism that, as Lawrence's removal from an immediate English 
working-class milieu is consolidated, the texts decline in quality. At the same time, I 
wish to retrieve a version of Lawrence distinct from liberal-humanist 'Lawrentian' 
constructions, and this will inevitably entail building upon the valuable foundations 
provided by Williams, Eagleton and Holderness. I am also keen to follow on from 
politically-minded criticism which has previously sought to reassess much of the 
conventionally disregarded material, such as, for example, Rick Rylance's reading of 
Kangaroo as 'a self-interrogating work, exploring the limits of its own argument even 
as it advances it' . [105] My own approach to emphasising Lawrence's 
self-interrogations, as well as to exposing the works' self-deceptions, attempts to 
combine a decidedly non-Lawrentian ideological standpoint - one which is of a piece 
with the broad range of socialist, materialist criticism - with a procedure of close 
reading which keeps the explicit object of criticism firmly under the critical gaze. (It 
may be ventured that, for instance, in his, nevertheless illuminating, historical account 
of Women in Love, Holderness does in fact lose his critical object beyond bits of one 
chapter, 'The Industrial Magnate' Y06]) It is hoped that a formalist concern with 
deconstructing the literary devices and functions of Lawrence's texts, complemented 
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by the texts' reconstruction with reference to their historical context and comparable 
texts by others, will respectively help avoid critical culs-de-sac such as asserting 
Lawrence's fascism, or reiterating Lawrence's own view of the world as a supposed 
exegesis of his work. 
The poverty of the debate concerning Lawrence's fascist tendencies is 
evident in the way critics resort to suggesting Lawrence's potential fascism - he is 
Eagleton's quasi-fascist, or a 'proto-fascist' l107] - instead of straightforwardly 
accepting that, fmally, Lawrence was not a fascist. Another critic, who still more 
cautiously suggests that elements of The Plumed Serpent 'seem commensurate with 
certain manifestations of fascism' P08] indirectly illustrates the non-productivity of 
much of the concern with Lawrence's 'fascism'. Peter Scheckner outlines the 
orthodox case against Lawrence that, in the so-called 'leadership' novels, characters 
such as Rawdon Lilly (Aaron's Rod), Benjamin Cooley (Kangaroo), and Don Ramon 
and Cipriano (The Plumed Serpent), who are accorded some measure of respect and 
sympathy, are in some ways fascistic - in their distrust of freedom for the masses, 
their averring the need for ll-Duce-style social control, and so on. We are also 
presented with the now conventional defence, that this line of thought is challenged 
within the text, particularly by other characters: 
Aaron is not convinced by Lilly's insistence that most men 
must submit to 'some greater soul than theirs.' Somers recoils 
from submitting to Kangaroo, and Kate Leslie ... is very 
cautious about her marriage to Cipriano; she is equally 
tentative about her association to Cipriano's nationalist 
movement. ... Except for Kate Leslie, who stays for the time 
being in Mexico, the protagonists of Aaron's Rod and 
Kangaroo find themselves tom between the desire to belong 
and the desire to be free from social commitment. Like many 
of Lawrence's heroes, they have little choice but to move on. 
The leadership novels reveal a strong attraction for and a deep 
41 
mistrust of 'the leader who IS a star of the new, natural 
Noblesse.' (92)[109] 
However, while this effectively detects a source of the texts' richness in their 
ideological tensions, it seems to miss anything of great import: it is fine in so far as it 
goes, but then it does not go very far. The main question should not be whether the 
leaders are accepted, or whether the texts are delivered from fascism by the scepticism 
of their protagonists; because, in fact, the texts' resistance to fascism is itself 
symptomatic of their greatest political crux: they only shy away from fascism in the 
same way they seem to do, generally, from socio-political forms of most kinds. The 
issue of Lawrence and fascism is a paltry affix to the more substantial matter of this 
political impasse. It is a sense of social and political breakdown, and the extent to 
which something may be retrieved from this, that is of essential concern to these 
works, with the notion of leadership offering one way of exploring the problem. The 
justification of these novels on the grounds that they are not fascist, and are therefore 
unobjectionable, is not dissimilar to today's political posturing which, keen to make 
capital of the continued spectre of fascism, declares something or somebody not 
fascist, or better still anti-Nazi/fascist, as if at once declaring the essential political 
health of the subject, and so discouraging closer inspection. In a similar way, if less 
intentionally and cynically, Scheckner's type of argument avoids either getting to the 
marrow of Lawrence's politics or exposing any political hollowness. 
The impenetrability, for much criticism, of Lawrence's politics and 
ideology has been further preserved by a second critical befogging, again illustrated 
by Scheckner. Approaching Lawrence's fiction through an often uncritical 
P
reciation of the non-fictional writings, or his · philosophy' , writing about Lawrence 
ap . 
may easily fall into a Lawrentian echo of the original. It must be pointed out that 
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Scheckner's Class, Politics, and the Individual is a generally commendable attempt to 
stress the importance for Lawrence's work of his attitudes to the working class, and to 
examine the nature of the work's involvement with, and disengagement from, politics, 
which previously had been so overlooked. Scheckner is by no means a categorical 
Lawrentian, and certainly is not averse to pointing out Lawrence's somewhat skewed 
representation of historical events, as, for example, in the depiction of the colliers in 
Women in Love and their satisfaction in their submission to industrial capitalism; yet 
neither does he succumb to crudely condemning Lawrence for 'failing' to portray 
historical reality. As Scheckner explains: 
The point is not the historical accuracy of the [colliers' 
submission] - it is almost the opposite of what actually 
occurred in England during the composition of the novel, 
particularly among the mining unions - but that it was an 
inevitable outgrowth of Lawrence's social outlook at the time. 
(65) 
Indeed, to be entirely fair to Scheckner, it also must be said that he more or less 
explicitly acknowledges his work as primarily descriptive; it is an account which 
purportedly 'traces the presence and development of class in Lawrence' (13) - an 
exploratory exercise rather than a fully analytical exegesis, and as such, perhaps, it 
will inevitably repeat Lawrence on occasion, rather than reproduce him in a new 
context that interrogates his self-representation. 
However, even allowing for all this, Scheckner's account still too often 
appears to become enveloped in Lawrence's view of the world. When, for example, 
Scheckner writes of Lawrence's 'desire to escape the ... mindlessness of his own 
class' (76). there is very little way of ascertaining whether this reflects Scheckner's 
own opinion of the psychology of the English working class or, in fact, refers to 
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Lawrence's later ideas about it. Admittedly, it might be awkward for Scheckner, if not 
exasperating for the reader, to tag every such statement with an 'as Lawrence saw it' 
or an 'according to Lawrence'. But the reason why this ambiguity arises so frequently 
is the lack of a sustained critical perspective detached from Lawrentian discourse, be 
it supplied by an examination of the historical or biographical contexts of that 
discourse, by comparative readings of contiguous texts, ideological difference, or 
whatever; without some such critical foothold it is all too easy to slip into a 
quasi-Lawrentian position where Lawrence becomes the presiding authority on issues 
of class, society, politics and everything, by virtue of the absence of any other 
authority. So, for example, to explicate Lawrence's depiction of the mining 
community in Sons and Lovers, Scheckner enlists another account by Lawrence of the 
'same' community from the essay, 'Nottingham and the Mining Countryside' (written 
in 1929): 
Both in the essay and in the novel, Nottinghamshire is 'a queer 
jumble of old England and the new .... Life was a curious cross 
between industrialism and the old agricultural England of 
Shakespeare and Milton and Fielding and George Eliot.' 
(27)[110] 
There is no suggestion of any problems involved in substituting the words of an 
essayist and long-standing emigrant from the place he describes for the account of a 
novelist who is still relatively familiar with it. Neither does Scheckner venture to 
expand upon what Lawrence might mean by the 'England of Shakespeare' or that of 
George Eliot. In fact, both Lawrence and Scheckner presume historical continuities 
and harmonies, here, which are highly questionable. Besides the matter of whether an 
'England of Shakespeare' has ever existed outside of Shakespeare, there is 
Lawrence's dubious conflation of this late-feudal world with Eliot's rural community 
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after the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Similarly, Scheckner neglects crucial 
changes and developments in Lawrence's life between the writing of Sons and Lovers 
and 'Nottingham and the Mining Countryside', not least ideological transformations 
stemming from his protracted dissociation from his native colliery community; and 
these changes are evident in the more abstracted, idealised account of the colliers, for 
example, in the later essay - serving to undermine assertions of all but the most 
superficial similarities between the two texts. 
But even if, as Scheckner supposes, there are fundamental symmetries 
with Sons and Lovers, then what added significance to the novel is supplied by a 
reading of 'Nottingham and the Mining Countryside'? 'In this essay,' writes 
Scheckner, 'Lawrence proves the superficiality of separating out the book's multiple 
personal conflicts from the turn-of-the-century mining world in which the Morel 
family is a virtual prisoner' (27). It may be remarked, firstly, that we do not need the 
essay in order to establish the evident connection of personal and social contexts in 
the novel; and secondly, that it is more obviously the case that Scheckner 'proves' the 
critical persistence of blurring distinctions between the literary category of non-fiction 
and the epistemological notion of 'fact'. This is not to say that Scheckner simply takes 
the essay to be 'true' history - on the contrary, he does his best to signal its subjective 
nature and to distinguish it from his own discourse by the method of using 'according 
to Lawrence', mentioned above'p lIJ However, because Scheckner does not often 
directly challenge Lawrence, but rather allows him generous quotations to speak for 
himself, Lawrence's non-fiction nevertheless attains a somewhat privileged status by 
default, as the nearest thing to a touchstone for validating the fiction. Consequently, 
Scheckner's own discourse cannot, after all, avoid becoming beholden to that of 
Lawrence. When, for example, Scheckner quotes from 'Nottingham and the Mining 
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Countryside' upon the perceived differences between, on the one hand, the colliers' 
spontaneous physicality and natural instinct and, on the other hand, their wives' 
'nagging materialism' and concern with social etiquette (28, 29),[112] he sums up thus: 
'As industrialism began to pull their lives apart, the men clung to what they knew best 
and what, for them, had some sort of passion' (29) - that is, Scheckner goes on to say, 
they clung to work. This assimilation of Lawrentian social theory and 'passional' 
vocabulary may seem innocuous enough, here, as a brief paraphrase. But then, after 
quoting the description of Walter Morel's contentment in performing small tasks of 
repair at home,[I13] Scheckner declares: 'The women could share in none of this, and 
the result is that every male-female relationship in Sons and Lovers is marked by this 
disjointedness' (29). The first clause carries the assured conclusiveness of a statement 
offact, and, sure enough, the 'women' referred to, who may initially be thought to be 
those in the novel, would seem to be those of mining communities in 'reality'. But 
just how has this apparent social fact been established? Its authority actually rests 
upon nothing more than similarities between essay and novel. The essay is presented 
as a tool for understanding society in the novel, while, reciprocally, society in the 
novel appears to confirm the truth of what is said in the essay. Scheckner, 
consequently, is caught between these two texts, constrained to follow their 
symmetries. The result is both to overstate the homogeneity of Lawrence's works and 
to confuse texts which contest history with texts that have actually been contested by 
the criteria of historical discourse. Whether or not the texts are, in fact, historically 
'accurate' in their depictions of industrial society and gender differences is another 
matter; but my point here is the unquestioning way in which eminently questionable 
ideas become established through their repeated citation. 
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Indeed, having accepted such typically binary Lawrentian schemata of 
male/female, natural physicality/societal consciousness, the critic's guard is dropped 
to propositions even more contentious. We are told soon afterwards, for instance, that 
a 'mind-body dichotomy becomes an appropriate metaphor to show class 
contradictions between the major characters [in Sons and Lovers]' (34). The familiar 
Lawrentian distinction between middle-class mental consciousness and working-class 
physicality may well be an 'appropriate', simplifying palliative for a writer faced with 
the uncertainties of breaking from his industrial working-class origins while less than 
entirely at ease in the middle-class social world; but Scheckner begs the question as to 
its appropriateness per se: it is proper that Lawrence deals with class in this way, 
Scheckner argues, simply because it is similar to the way he represents differences 
between the sexes. Such binary representations are, of course, liable to be fraught with 
prejudices, though the point here is not to 'blame' Lawrence for ideological constructs 
determined by his circumstances, but to note how Scheckner silently assumes their 
veracity and passively replicates their prejudices in the form of authoritative social 
comment. Having accepted the notion of the colliers' semi-conscious physicality, for 
example, Scheckner has prepared his ground for that old cliche concerning the 
peculiar social problem of working-class violence: 
The occasional gratuitous brutality of men like Morel and Dawes, 
which Gertrude's snobbery or Paul's elitism inevitably draws out, 
is never romanticized. Such bullying represents an aspect of 
working-class life that Lawrence detested, one that he portrayed 
repeatedly, especially in his wartime and immediate postwar 
novels. (36) 
We may feel a need ironically to emphasise the words, 'that he portrayed', for 
Scheckner once more implicitly grants historical authority to Lawrence's depiction of 
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society, without subjecting that depiction to analysis by historical discourse. Instead, 
Scheckner calls upon further representations by Lawrence, with the implication that, 
because Lawrence 'repeatedly' portrayed this 'gratuitous brutality', it must be a more 
or less typical predisposition of the working-class male. 
Thus, having quoted Lawrence suggesting the 'England of Shakespeare', 
Scheckner himself goes on to offer us the world of Lawrence; but neither region is 
presented merely as an imaginative landscape or ideological creation, for they are laid 
before us as spontaneously recognisable approximations, if not perfect replications, of 
an implied 'real' world. This substitution of artistic representations of history for 
history itself is natural enough in a creative writer such as Lawrence (although not so 
acceptable, perhaps, in a biographical history such as 'Nottingham and the Mining 
Countryside'), but, more objectionably, it also occurs frequently in Lawrence 
criticism. A major reason why Lawrence's world (which certainly is a 'queer jumble') 
slips so readily and unopposed into critical exegeses is apparent in Scheckner's 
account. Although Scheckner allows for the many contradictions in Lawrence's work, 
he fails to appreciate just how 'jumbled' it is. This is because, under the persistent 
weight of Lawrence's essentially unmediated expositions, Scheckner's remaining 
commentary cannot help but be imprinted with the superficial coherence of 
Lawrence's 'philosophy'. This pervasive misnomer for Lawrence's abstract thought 
grants it an organisation and intellectual rigour that it might otherwise often appear to 
lack. And, as this implied 'system' is so often applied in explicating Lawrence's 'art', 
then so too is the fiction liable to be glossed into a similar simplified unity. The effect 
is a perpetual begging the question, as critics assume the value of Lawrence (in the 
non-fiction and abstract commentaries within the fiction) in the very process of 
supposedly establishing the value of Lawrence (as the artist). So Lawrence is judged 
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in the light of more Lawrence, with the critic's text reduced to a passive reflection of 
those of his subject. Here, for example, is Scheckner discussing The Plumed Serpent's 
distinctions between Mexican Indians and Westerners: 
the opposite of the Indians 'who have never been able to win a 
soul for themselves, never been able to win themselves a 
nucleus, an individual integrity out of the chaos of passions 
and potencies and death,' are the Europeans and North 
Americans with whom Kate unhappily identifies. For the white 
man, 'let him bluster as he may, is hollow with misgivings 
about his own supremacy. Full speed ahead, then, for the 
debacle' .... Either the body crushes the spirit beneath it, like 
the Indian, or the spirit rises out of the body, as in the case of 
the white man. This is the great tragedy of our times. In the 
American continent, the narrator says, 'If a man arrives with a 
soul, the maleficent elements gradually break it, gradually, till 
he decomposes into ideas and mechanistic activities, in a body 
full of mechanical energy, but with his blood-soul dead and 
putrescent' .... Lawrence's lifetime objective was to find a way 
to put these pieces back together. (129-30)[114] 
This is a patchwork of quoted Lawrence and what amounts to little more than 
paraphrased Lawrence. When we read 'This is the great tragedy of our times', we may 
well feel a need for clarification as to whose voice this is, Scheckner's or Lawrence's; 
but, after all, it is of little consequence because any hard distinction between the two 
has melted away, leaving a criticism which loses any critical angle on its object. 
What, for example, does Lawrence mean by 'individual integrity', or the death of a 
man's 'blood-soul'? It is simply assumed that such terms are self-explanatory and that 
Lawrence's 'lifetime objective' is legitimate or meaningful. Scheckner omits to ask if 
a real problem to be solved is diagnosed in the first place. The recurring Lawrentian 
division of 'soul' and 'ideas', the divorce of emotion from intellect, could be seen, not 
merely as a common-sense observation of the world, but as a production of a world 
which serves particular interests. It may be argued, for instance, that under this 
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scheme of things, to have genuine physical vitality and 'blood-soul' - that is, to be 
non-Western, or, in The Rainbow and Women in Love, to be working class - you must 
renounce claims to intelligence; and, reciprocally, to be conventionally educated and 
'individual' entails being irrevocably removed from the experiences of, and identified 
against the interests of, these people deprived of their rights and power. All of this 
clearly has significant political ramifications, not least concerning the nature and 
possibility of revolution, as the potential collective agents of political change are 
divided from the possibility of educational and intellectual means of breaking 
capitalist hegemony. Similarly, 'individual integrity' could be seen as a spiriting away 
of Western middle-class material advantages, an individualism resulting from less 
exposure to 'the chaos of passions and potencies and death' , rather than from benefits 
of wealth, technology, rights and education. Whatever the case, the point is that 
Lawrence's philosophy forms leading questions whose answers present the world in 
ways readily compatible with, and limited to, certain political theories and practices; 
that is to say, Lawrence's philosophy is ideology. This epithet is not particularly 
intended to disparage Lawrence's abstract thought, but simply aims to acknowledge it 
for what it is. 
While maybe not a Lawrentian in the first instance, Scheckner's work is 
all the more indicative of the irrepressibly ideological nature of Lawrence's 
philosophy and of Lawrence studies as a consequence. We see how critics are drawn 
into using Lawrence to expound Lawrence, and how their ostensible descriptive 
objectivity/ideological neutrality often results in conceding to, or replicating, the 
tangled weave of Lawrence's philosophy. And it is a very deadening exercise, not 
least because such criticism also has a tendency to present this miscellany as a 
coherent, logical body of thought - as a philosophy, in fact - or at least to problematise 
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its contradictions as in need of resolution. In my v i e w ~ ~ this approach is deeply 
m i s t a k e ~ ~ for, as a philosophy per se, a systematic description of 'reality', much of it 
remains feeble and muddled; on the other hand, it is as an evidently suasive, 
contentious, ideologically manufactured ' r e a l i t y ~ ~ that its energy and richness is to be 
found; and no less so for being fractured by internal contradictions and shot through 
with ambiguity as a consequence of Lawrence's peculiarly mutable relations to 
contemporary ideologies. The recalcitrance of Lawrence's texts to being reproduced 
as a philosophy is perhaps apparent in Scheckner's omission to relate 'Lawrence's 
world view' (13) to much in the world other than more Lawrence; and it is certainly 
manifest in commentaries more insistent upon the philosophic nature of Lawrence's 
thought, such as Michael Black's D.H Lawrence: The Early Philosophical Works, for 
example, which connects and contextualises its extensive quotations with little 
beyond the assumption of Lawrence's philosophic geniusYlS] 
The inclination amongst liberal humanist critics, such as Black, for 
preferring 'philosophy' to ideology is not to be wondered at. Firstly, it immediately 
depoliticises Lawrence's work, suggesting, indeed, that its nature transcends politics, 
and hence, by implication, defends the Leavisite consensus of a broadly liberal, 
politically impartial Lawrence. And, as might be inferred, this neutralising effect of 
the 'philosophy' provides a method for elevating Lawrence not simply above 'mere' 
politics, but to a level of the greatest import: a writer concerned with eternal verities 
rather than whingeing in a cause. One of the characteristics of this type of criticism is 
the way that it blandly dismisses Lawrence ~ ~ s more provocative or disturbing ideas - as 
being either 'misunderstood' or simply too obviously bizarre to warrant further 
mention; but it also wafts away the slightest whiff of politics whatsoever. As concerns 
Lawrence's early socialism, for example, the most comprehensive recent biography 
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briefly mentions it as nothing more than a developmental plaything to be discarded on 
the inevitable thrust towards maturity: it is 'a useful intellectual staging post' )116] We 
are given a notion of this maturity as being necessarily beyond socialism, because, in 
effect, it is a maturity to which this early life is biographically 'predestined'. In other 
words, this amounts to a mere assertion that the early political involvement is of little 
interest because it is the incidental experience of a pupal Lawrence, one passively 
assimilating his socialism, we might say, rather than actively pursuing an interest of 
his own accord; it does not belong to the 'genuine article' of later years. This rather 
presumptuous concern with the 'fully developed' writer, as it were, is perhaps 
reflected in the views of the editors of the Cambridge Edition of Lawrence's works 
concerning textual 'development' which generally seem to suggest Lawrence's later 
revisions to be the improvements of a more considered outlook. Incidentally, such 
appeal to the perceived wisdom of experience is less likely to be granted by 
Lawrentians to the 'mature' accounts by, for example, Bertrand Russell or Cecil Gray 
of their relationships with, and opinions of Lawrence. The self-serving revisionism 
and ideological mutations that may rightly be ascribed to Lawrence's erstwhile 
associates are apparently not characteristic of the man himself. The idea of a 
progressive intellectual maturity goes hand in glove with the philosophic Lawrence 
whose texts represent a cumulative process of greater learning which deals with ever 
more comprehensive issues, in contrast to an irretrievably tendentious Lawrence 
whose texts are ideologically textured and warped products, 'reduced' to serving 
particular, even partisan, interests. 
As suggested above, I do not think this political neutralisation does 
Lawrence's work any favours: it effects a condensation of Lawrence's thought into a 
relatively unified body of generally unexceptionable views (unexceptionable, that is, 
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for the tenets of contemporary liberal humanism); whereas, if the postmodem 
'explosion' of Lawrence criticism is of any worth - and I believe it is - the value of 
Lawrence's texts surely lies in their multifarious significations, the anarchy of their 
'thought'. It is this which the 'philosophic' approach would seem intent upon resisting 
because, perhaps, its most important effect is to buttress a fundamental convention of 
bourgeois literary theory, namely the ultimate 'explanation' of a text by ascertaining 
authorial intentions. The implicit assumption of authorial sovereignty (previous to 
Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, et aZ.) established the author as the proprietor of 
both text and textual signification, with the reader appointed as a passive consumer of 
a pre-established meaning, and with criticism rendered an inherently conservative 
practice, seeking to reiterate that which has already been said by the author. ll17] This is 
the state of affairs when Lawrence's work is granted the status of philosophy, for the 
logocentric belief is called into play which asserts that words, if employed with 
precision, have determinate meaning, and so works upon a traditional prejudicial 
esteem for philosophy (at the expense of mere literature) as a vehicle for truth. When 
confronted with Lawrence's 'philosophy' we are being told to contemplate a given 
object and appreciate its predetermined truth-value. To replace 'philosophy' by 
'ideology', however, is to superannuate the proprietary role of the author and to 
challenge the presumption of a stable, privileged meaning residing within the text. In 
contrast to a sole originator (and 'controller') of the text - whose meaning is the 
author's private possession - a reading of the text as ideology recognises it as social 
discourse, made possible by a specific social formation and produced to have certain 
effects within and upon that social formation; and to acknowledge this is at once to 
become actively engaged with the social discourse rather than subject to it - a first 
step to being able to challenge it and to shape it, and so, potentially, to transform its 
53 
societal effects. In this way, the text's process of signification and its significance for 
society can become subjects of genuinely public contention. To insist upon the reader 
as a producer of the text rather than passively consuming it is to allow the text's full 
proliferation of meaning. And the eminently 'philosophical' /brazenly ideological 
character of Lawrence's work means that it is especially conducive to this approach, 
for the simple reason that its frequent provocativeness provokes us to respond, its 
contentiousness demands that we contend with it. Consequently, Lawrence's reuvre is 
vivified by the question of what we may make of it and, hence, so too is Lawrence 
criticism revealed as, at least in part, a struggle between competing ideologies to 
appropriate a version of Lawrence that is amenable to, and utilisable by, their 
respective ideas about human nature and the organisation of society. That is to say, 
criticism becomes an openly political practice. Of course, this is only making explicit 
what has implicitly been the case all along; it is not that liberal humanist criticism 
generally - and so too the majority of Lawrence criticism - is not political, just that it 
is not openly so, as suggested by the conventional transfiguration of ideology into 
philosophy. 
I would by no means disagree with the notion that Lawrence himself was 
often uninterested in politics. Expressions of contempt for political thought and action 
in his writing are too numerous and emphatic to deny this. 'I don't really care about 
politics', says Somers, for example, in Kangaroo: 'Politics is no more than your 
country's housekeeping.'[I18] A similar disdain is shown by Gudrun in Women in Love: 
'Ah, what a farce it was! She thought of Parnell and Katherine O'Shea. Parnell! After 
all, who can take the nationalisation of Ireland seriously? Who can take political 
Ireland really seriously, whatever it does? And who can take political England 
seriously?,[119] Although this is not necessarily Lawrence's attitude here, but that of 
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his characters, this is an attitude to be found repeatedly in his work. Political life is 
seen as absurd, and essentially nothing more than a large-scale domestic tragicomedy, 
to be mocked by detached individuals and finally left behind altogether. However, to 
acknowledge Lawrence's frequent lack of interest in politics is certainly not to 
concede to a Lawrence who, hence, is of no interest to a political criticism. No one 
would deny Kangaroo's eminent concern with contemporary (quasi-)radical politics; 
and, as I hope to show in my chapter on Women in Love, below, this novel too fails to 
match the glib disregard for politics that is shown by some of its characters and at 
times by its author.[l20] Indeed, perhaps the particular interest to Lawrence's work lies 
in this uneasy relationship with the political world. It is not that Lawrence rises above 
political dogmatism, so much as that he fmds it problematical to fit clearly ideological 
statements and attitudes into a coherent political framework. The result is a body of 
work which pitches the reader head-on into the contradictions, perplexities and 
hostilities of modem political history. Indeed, Lawrence is, in a very significant way, 
our contemporary, in that an apparent obviation of politics belies unresolved 
fundamental conflicts at the heart of both Lawrence's writing and Western society 
today. Perhaps a more telling example of Lawrence's relation to politics is to be found 
in his essay, 'The State of Funk' (1930): 'The great social change interests me and 
troubles me, but it is not my field. I know a change is coming - and I know we must 
have a more generous, more human system based on the life values and not on the 
money values. That I know. But what steps to take I don't know. Other men know 
better. '[121] Here we see a deep concern for the way society is organised, together with 
supreme confidence in impending revolutionary social change and in the urgent 
necessity of such change; simultaneously, an extremely tentative theorising of the 
situation, amounting to liberal tokens of · human' and 'life values'. might seem to 
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suggest a conservative relinquishing of the political field of action to one's "betters'. 
Yet, when Lawrence says, 'Other men know better', he is not so much conceding to 
political quietism as he is indicating his own - and a considerable proportion of 
European society's - political confusion. Lawrence is not expressing faith in the 
political strategies of others, but just the opposite: his lack of faith in any political 
alternative means the frustration of his own potential participation in politics - a 
frustration perhaps evident elsewhere in his, and in his characters', exasperated 
dismissal of politics altogether. 
So even though Lawrence's texts may often seek to set aside the 'problem' 
of politics, they often do so by working through a kaleidoscope of political 
perspectives and political problems. Perhaps most interestingly, because of 
Lawrence's peculiar ideological repertoire, which both easily assimilates and 
vehemently rejects important beliefs and practices of dominant ideologies, his texts 
are readily apt to expose the aporias, flaws and contradictions in them. For much of 
his life he remained uneasily bound to the principal tenets of liberal capitalist 
ideology, despite being acutely aware of capitalism's illiberality - its enslaving 
industrialism and militarism. Consequently, the contradictions of capitalist ideology 
become starkly illuminated within the contradictions of Lawrence's work (no more so 
than in Women in Love, for example, whose middle-class heroes affirm their liberty 
and decency in the process of blithely consigning the rest of the world to industrial 
subj ection). [I 22) In order to reveal these contradictions most completely, though, we 
must keep in mind the ideological nature of Lawrence's works and read against the 
grain of the works' rhetorical strategies. For, amongst other things, these strategies 
exist to gloss over ideological weak points, to shore up a work's integrity as 
ideological discourse, and thereby bestow it with an ease and fluidity of style which 
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may altogether conceal the work's ideological nature beneath a surface betokening the 
plain and simple truth. The fact that art which most adeptly achieves this suave 
regimentation of its internal components is often that which is held in most esteem is 
a ready indication that one of the functions of art is to reproduce certain ideologies as 
'reality'. Hence, when critics measure the formal integrity of a text as art-object, it 
often amounts to measuring the extent to which the inevitably flawed, incomplete 
ideological facet is cosmetically hidden or reconstituted. Concepts of the 'style' and 
'form' with which a work is 'put together' are invoked in the interests of ascertaining 
artistic success, as gauges of the art-object's internal unity and coherence; but, under 
such criteria a superficial unity and coherence are also demanded of, and therefore 
frequently bestowed upon, the ultimate referent of this internal logic - namely, the 
'real' (capitalist) world 'outside'. Thus, the aesthetic and ideological are inseparable, 
and so, when examining either, we must be aware that we are dealing with both. 
When I write of 'rhetorical strategies', I simply mean those means by 
which the text suggests, manifestly or latently, how it 'should' be read - what it 
should be taken to mean. What is not always apparent is that the outcome of these 
strategies depends, ultimately, upon the reader; as argued above, the reader is 
potentially dominant as a producer of the text, not necessarily submissive as a 
consumer. This relationship between author, text and reader becomes more apparent 
when the author himself is manifestly uncertain of his control of the language he uses. 
In a letter to Bertrand Russell, for example, following his sketchy and simplistic 
quasi-socialist vision of social change, Lawrence pleads: 'You must have patience 
with me and understand me when my language is not c1ear:[I23] Some might say this 
would make an apt epigraph for much of Lawrence's work where obscure language 
apparently demands to be accepted "as it is', somehow, rather than admit to reflection 
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and interrogation by the reader. However, whether pleading or demanding, the fmal 
decision to accept or reject the authorised version is left to the reader. It could be said, 
on one hand, that much criticism - of the broadly 'Lawrentian' kind - has chosen the 
'patient' and 'understanding' approach, to follow the path set for it by the text - the 
sterility of which I point out, above. But, on the other hand, to grasp something's 
meaning usually entails, to some extent, newly fashioning it in relation to the 
perceiver's intellectual and experiential context. Every reading is a rewriting, and it is 
difficult to see how even the most Lawrentian explication of Lawrence could fail to be 
anything other than a re-encoding of Lawrence, presenting the work through an 
inevitably different ideological perspective. Indeed, in one sense, this school of 
criticism which may have seemed to deal with Lawrence's texts most 'loyally' is 
perhaps that which most frequently 'betrays' them. Broadly adhering to a 
conventional Anglo-American aesthetic which measures the success of a work of art 
by the extent to which its different parts form a unified coherent whole, such 
traditional literary criticism, both of the Lawrentian kind and of Lawrence's 
detractors, has grievous difficulties when faced with Lawrence's innovative 
experiments with aesthetic form and with his more unconscious articulations of a 
contradictory world. Stephen Gill's criticism of the rigid scheme of polarities in Lady 
Chatterley's Lover, for example, fails to acknowledge the novel as the product of, and 
a comment upon, a world which reifies human experience into apparently immutable 
opposites - of body and mind, industry and Nature, and so on.[I24] In effect, Gill 
criticises a formal preoccupation with fixed contradictions when the 'problem' lies 
with the world's ideologically fixed contradictions, subsequently incorporated in the 
novel's design - not so much an explication of the work as flinching from it. [125] The 
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Marxist critic Pierre Macherey has called this flaw In traditional criticism 'the 
normative fallacy': 
Because it is powerless to examine the work on its own terms, 
unable to exert an influence on it, criticism resorts to a 
corroding resentment. In this sense, all criticism can be 
summed up as a value judgment in the margin of the book: 
'could do better' .[126] 
For Macherey, a text is always 'incomplete' because besides what it actually says 
there is another dimension to be accounted for - what the text does not say, what its 
ideology will not allow. Furthermore: 
the silence of the book is not a lack to be remedied, an 
inadequacy to be made up for. It is not a temporary silence that 
could be finally abolished. We must distinguish the necessity 
of this silence. [127] 
In other words, it is not the critic's task to amend the text or censure its lack of unity, 
but instead to explore this alternative discourse of omissions and absences which most 
palpably demarcates the ideology within which the text is produced. For Macherey, 
then, the text's full significance lies not in its existence as a unified totality but in the 
conflict between its explicit and implicit meanings; it is the work's contradictory 
nature that is of interest to the critic. 
This attempt to deal with the work on its own terms, in place of the 
doctrinaire assumption that all art should aspire to unity, should appeal to anyone 
seeking to break the narrowness of traditional bourgeois aesthetics; and it should be 
particularly attractive to those of us wishing to engage productively with Lawrence's 
aesthetics that appear to have broken with those conventions so often before. 
Lawrence's frustration with what he believed to be the limited way that many people 
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see the world and the art it produces, is evident on those occasions when he felt 
compelled to defend his own work. Thus, for example, in the oft-quoted letter to 
Edward Garnett, in which Lawrence justifies his method of characterisation in what 
was to become The Rainbow, comes the admonition: 
I have a different attitude to my characters, and that necessitates a 
different attitude in you, which you are not as yet prepared to give . 
... You mustn't look in my novel for the old stable ego of the 
character. There is another ego, according to whose action the 
individual is unrecognisable, and passes through, as it were, 
allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we've 
been used to exercise, to discover are states of the same single 
radically-unchanged element. [128] 
Sixteen years later, Lawrence would defend Lady Chatterley's Lover in a similar vein: 
How different they are, mental feelings and real feelings. ... Our 
education from the start has taught us a certain range of emotions, 
what to feel and what not to feel, and how to feel the feelings we 
allow ourselves to feel. All the rest is just non-existent. The 
vulgar criticism of any new good book is: Of course nobody ever 
felt like thad-People allow themselves to feel a certain number of 
limited feelings .... And these notes, which I write now almost two 
years after the novel was finished, are not intended to explain or 
expound anything: only to give the emotional beliefs which 
perhaps are necessary as a background to the book. It is so 
obviously a book written in defiance of convention .. ..£129] 
Such discernment of the necessity of thinking and feeling independently of a 
prescribed norm is a laudable characteristic of Lawrence's work. But these points 
about people's miseducation and the need for a different attitude implicitly bear an 
epistemological difficulty relevant to any critique of Lawrence's art, and not least to a 
Machereyan reappraisal of Lawrence's decentred a r t - f o r m ~ ~ for, essentially, Lawrence 
is telling his critics, 'you have the wrong attitude, the wrong beliefs', which raises the 
question of just how are we meant to ascertain the true belief? If we substitute 
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'ideology' for 'belief then perhaps the implication for Macherey's theory of the text 
becomes more clear, for it would be reasonable for opponents to protest that a Marxist 
like Macherey, who sees the capitalist world as conflictual and contradictory, will 
inevitably see art produced by that world as contradictory too. Indeed, the extent to 
which Macherey's view of literature is plainly founded upon his Marxist ideology 
leaves little easy way of establishing its supremacy as regards, say, the account of a 
politically conservative critic, who holds an essentially functionalist view of a stable, 
harmonious world, and who thereby sees no reason why art should be contradictory, 
nor any value in art which clearly lacks a corresponding harmony of its own 
constituent parts. And, of course, there is much the same problem of theoretical 
justification concerning the materialist critical practice of locating texts within their 
historical context. This methodological preference is itself an instance of literary 
criticism, an interpretation of what literature 'is', with no more secure foundation 
upon objective 'Truth' than, for example, the more received interpretation of literary 
texts as independent aesthetic objects, whose value may be appraised by the close 
inquiry of a suitably 'sensitive' mind. 
I raise this problem of theoretical justification not as a prelude to offering 
a solution - as yet none exists, or there would no longer be any point to theorists 
continuing to argue their theories; but merely to acknowledge the inevitable subjective 
tendentiousness of my own critical practice - a tendentiousness, nevertheless, which I 
believe needs affirming in all social practices if we are ever to forge a situation where 
common universal values (whatever they may be) simultaneously realise and render 
redundant 'True Theory' (the possibility of such a situation ever existing, I 
understand, again being a tendentious point of view). I wish, at least, to avoid the 
blindness to theoretical problems of an old-fashioned Marxism which points to its 
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'scientific' understanding of history when claiming the 'truth' of its view of the world 
and, likewise, the 'objectivity' of its method of historically contextualising literary 
texts. But in rejecting a 'vulgar' criticism grounded upon a naive assumption of the 
objective tendencies of history, neither do I wish to embrace the wholesale scepticism 
of that sort of post-structuralism which baulks at the idea of determinate meaning and 
therefore puts notions of 'truth' and 'reality' into a state of suspended animation: if 
such notions are the products of discourse, subject to the fundamentally unstable 
signified, then how can we know a transcendental determinate world beyond this 
discourse? This attitude seems to herald a dead end to both politics and academic 
criticism, since, for practical purposes, both depend upon some degree of consensus, 
whereas here any truth-claim, let alone agreement between individuals upon it, is 
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adjudged unknowable because it is a truth eternally relativised by the perpetual 
shifting of signified meaning. Participation in both politics and literary criticism 
becomes, therefore, eminently ridiculous, beyond asserting the benefits of a 'pluralist' 
society - whatever post-structuralists choose 'pluralist' to mean - and ironically 
contesting literature's ability to address a determinate 'real' world in any meaningful 
way. 
This impasse between the traditional notion of a transcendental referent, 
such as history, serving as a final adjudicator between competing propositional 
statements, and a post-structuralist interminable relativism, is tackled by Tony 
Bennett in Outside Literature. Subscribing to a 'post-Marxist' position, Bennett 
rejects the concept of an extra-discursive referent, while perceiving the 
post-structuralist fallacy which maintains that the implausibility of absolute, 
positivistic 'Truth' renders meaningless all conceptions of truth: 
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It by no means follows, because we cannot establish certain 
propositions as absolutely true, that we have no means of 
establishing their provisional truth - of determining that they 
meet conditions which justify our regarding them as true and 
so as capable of serving as a basis for both further thought and 
action. Nor does it follow, if we accept that there can be no 
escaping the constraints of language and narrative, that 
anything goes - that all possible narrative systems or language 
games are to be ranked equally with regard to their 
propositional content. [130J 
Bennett then applies this recognition of a still-practicable degree of indetenninacy to 
his conception of history not as a fixed object awaiting discovery, but as a 
provisionally fixable 'institutionalised fonn for the social regulation of statements 
about the past' .[131J Bennett fonnulates the past as a 'complexly laminated social zone 
of representation', and sees part of history'S function as 'subjecting representations of 
the past to a disciplined regulation, [and the] elaboration of rules and procedures for 
the disciplined interrogation of evidences which allow new knowledges to emerge and 
transfonn the face of the past' . [132J It is a similar disciplined provisionality that I intend 
to achieve in my reading of Lawrence, and where I subject his own (predominantly 
literary) representations of the past to historical regulation I do so primarily with the 
hope of allowing a new Lawrence to emerge; it is my intention neither to berate a 
writer of fiction and poetry for lacking historical objectivity, nor to claim such 
absolute objectivity for my own work. Literature may be anchored in history, but what 
is history itself founded upon? Bennett's conception of history as an 'institutionalised 
form' readily points up its socio-political relativity - history is what people of varying 
opinions in such places as university history departments make it to be; but it also 
suggests the inevitable 'reality' of how we ascertain what is real, for it is only within 
the context of ongoing debate which finally refers back to society that academic 
questions about knowledge, truth and so on, become meaningful. We need certain 
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regulations and protocols in order to achieve some consensus in what we accept as 
valid, but necessary too is some degree of indeterminacy/contention in our matter if 
there is to be any point at all to academic disciplines. [133] As Bennett writes of history: 
'it is [historiographical] disputes which constitute the discipline rather than being its 
accidental by-products';[134] and just as the study called 'History' is born of historical 
contention, so too is 'Literary Studies' the product of similar contests. 
It should be clear that my approach to Lawrence refuses any simplistic 
historicism, and it likewise rejects the corresponding notion of 'textual realism' - that 
the 'true' meaning of Lawrence is held unchangeable within the texts themselves; my 
purpose is not to discover or theorise the meaning of Lawrence's texts, but simply to 
create an interpretation produced between those texts and my anti-Lawrentian reading. 
And in doing this I reject, also, a 'readerly' realism, an approach that replaces the 
'objectivity' of the text's sovereign autonomy of meaning with the putative objectivity 
provided by the concept of the 'ideal', or 'intended', reader - the type of reader the 
text was 'meant' for, who can elicit the reading experience the author wished - a sort 
of textual realism by proxy. My own reading makes no claim to 'ideality', because 
what it principally aims to do is only that which literary criticism is able to do -
engage with the text as discourse, as part of a continuing debate involving 
multifarious topics which contribute to our understanding of the world; an 
understanding, furthermore, informed and complicated by the same aspect of 
contentiousness which Lawrence's work thrives on, and having to allow for that 
degree of tenable heterodoxy evinced in Lawrence's defence of his writing. 
It is within this general context of debate and relative indeterminacy that 
all texts exist within Literary Studies; but, put another way, in any specific context, 
any particular reading, all texts exist with relatively determinate meaning. Just as 
64 
there cannot be always absolute detenninacy of meaning, so too can there neither be 
always absolute indeterminacy of meaning: the meaning of Lawrence may well 
change radically when read from different perspectives, but from within a given 
approach it remains practicably determinate for the explicatory purposes of literary 
criticism. Such being the case, rather than trying to make my approach theoretically 
secure, it seems more useful simply to spell it out: it is one which is sceptical of 
Lawrence's self-representations and self-conceptualising 'philosophy'; one which 
accepts that successful art need not manifest internal unity and coherence; and one 
which locates and interrogates Lawrence within the 'history' of capitalist 
contradiction and in light of contiguous texts similarly engaged with social 
contradiction. The 'meaningfulness' of this approach may be challenged 'internally', 
that is, as to how it articulates itself within these given parameters, as a discursive 
subjectivity purporting to maintain the disciplined regulation of Literary Studies - a 
practical question of how it speaks itself; it may still, of course, also be 'externally' 
objected to, rejected wholesale from a perspective outside its basic assumptions, but 
where such criticism is of ideological matters rather than simply methodological ones 
- a criticism of what it says - it cannot finally be secured against because ideological 
discourse cannot be transcended. Obviously, the problem remains that there is, 
actually, no pure and simple sphere of methodology, either, which is beyond ideology; 
but, as argued by Bennett, by exercising, and by being judged by, clear regulatory 
criteria, this particular 'language game' should attain a provisional determinacy 
sufficient for the practical purposes of literary criticism. 
My view of history and capitalist reality as being contradictory provides 
no objective foundation for my exegesis of Lawrence, merely a prospective trajectory. 
No less ideological than Macherey or anyone else, in discussing Lawrence's politics 
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and ideology I inevitably involve my own; and not to do so, I would argue, besides 
not being feasible, could neither produce anything serviceable to the purposes of 
Literary Studies. This is to say, my point is not that other critics misrepresent some 
'essential' Lawrence - none exists other than what we make of himlhis work - but that 
such representations have a function in serving particular cultural interests which are 
perhaps very different from those which Lawrence might have originally had in mind; 
and, furthermore, that this sort of appropriation and rewriting of Lawrence is no bad 
thing in itself, but is, in fact, the essence of criticism, as Macherey suggests: 
For there to be a critical discourse which is more than a 
superficial and futile reprise of the work, the speech stored in 
the book must be incomplete; because it has not said 
everything, there remains the possibility of saying something 
else, after another fashion. [135] 
But where, I hope, my own literary analysis differs from more traditional rewritings of 
Lawrence's texts is in there being no special attempt, on the one hand, to champion 
Lawrence's excellence because he reveals 'truths' about the world (which usually 
means he upholds certain cultural values that are agreeable to the critic), and neither, 
on the other hand, is there any wish to condemn his art for inaccuracy in its depiction 
of society (a charge often resulting from the text's display of cultural values which the 
critic finds disagreeable ))136] Instead, my broadly Machereyan approach takes for 
granted the literary work's 'incompleteness', but, rather than berating an artistic 
failure, it aims to show just why the text is inevitably ideologically limited in the way 
it is - in Macherey's words, it seeks to 'distinguish the necessity of [the text's] 
silence' ,[137] and, in so doing, to distinguish likewise the literary text as something 
relatable to, yet not to be confused with, objective historical discourse. The 
ideological limits of my own work are a matter for each reader, but this subjectivity is 
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tempered, I hope, with a traditional commitment to the detail of Lawrence's texts 
('the words on the page') and with an equal concern with the wider picture of the 
text's historical context: the 'fact' of history and the 'fact' of the text, even if far from 
establishing indubitable truths, at least provide identifiable and testable data upon 
which to base an understanding of the formation and function of Lawrence's texts 
within a social and (therefore) ideological world. My work is, finally, no less 
'objective' than the avowedly scientific approach of, say, Russian Formalism, and no 
more partisan than the liberal-Lawrentians' (spurious) eschewal of ideology in favour 
of 'common-sense' values and interpretations; it may be, after all, just another set of 
cultural values and political presumptions, but if it comes down to politics then the 
only thing left to do is argue - and it is best to do so openly, which formalists and 
humanists often have not. It is this continual process of argumentation which 
underpins Literary Studies, the same process of interpretation, reinterpretation and 
counter-interpretation that is at work in our understanding of the world at large. As 
Lawrence recognises in his defences of The Rainbow and Lady Chatterley'S Lover, 
certain ways of representing and thinking about the world are institutionalised, and are 
conducive to a certain conception of human nature while preventing alternatives: 'Our 
education from the start has taught us a certain range of emotions .... All the rest is 
just non-existent. '[138] Yet by recognising the tendentiousness of such teaching, 
Lawrence is at least able to retaliate with 'a different attitude', and work 'in defiance 
of convention' .(139] And in this instance, what is good for the production of 
Lawrence's work also holds good for the production of Lawrence criticism: after 
allowing for the interestedness of all accounts of literature, all that remains is to argue 
our own particular case. 
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Indeed, it is only by being overtly tendentious in our criticism that we may 
open up to the critical gaze the political tendencies buried in Lawrence's work. This is 
not least because Lawrence's rhetorical strategies often work towards silencing 
potential political issues, amounting to an implicit protest of: 'what steps to take I 
don't know. Other men know better. '[140) This sense of confusion is evident in the 
contradictions and disjunctions which riddle Lawrence's work. The outcome is often a 
language whose forms and devices gravitate towards silence. Language is used to 
construct a political reticence where even as it ostensibly talks up an issue, it 
circumscribes that issue in such a diminished aspect that it simultaneously collapses. 
This is nowhere more apparent than in Lawrence's use of 'yet' and 'but', not simply 
to introduce a qualifying clause, but to contradict, or cast a fog upon, that which has 
immediately preceded. So, for example, we see in The Plumed Serpent the avowedly 
non-political Don Ramon who, using language typical of Lawrence's own 
'non-political', 'philosophical' pronouncements, outlines to his friend, Cipriano, an 
agenda that would be distinctly political if it were not for its bewildering obscurity: 
One must have aristocrats, that we know. But natural ones, not 
artificial. And in some way the world must be organically 
united: the world of man. But in the concrete, not in the 
abstract. Leagues and Covenants and International 
Programmes: Ah! Cipriano! it's like an international 
pestilenceY41) 
We may think we have a reasonable grasp of concepts of aristocracy and a united 
world of mankind, but then we are confronted by the awkward, not to say impossible, 
consideration of apparently having to reject any aristocracy produced by human 
culture (and therefore 'artificial'); it must be "natural' (presumably not in the same 
way that all other aristocracies have justified their culturally produced privilege on the 
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grounds of being a 'natural' state of affairs); and we face a similarly perplexing task 
in imagining a united world whose anathema is the 'abstract' and malignant system of 
international organisation (equally absurd, we subsequently hear that Ramon's notion 
of a world united in 'concrete' terms is the world where 'the First Lords of the West 
met the First Lords of South and East, in the Valley of the Soul').[142] The apparently 
solid ground provided here, by aristocracy and internationalism, for a political 
engagement with the text, disintegrates before our eyes in a chaos of contrariety. Such 
stifling of eminently political speech is often maintained by liberal humanist 
criticism's own muted political voice and slender appreciation of ideology - resulting 
in the text and critic becoming tacitly involved in a conspiracy of silence as regards 
ideological matters. In order to expose the ideological fissures which texts may 
attempt to conceal, and to determine the nature of their political silences, we need a 
manifestly ideological criticism, and one which must be openly sceptical of the way 
Lawrence's texts are constructed to be read. 
It would appear, in fact, that Lawrence's work is tailor-made for a critical 
approach such as this, not least because, besides its didactic element, it often invites 
the reader's challenge to such didacticism. If we are still to pay obeisance to 
Lawrence's authorial authority then why not do so by accepting this invitation to 
scepticism? A very explicit example of the challenge which Lawrence lays before his 
readers occurs in Aaron's Rod (1922). During a typical, even self-parodic, account of 
Lawrentian self-realisation, we are given an extensive excursus upon how Aaron 
Sisson realises 'that his very being pivoted on the fact of his isolate 
self-responsibility, aloneness. His intrinsic and central aloneness was the very centre 
of his being. '[143] Perhaps conscious of a rather po-faced pretentiousness, the narrator 
abruptly sums up: 
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D ~ n ' t t grumble at me then, gentle reader, and swear at me that 
this damned fellow wasn't half clever enough to think all these 
smart things, and realise all these fme-drawn-out subtleties. 
You are quite right, he wasn't, yet it all resolved itself in him 
as I say, and it is for you to prove that it didn't. (164) 
The affected playfulness does not conceal the bold emphasis with which the narrator 
reminds us that the fiction is 'made up', while simultaneously asserting authorial 
authority over this creation. Positing the notion of a grumbling, swearing, 'gentle 
reader', the narrator acknowledges the collapse of the nineteenth-century tradition of 
an assumed consensus between author and reader. Such ironic employment of the 
conventional address to the reader also serves as security against readerly dissent. 
Uncertain about how his fiction is to be received,[l44] the author predicts the reader's 
dissatisfaction and so gains some semblance of control over it: by effecting a 
symbolic recapture of the malcontent reader within the text, an impression of 
authorial authority may be maintained. However, there still remains the physical 
reader 'outside' the text, and, in the very act of asserting authorial sovereignty, the 
narratorial device implicitly concedes to the reader's crucial impact upon the 
'production' of the text: firstly during the writing itself, as a hypothetical construct of 
the author which will partly determine the material which he selects and how it is 
presented so as to be 'consumed' in a certain way; and secondly, as a real person, 
generating meaning by a reading which mayor may not follow the way the text has 
been constructed to be read. And the effect, perhaps, of such petulant interpolations 
by the narrator is not only to draw attention to the potential conflict between author 
and narrator, but also to provide sufficient incitement for that conflict to be realised. 
In the final chapter of Aaron's Rod, the laconically entitled, 'Words'. the nature of the 
relationship between author and reader is further illuminated during Aaron's 
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discussion with Rawdon Lilly. Lilly is lecturing Aaron upon the truth, as he believes, 
of the final isolated singleness of the individual: 'You are your own Tree of Life,' he 
tells him (296). Aaron's objection to this alienated individualism is not only critical of 
what Lilly says but also suggests a fault with how he says it: 
'But you talk,' he said, 'as if we were like trees, alone by 
ourselves in the world. We aren't. If we love, it needs another 
person than ourselves. And if we hate, and even if we talk.' 
(297) 
And this other necessary person is not necessarily one who will accept all that he is 
told. This becomes evident from Lilly's anxious persistence in dictating the 'truth' 
about the world and from his frustrated misanthropy as a consequence of people's 
unresponsiveness to it, and, so too, from Lawrence's own haranguing of the reader, 
motivated by the perception of a less than tractable readership. Lilly's didacticism is 
much like a velvet glove in search of an iron fist, readily denouncing all forms of 
'bullying' (282), but, one suspects, mainly because Lilly himself is divorced from the 
material power required to effect a more coercive implementation of his own ideas. 
This is most strongly suggested in the penultimate chapter. Lilly declares, 
'I think there is only one thing I hate to the verge of madness, and that is bullying. To 
see any living creature bullied, in any way, almost makes a murderer of me' (282). 
Here, and throughout the novel, 'bullying' is the derogatory label attached to all 
manifestations of that social power which the alienated Lilly (as well as Aaron) lacks. 
It could, therefore, be seen as a term borne by envy, for, if granted such power 
himself, Lilly would immediately and forcefully put it into effect: after outlining his 
idea of the necessity of "inferior' beings making a voluntarily submission to their 
betters, Lilly adds: 'once made it must be held fast by genuine power. Oh yes - no 
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playing and fooling about with it. Permanent and very efficacious power.' • You mean 
military power?', asks a companion, whereupon Lilly COnfIrmS: 'I do, of course' 
(282). It may be pointed out that this outburst is framed by two apparent disclaimers, 
renouncing its authenticity as a statement of intent. When fIrst asked to provide his 
alternative to the idealism that he rejects, Lilly protests: 'My alternative ... is an 
alternative for no one but myself, so I'll keep my mouth shut about it' (281); and then, 
having propounded his idea of a voluntary slavery, Lilly meets its cool reception with 
the challenge: 'Do you take this as my gospel? ... 1 should say the blank opposite with 
just as much fervour' (282). However, Lilly's preludial qualifIcation of his proposed 
reorganisation of society, which may appear contrastingly, even contradictorily, 
liberal in acknowledging the freedom of others to think differently, is nothing of the 
sort. It concedes nothing to others because Lilly is in no position to make concessions; 
it is rather an admission of his powerlessness to effect his 'alternative', disguised as 
magnanimity. Lilly's closing dismissal of his 'gospel' demonstrates a similarly subtle 
attempt to sidestep anticipated criticism. By casting the haze of irony upon his words, 
Lilly effectively withdraws them from further discussion - just what are his 
companions, or the reader, meant to respond to: a serious proposal of social 
reorganisation or teasing mockery of such political earnestness? Lilly's advocacy of 
slavery is hermetically sealed from criticism by his own protestations of its triviality. 
Within the text, its most direct critic, Levison, is branded a 'fool' (282) for failing to 
perceive its playful nature, and, one feels, this serves to warn the reader against 
adopting a similar attitude. Prepared to condemn the lunacy of such an attitude as 
Lilly's, the reader himself risks being charged with idiocy. A consequence of this 
trammelling of critical judgment is that if dubious, not to say repugnant, ideas are not 
openly affirmed, then neither are they directly dismissed. And it is significant that this 
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playful, ironic mode is not only an attribute of Lilly, but of the narrator, too. Indeed, 
the manner in which Lilly brackets his pronouncements, here, between protesting their 
lack of significance to anybody but himself and dismissing them as said on a whim, 
presents a microcosm of the novel as a whole. The utterances of all the characters, of 
the narrator (of Lawrence?), are placed in a context which similarly appears to 
depreciate their significance, and, perhaps, the significance of all that can be said or 
written, with arch chapter titles such as 'Talk' and 'Words'; and the overt 
impertinence of the narrator's interlocutions, in marked contrast to the bland 
confidences which we might normally expect, further suggests that we take anything 
said in the text as considerably less than 'gospel'. Hence, any political ideas expressed 
within the book are immediately cast into a limbo. This is not to say they must 
necessarily remain there, but it is often the case that such ideas are left hovering above 
critical interrogation. An example is provided by Mara Kalnins in her introduction to 
the Cambridge Edition of the novel. Kalnins asserts: 'Lilly's idea of power transcends 
any notion of mere authoritarianism. Lawrence's vision of man is not political but 
spiritual' (xxvi). We may first note the identification of Lilly's ideas with Lawrence's 
vision - indeed, Lilly's opinions present a 'problem' precisely because, as Kalnins 
observes in passing, Lilly 'often articulates Lawrence's beliefs' (xxvi).[145) The 
anxiousness of liberal critics to defend such illiberal characters as Lilly would seem to 
be a corollary of their desire to maintain the notion of a broadly liberal Lawrence and 
to preserve the generally depoliticised nature of Lawrence studies. One suspects that if 
no record existed of the resemblance between such characters' attitudes and those of 
Lawrence then Lilly and his kind would simply be dismissed as patent absurdities. 
For, if Lilly does not amount to 'mere authoritarianism', it is not because he 
'transcends' it, but just the opposite: Lilly embodies a mealy-mouthed vision of 
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domineering tyranny which falls short of authoritarianism only because he lacks 
entirely the authority necessary to it. 
In his powerlessness, Lilly somewhat reflects the insecurities and 
frustrations of his author when faced with unpleasant political realities, and echoes 
him in the way organised politics is often repudiated in toto, while his own apparently 
political statements are transmuted into things immaterial or psychological. It is in 
this evasion that we have the 'spiritual' Lawrence that is called into play by Kalnins 
(another example of how critics readily take up Lawrence's self-representation in his 
defence). Kalnins goes on to argue that Lawrence's spiritual vision is 'not a denial of 
man's freedom and individuality but a confirmation of it because it is based on a 
recognition of the innate and inexplicable differences between each unique human 
being' (xxvi). This idea of individual difference is a tenet commonly found in 
Lawrence's work and frequently invoked by critics wishing to stress his liberal 
credentials; thus Kalnins quotes Lilly telling Aaron, 'your soul inside you is your only 
Godhead' (296). Such talk may be all very well when given as advice upon an 
individual's personal life, but it is wholly inadequate in providing a meaningful social 
perspective; and, in the absence of any other political framework which may 
appreciate the collective nature of society, this impoverishing translation of the social 
into the personal occurs all too often in Lawrence for it to be ignored. In an early 
critique of Lawrentian ideology, W.H. Auden finds fascist tendencies in the way The 
Plumed Serpent presents 'politics as if it were an affair of personal relations' .[146] The 
potential illiberality of such an apparently liberal and individualistic attitude is also 
evident in Aaron's Rod where, notably, ideas of spiritual freedom and difference seem 
by no means incompatible with physical slavery; indeed, having accepted the idea of 
innate spiritual differences, the next step frequently is to use this 'spiritual' quality to 
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justify material and economic 'differences' and to condemn others to a wretchedly 
different life. Thus Lilly, reflecting upon the peoples of Asia and black Africa (and, 
with less emphasis, those of Europe), sees a problem not of poverty but of their innate 
predisposition to overpopulation - 'flea-bitten Asiatics' are 'vermin', whereas 'Higher 
types breed slower' (97). In the light of Nazi propaganda concerning verminous 
Jewry, not to mention current Western projects for Third-World population control, 
refraining from acknowledging the significance of such remarks, on the grounds that 
Lawrence's vision is not essentially political, seems remarkably obtuse. Such, 
however, is often the consequence of this spiritualised version of Lawrence which 
risks spiriting his work away from the material world to which the work has great 
relevance. It is vital to recognise this is a thoroughly political enterprise, after all: 
Lawrence, professing more interest in the profundities of the soul than in mere 
politics, adopts a tactic deployed throughout the centuries by religious movements and 
institutions eager to acquire and maintain power; and critics who proliferate this 
ostensibly non-political Lawrence are nonetheless engaged in a political act. 
Lawrence's spiritual vision is just one more instance of tendentious politics assuming 
the cloak of universal truth. (147] 
I point this out not to rebuke Lawrence for being dishonest, but rather to 
suggest the rhetorical richness - and elusiveness - of much of his writing. All texts 
establish protocols, whether explicitly or implicitly, as to how they are to be 
consumed by the reader, which the reader may either follow or decide to challenge. 
Lawrence's rhetorical strategies are particularly intricate and densely compacted, in 
my view, because they are an attempt to pull together a hopelessly fractured ideology 
and present a screen of 'philosophical' integrity and unity where, in fact, it is 
confusion and uncertainty which predominate. The extent to which the texts have 
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acquired a large number of less than critical critics, all too happy to read exercises in 
ideological propagation as searches for philosophical truths, is a measure of the 
success of Lawrence's rhetoric; but perhaps it also indicates the peculiarly 
self-defeating way the texts have contributed to their own narrow exegeses in much 
Leavisite and post-Leavisite criticism. Both the text's screening of its contradictions 
and critical readings which assume the value of artistic unity and coherence need to be 
resisted if the plethoric significance and value of Lawrence's work is to be displayed. 
The aforementioned use of irony in Aaron's Rod provides an example of 
the self-defeating way the texts often work upon the reader, for it helps to claim the 
narrator's/author's authority in determining what the text is, or is not, to say, but only 
at the cost of challenging the idea of a body of words having a single prescribed 
meaning which proscribes alternative meanings. The ironic mode, as used by Lilly in 
dismissing his 'gospel' (282), for example, is one that asks all the questions of the 
reader: is the reader capable of grasping all the insinuated complexities of the 
discourse, or is he, like Lilly's earnest critic, Levison, a misconceiving 'fool'? And 
where does the irony end, if at all? Are we to see Lawrence as 'an apocalyptic ironist 
who says, in effect, a plague on all your houses'?l148] Or is it the case that relatively 
rare acknowledgements of irony, by characters such as Lilly, and occasional sarcastic 
narratorial interjections merely aim to suggest a wider ironic potential through the 
work, which may be activated as an escape clause by the author and his defenders 
when called to account for such dubious statements as those about 'flea-bitten 
Asiatics'? Certainly, the speaker/writer is freed from the burden of defending such 
statements, and instead has a free hand to polemicise without surrendering his words 
to the circumspection of debate; potential appeals to irony threaten to blast aside all 
criticism (it is fitting, therefore, that the discussion upon Lilly' s benign slavery is 
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ended with the disapproving Levison interrupted by an exploding bomb). This would 
seem a strikingly attractive proposition to a politically alienated malcontent such as 
Lilly, and no less so to an author such as Lawrence, having to commit his words to the 
judgment of a public he often felt removed from and frequently at odds with - a means 
of reasserting his artistic freedom. [l49] Such rhetorical tactics are to be expected and 
accepted, then, as an integral part of the texts' formation, rather than censured for 
being manipulative. But it is helpful to the reader to realise that if he is manipulated 
into awkward positions concerning the actualities of textual significance then it is 
only because of the difficulties faced by the writer and the ideological imbroglio 
which his texts have to deal with; for this realisation helps the reader to maintain his 
role as producer of the text's meaning. The problem of deciphering exactly what, if 
anything, constitutes the 'authoritative' authorial message becomes a key to unlocking 
the text's imprisonment of the reader, as the freedom of the author to write as he 
pleases is bought at the cost of indicating the reader's freedom to interpret: such 
forthright manipulation of the reader as in Aaron's Rod actually draws attention to the 
very same weaknesses it seeks to shore up and gloss over; and this self-contradictory 
quality emerges in full in the demands which the text makes of the reader. Texts 
which ask all the questions of the reader in this way, whose meanings have to be 
'worked out', inevitably pass creative power and jurisdiction of significance to the 
reader, pointing up the reader as producer. This quality, what Roland Barthes would 
designate as belonging to a 'writerly' text,[l50] is generally more evident in Lawrence's 
later texts, after the break with Eastwood became entrenched, after the fiasco of The 
Rainbow's prosecution for obscenity, and after the personal and social degradation 
inflicted by the Great War; and it would seem, in Lawrence, to be a quality generated 
by such ruptures and their consequent ideological mutations, as much as by any 
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independent aesthetic consideration. The fact that these texts are products of a 
capitalist society recognised by Lawrence as increasingly debilitated and debilitating, 
and describe the struggle to find alternatives to it, as well as illustrating the tenacity 
and dexterity with which capitalism preserves itself in various ideological guises, 
should make them appeal to a progressive criticism. Indeed, these later texts should be 
of as much interest as earlier ones which may seem more 'genuinely' affiliated with 
working-class interests and socialism (such as the short stories 'Her Turn' and 
'Strike-Pay', for example, and, to a lesser extent, Sons and Lovers); for in their 
political ambivalence, a radical 'openness' derived not least from a detached, ironic 
perspective, many of these later texts not only suggest the arbitrarily restrictive critical 
practice of trying to establish a work's unified coherence, but also, perhaps, point up 
the arbitrariness of the narrow political and social realities dictated to people 
represented by the characters in the earlier texts. Mrs Radford's endeavours against 
the male hegemony in her household in 'Her Turn' ,[l5I] for example, can be seen as 
complemented in the way that Aaron's Rod implicitly questions the authority of its 
dominant conservative ideology. 
It might be objected that there is considerable testimony to many of these 
later texts being something quite other than radically 'open', and evidence of the 
spectacular ineffectiveness of irony in complicating matters, in the frequency with 
which Lawrence is accused of fascism. Those critics who give undue weight to 
Lawrence's flirtations with fascism, however, appear to be only the other side of the 
same coin as Lawrence's liberallLawrentian defenders: the latter point out. rightly, 
Lawrence's qualifying devices against effusions of authoritarianism - irony, 
alternative points of view and such - but then overvalue them and exaggerate their 
effects to the point of virtually erasing the significance of the authoritarian politics (as 
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Scheckner tends to do, above); on the other hand, those who accuse Lawrence of 
fascism tend to set aside the significance of these qualifying devices, not interrogating 
them but simply dismissing them as palliatives to a central fascistic message. While 
such casuistry clearly seems part of their function, there is inevitably more to these 
qualifications: it is difficult to see how, rather than purely the instruments of an 
authoritarian ideology or merely incidental to it, they do not form an integral part of 
the text's complex and contradictory ideology. The amount of arguing among 
characters, unresolved differences of viewpoint, the strained and cryptic language of 
the narrators' 'philosophies' are all more indicative of an ideological miscellany 
which refuses to coalesce its own incongruous elements, than they are of texts which 
smoothly supply a totalitarian agenda for society. As for the authoritarian attitudes 
undeniably present within Lawrence's work, along with the host of other racial, 
sexual and social ideas that we may find unpleasant, they cannot be banished away, 
but remain a source of ideological conflict within the text and, thereby, a factor of its 
richness and interest to us. My intention, then, is not to condemn Lawrence for any 
fascistic tendencies, which is often much the same thing as condemning him for being 
a product of his time and milieu (the same society which could produce such an 
indisputable progressive as H.G. Wells who, nonetheless, expressed, at times, what 
may now seem rather 'fascistic' ideas concerning the reorganisation of society and 
human nature).[152] It should be equally clear that I do not seek to 'rehabilitate' a 
'Lawrence' of largely unexceptionable views. What I do intend is to read Lawrence's 
texts as representative of contemporary political and ideological fissures (a capitalist 
world whose complacency is torn to shreds by war and revolution, as viewed by a 
writer shot apart from his working-class origins), and as attempts to conjure a remedy 
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whose perceptible flaws frequently allow and incite readings which transcend an often 
superficial manifest vision of society and politics. 
Indeed, the openness of Lawrence's texts to reworkings by the reader often 
reflects the political tensions and social contradictions of the capitalist society of 
which the texts are born. And just as that society requires the consent of the 
dominated classes for it to function the way it does, so too do Lawrence's fictions 
require the reader's collaboration in supplying their meaning; but, just as the 
dominated can struggle to change the design which dominant classes may wish for 
society, so too may readers work to furnish a different meaning from that which 
Lawrence might have consciously intended for his texts. As suggested by Auden in 
my epigraph, the interests of writer and reader may well be at odds, and it may be 
useful to look for alternative readings which challenge apparent authorial intentions. 
This need not mean corrosively negative criticism of the sort Auden himself supplies 
upon Lawrence's supposed misanthropy, but may, on the contrary, help to go beyond 
the given, reductive personalising of politics which Auden also diagnoses, to uncover 
socially and politically meaningful reasons for the works' political disintegration. In 
fact, we may, after all, take our cue from Lawrence: in Aaron's Rod, for example, 
Lilly's only power is suasive and, as such, it is set to work upon Aaron in a manner 
similar to that in which a text works upon its reader (or the way the ideological state 
apparatus dominates society) - attempting to gain a voluntary submission to the 
'reality' which it presents; Aaron, on the other hand may prefigure a reader, who, if 
not out-rightly subversive, at least remains somewhat independent of any didactic 
control. 'And whom shall I submit to?'. asks Aaron at the end of the novel, in 
response to Lilly's reiteration of the need to submit to a greater man: 'Your soul will 
tell you' , answers Lilly (299). These concluding words prove remarkably 
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inconclusive, considering that one of the most recent things his soul has impressed 
upon Aaron is the necessity of maintaining a vigilant independence: 
'Sleeping or waking, man or woman, God or the devil, keep 
your guard over yourself. Keep your guard over yourself, lest 
worse befall you .... ' 
Thus thinking, not in his mind but in his soul, his active 
living soul, he gathered his equanimity once more, and 
accepted the fact. (230) 
In this way, the ending ensures that the dialectic between established, or dominant, 
ideologies and emergent ideologies is seen as open and ongoing, allowing for the 
possibility of an improved synthesis issuing from, on the one hand, the capitulation of 
the individual to the 'greater' collective impulse, and, on the other hand, virulent 
individualism. Contrariwise, it seems that the 'soul' of Lawrentians all too often tells 
them to submit to the leadership figure of Lilly's creator, when it would seem more 
productive, perhaps even more in keeping with Lawrence's own spirit, to 'grumble' 
and prove him, not 'wrong', but ideological. Indeed, to finish this exhortation against 
taking Lawrence at his own self-explaining word, there is nothing more audaciously 
apt than to enlist the support of Lawrence himself: 
NOTES 
stress is laid on the fact [of what] the author or artist intended 
.... It is the old vexed question of intention, become so dull 
today, when we know how strong and influential our 
unconscious intentions are. And why a man should be held 
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friend S.S. Koteliansky, 'it won't be popular' (Lawrence, Letters: Vol III, pp. 
729, 728). 
See, for example, 'Education of the People' (wr. 1920), which Lawrence 
finished shortly before recommencing work on Aaron's Rod: 'When it is a 
question of the human soul, the direction must be a culmination upwards: 
upwards from the very roots, in the vast Demos, up to the very summit of the 
supreme judge and utterer, the first of men. There is a first of men: and there 
is the vast, basic Demos: always, at every age in every continent. ... There 
must be classes of men; there must be differentiation: either that, or 
amorphous nothingness' (D.H. Lawrence, Reflections on the Death of a 
Porcupine and Other Essays, ed. Michael Herbert [Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988], pp. 110-11). And after completing the novel, bar 
revisions, at the end of May 1921, Lawrence wrote to Evelyn Scott on 3 June 
1921: 'In short, why not have done with Jesus and with love, and have a shot 
at conscious, proud power. Why not soldiers, instead of lovers? ... Kick the 
posterior of creeping love, and laugh when it whimpers. Pah, it is a disease, 
love .... Give me henceforth Mars, and a free fight' (Lawrence, Letters: Vol 
III, p. 734). 
W.H. Auden, 'The Prolific and the Devourer' (wr. 1939), in The English 
Auden: Poems, Essays and Dramatic Writings, 1927-1939, ed. Edward 
Mendelson (London, Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 404. 
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'inexplicable differences between each unique human being'; it is, however, 
strikingly contradictory to Kalnins's assertion of his non-political vision. 
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declares: 'power is given differently, in varying degrees and varying kind to 
different people. It always was so, it always will be so. There will never be 
equality in power. There will always be unending inequality' (Lawrence, 
Reflections, p. 326). 
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in Peter Widdowson (ed.), D.H Lawrence (London, Longman, 1992), p. 152. 
O'Hara is referring specifically to Women in Love. 
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handling the English publication of Women in Love, Aaron's Rod's 
predecessor: after reading disagreeable reviews of The Lost Girl, Lawrence 
wrote to Martin Secker, on 12 December 1920, advising him: 'refrain from 
sending out review copies .... It will give reviewers a chance to say nothing, 
which is best' (Lawrence, Letters: Vol III, p. 638). 
See Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970), trans. Richard Miller (Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1975). 
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Stories, ed. John Worthen (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
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For example, in Anticipations (1901), Wells freely writes of 'inferior races' 
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especially, Chapter IX). Later, in response to a reviewer's discussion of this 
work, Wells wrote: 'He gives a fancy sketch of my "Anticipations" ... & 
attributes to me the conception that "rapid transport & Eugenics were to be 
the pillars of the State". As a matter of fact there is a chapter in Mankind in 
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(H.G. Wells, letter to the Editor, The Nation, c. early June 1912, The 
Correspondence of H G. Wells: Vol II: 1904-1918, ed. David C. Smith 
[London, Pickering and Chatto, 1998], p. 328). I would suggest that 
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nature of work, above, pp. 2-6). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
IRRESOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE: THE BLINDNESS OF 
INDIVIDUALISM IN WOMEN IN LOVE 
To see someone who does not see is the best way to be intensely 
aware of what he does not see. 
Roland Barthes[1) 
D.H. Lawrence's correspondence with Bertrand Russell between 1915 and 1916 
marks his stonny passage from an intensely optimistic, if rather naive, anticipation of 
socialist change to a disgusted, even misanthropic, frustration at the world's 
reluctance to follow his lead: 
So a vision of a better life must include a revolution of society. 
And the drama shall be between individual men and women, not 
between nations and classes. (24 February 1915) 
One must be an outlaw these days, not a teacher or a preacher. 
One must retire out of the herd and then fire bombs into it. (19 
February 1916)[2) 
Women in Love was written at a time when the world 'drama' was still very much one 
between nations and, as the war drew to an end, between classes too. Nevertheless, 
despite the non-materialisation of his revolution, the drama of Lawrence's new work 
would be explicitly focused on the lives of individual men and women. However, 
these are individuals who only maintain their claim to individuality by condemning 
everybody else to the herd. 
Ursula Brangwen's and Rupert Birkin's rejection of the conventional life 
is neatly encapsulated in Chapter XXVI, 'A Chair'. As they move closer to marriage 
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the couple visit the town market to find if there is any furniture worth buying. The 
eponymous chair that they purchase is initially admired for its formal beauty. 
However, as a possession, a piece of property contributing to the marital home, it 
becomes sickening to them. The chair comes to signify what Birkin calls the 
'detestable society of man' that tyrannises the individual with its 'possessions, 
possessions, bullying you and turning you into into a generalisation' .[3] Ursula and 
Birkin want to live as free individuals, unhampered by the habits of society. Perceived 
as substance and symbol of corrupting social custom, the chair is given away to a 
working-class couple who are about to be married themselves - doubtlessly compelled 
to because of the woman's pregnancy. Superficially, the gift is a quite innocent, 
indeed beneficent gesture. There is, though, a strong hint that Ursula's and Birkin's 
emancipation from domestic impediments is bought by leaving others encumbered. 
Thus Birkin's initial refusal to offer the chair to the couple 'getting a home together': 
'I won't aid and abet them in it' (357). His reservations are eventually overcome by 
Ursula, who indirectly attests to the working couple being condemned to a domestic 
prison anyway: 'It's right for them - there's nothing else, for them' (357). Again, on 
the surface, this is simply good-natured sympathy; but there is a suggestion of the text 
dodging free of its own hindrances, delicately omitting the issue of exactly why there 
is nothing else for these people; just why it is that Ursula and Birkin may liberate 
themselves but the working-class couple may not. Rather than explain the basis for 
the couples' different prospects, however, the text instead makes an apology for it. 
The working-class couple, Ursula and Birkin agree, are of the 'meek' and 
multidudinous 'Children of men' who 'shall inherit the earth' (361). Ursula and 
Birkin, by implied contrast. are of the proud and unique who, by natural right, will 
inherit their liberty. While it is true that any novel which foregrounds main 
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protagonists will inevitably background unnamed characters as identityless 
anonymities, Women in Love turns a practical necessity into an ideological issue. It 
explicitly collectivises the unnamed characters so that, rather than simply provide 
Ursula's and Birkin's societal background, they depict society as something markedly 
apart from Ursula and Birkin. The novel refuses to represent society as anything but a 
reified object to be contrasted with, and eventually cast aside by, the individuated 
heroes. For them, and for the reader who is locked within their perspective here, the 
other couple and townsfolk in general are the embodiment of a degenerate social 
enterprise: 
The people who moved about seemed stumpy and sordid, the 
air seemed to smell rather dirty, there was a sense of many 
mean streets ramifying off into warrens of meanness. (354) 
This mythopoeic distinguishing of Ursula and Birkin from the common lot illuminates 
much of the text's ideological scheme: it allows the condemnation of society and the 
rehabilitation of the free individual; it allows criticism of the industrial form of 
society but not its class-based, capitalist nature; and, of course, it clears Ursula and 
Birkin from any past or future responsibility for society as they take their leave of it. 
The exile of Ursula and Birkin corresponds to the text's wider effort to 
sever visible links connecting its ideology to the society it criticises. Both attempts to 
dissociate from the world are fraught with difficulty. For Ursula and Birkin the 
immediate question is where are they to go in a world pervaded by the children of 
men? 'We've got to live in the chinks they leave us' is Birkin's answer (361). The 
prospective narrowness of this new life brings further problems, with the recognition 
that it means leaving behind not just inanimate objects but people too. It is this final 
isolation which Birkin himself baulks at when confessing to 'hankering after a sort of 
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further fellowship', specifically with Gerald Crich (362). Ursula agrees as to the 
desirability of sharing their new world with others but dismisses what she sees as 
Birkin's wish to force people to his way of thinking, telling him: 
You must learn to be alone .... And yet you want to force other 
people to love you .... You do try to bully them to love you. -
And even then, you don't want their love. (363) 
Evident here, perhaps, is a tension between the positions adopted in the two letters 
quoted above; an indecision between still trying to save the world with a 'revolution 
of society', or detennining to have done with it and 'fire bombs into it'. The necessity 
of the latter is clearly insisted upon here and throughout the text, but there is a 
residual nostalgia for what might be being relinquished. Suggestive of the 
precariousness of the text's ideological coherence is Birkin - to a large degree 
Lawrence's spokesperson - asking himself whether or not he wants that further 
relationship beyond marriage and having to admit: 'It's the one problem I can't solve' 
(363). Yet this is the crucial problem which the text's isolating ideology of 
individualism has to solve, and, in one way, it does so with the death of Gerald. 
However, the text's less than complete courage in its own convictions, which Birkin 
voices in 'A Chair', cannot be entirely erased: indeed, it persists implicitly to question 
and undennine the text's ideological integrity. 
In July 1916, as Lawrence began to type the fifth version of what was to 
become Women in Love, he affinned his adherence to individualism thus: 
I do esteem individual liberty above everything. What is a 
nation for, but to secure the maximum of liberty to every 
individual[?] ... let every man move according to his 
conscience - and the government which compels a man against 
his conscience is a dastardly cowardly concern. (12 July 
1916)[4) 
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Recently subjected to his fITst examination for conscription, Lawrence knew well 
enough how his own government could compel a man against his conscience. His 
opposition to the erosion of individual liberty is carried over to Women in Love, but 
only with the result of demonstrating its inadequacy. The division of individual 
conscience and national government recur in the novel in the form of Ursula's and 
Birkin's complete separation from society. But their lack of any relation whatsoever 
to society prevents any meaningful opposition to it, allowing the substitution of 
simple abjuration for protest. Ursula and Birkin make their 'fmal transit out of life', 
'the peace and bliss in their hearts' transcending 'the superficial unreal world of fact' 
(388, 389). It is one thing to call governmental oppression a 'cowardly concern' and 
another thing to do something about it, and Lawrence's isolating individualism would 
seem to deny just that. He was certainly hamstrung by his rejection of political 
alternatives to the industrial capitalism he hated. For Lawrence, an alternative such as 
socialism, for instance, was now seen as part of the problem - just another way of 
managing industrialism. And it was his antipathy for the de individuating effects of 
industrialism, rather than for capitalism per se, which was the prime mover of his 
desire for change. [5] 
Unfortunately, as Graham Holderness has pointed out, such prioritisation 
of the individual all too easily ends up adumbrating the original ethos of capitalism 
itself. [6] In summing up his own account of Women in Love, Holderness asserts that 
any critique of industrial-capitalist ideology that the novel may offer is inevitably 
compromised because the text remains 'bound within an ideology of individualism 
which is actually the obverse side of the entrepreneurial system''p] For Holderness the 
result is nothing less than a buttress to capitalism: 
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Attempting to be the conscience of capitalism, the novel 
proves to be its shadow. Attemping to preside over the funeral 
obsequies of capitalism ... the novel becomes an instument in 
its regeneration and historical persistence. [8J 
While agreeing as to the contradictory nature of the text, and that its 
ideology of individualism largely removes the teeth of any attack it may make on 
capitalism, I do not think there is as complete a reversal as Holderness suggests. As 
another commentator has remarked, 'Women in Love is not merely a novel that 
accommodates contradictory readings, it positively invites and even compels them. '[9] 
This capacity for antithetical readings checks the text from necessarily being 'an 
instrument' for conservative purposes. What it is an instrument for depends 
particularly upon how it is read. Holderness's reading of Women in Love is limited by 
two points, the first being its rather crude pro-realism. Holderness values realism 
more highly than other forms, contending that it is the most faithful representation of 
historical truth - a privilege that would appear to be denied Women in Love on account 
of its prevailing modernism. This preference for realism, though, seems difficult to 
justify. Ultimately, the raw material of art is always, and only can be, drawn from the 
'real' world, and all art finally refers to that world in some way. There is no reason 
why realism should have any inherent superiority in this, for, additionally, it is 
impossible for any art to figure some pure objective truth; 'historical reality' will 
always be changed and transformed by the artist's ideological assumptions about 
reality, even in realism.[loJ 
A second limitation of Holderness's reading of Women in Love is his own 
omission of most of the novel other than one chapter, 'The Industrial Magnate'. 
Holderness calls 'The Industrial Magnate' a 'central chapter of the novel' because it 
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explores the relationship between industrial capitalism and war ideology. [IIJ This 
could, though, be little more than saying that this chapter is important because it deals 
with subjects which Holderness considers to be particularly important, rather than of 
central importance to the text as a whole. Indeed, the relation of a single chapter to the 
novel in its entirety is more problematical than Holderness's account would suggest. 
The chapters do not so much amalgamate into one structure as remain essentially 
discrete vignettes of a world experienced in dislocated fragments. In claiming 
centrality for 'The Industrial Magnate' Holderness ignores the decentered nature of 
Women in Love, whereby it is possible to move from the end of Chapter XVI, 'Man to 
Man', immediately to Chapter XVITI, 'Rabbit', without any obvious disturbance to the 
narrative in missing out the 'central' Chapter XVIT, 'The Industrial Magnate'. 
Holderness's method of extrapolating from that one chapter contradicts his own 
acknowledgement of the text's non-realist nature, implicitly working, as it does, on 
the realist assumption of a shared objective world existing between different 
characters and different chapters. True enough, 'The Industrial Magnate' draws the 
development of the Crich family's mines in a way that may be reducible to an 
examination of industrial capitalism and war ideology, but this is very much 
marginalised throughout the rest of the novel. And, of course, Women in Love directly 
challenges any notion of an objective world that can be described consistently, 
notably in such scenes as by the railway-crossing in 'Coal-Dust', for example, where 
events are related through characters' radically different perspectives. It is such 
interplay of characters' conflicting viewpoints which is obscured by Holderness's 
focus upon 'The Industrial Magnate'. This chapter, and thus Holderness's acccount of 
Women in Love, makes little room for anything other than Gerald, his father, his work, 
and the industrial system created in his own image. rl2J 
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Such prioritisation of Gerald contradicts our intuitive response to a text in 
which, after all, it is Birkin (in tandem with Ursula, at any rate) who appears to be the 
intended focus of our sympathies. For Holderness, though, Birkin and Ursula are 
entirely subsidiary and, having made their 'transit out of life' (388), become 
redundant: 'the two characters have no further significant function in the novel .... 
Once outside that perfect, sealed system which is Gerald's society, they fall outside 
the novel's significant pattern.'lI3] Birkin is nothing more than 'Gerald's shadow':lI4] 
he represents an ideology of individualism borne by the entrepreneurial system that is 
represented by Gerald. Holderness's foregrounding of Gerald fits his view of the 
novel as primarily being about capitalism itself, and 'Attempting to preside over the 
funeral obsequies of capitalism'llS] (figured in the death of Gerald), but inadvertently 
perpetuating that system in Birkin's individualism. But surely the reverse of this 
formulation is more accurate: the text's predominant concern is to preserve liberal 
individualism (Birkin), and its mistake is to believe that it can achieve this at the same 
time as, and even by virtue of, its disposal of industrial-capitalist society (Gerald). It is 
certainly true that there can be no such easy divorce of ideology and socio-economic 
system, but, instead of Birkin being Gerald's shadow, the reverse is true: industrial 
capitalism (Gerald) is the unshakeable, ominous shadow cast by liberal-individualist 
ideology (Birkin). And this inevitable failure to assert the independence of Birkin's 
individualism allows the text to succeed in a different way. It is one contention of this 
chapter that, through the impossibility of the task it sets itself, Women in Love 
functions in a similar way to the films of Chaplin, as seen by Roland Barthes. In 
showing the proletarian who is oblivious to revolution, Chaplin, Barthes argues, 
. shows the public its blindness by presenting at the same time a man who is blind and 
what is in front of him' .[16] In our case it is the novel'slBirkin's individualist ideology 
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which is blind to the industrial capitalism lurking behind it, concealing its coercive 
nature behind the individualist rhetoric of freedom. The text's blindness to its own 
contradiction serves to intensify our awareness of it, and thus 'positively invites and 
even compels' [17] a reading of its ideology contradicting that which is explicitly 
intended; a reading which confrrms the ideology's symbiosis with industrial 
capitalism, rather than its independence from, and opposition to it. In this way the text 
allows a wider view of capitalism's duplicities than if it focused on Gerald's 
enslaving industrial system alone. 
The text exposes its ideological flaws through its blindness to them, but 
also through its desperate remedies to the inadequacies of which it is conscious. A 
pertinent example occurs at the beginning of Chapter XVI, 'Man to Man'. Here the 
text reveals its ideological origins in nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism in 
its reproduction of that system's emphatic division of the sexes (generally the text 
adheres to the same advocacy of a free-individualism whereby woman is not quite so 
free nor individual as man). As Birkin lies in his sickbed he revolts against the idea of 
a conventional, married, domestic life with Ursula as being too narrow, intimate and 
insular, and contemplates what he sees as Hermione's feminine tyranny, Ursula's 
possessiveness, and himself as their 'everlasting prisoner' (200). This is clearly a 
response to contemporary female challenges to male hegemony, but, rather than 
directly explore the issues, the text is compelled to obscure them and their 
relationship to capitalist history. Thus Birkin, who insists upon the necessity of 
freedom, posits woman as the great threat to freedom and thereby masks capitalism' s 
own illiberality and justifies its continued subjection of women. Similarly, emerging 
changes in gender roles are represented as outrageous feminine arrogance, enabling 
the text to sidestep more troubling real things such as female suffrage and labour 
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rights. [IS) Nevertheless, these omissions allow the text to do more positive things, for 
although the text here attempts an emphatic disposal of such a debate, its very 
insistence obstructs it. The reader becomes conscious of the peculiar effort being 
expended to shore up the text's ideological weak points. I have mentioned that Birkin, 
to a considerable extent, is Lawrence's spokesperson. Elsewhere, however, there is 
usually a qualifying frame placed around his proclamations by the responses of other 
characters to his sermonising. (This is not to agree with critics who see Birkin as 
essentially reduced by this method to just another voice within a text of many voices. 
It rather seems to me that the other perspectives serve to smooth the more strident 
edges to Birkin's dominant voice, assisting its general acceptance via localised 
objection. It appears difficult not to accommodate other viewpoints into a novel, 
unless the aim is a monologue, which, in fact, is more or less what occurs at the start 
of 'Man to Man'.) Here the text's 'message' is laid before the reader uninterrupted 
and unopposed. 
The first nine paragraphs of the chapter carefully intertwine misogynistic 
stereotypes and sweeping declarations against women with Birkin's personal 
experiences. The consequence of this is double-edged. On one side, the text is enabled 
to deny authority to such opinions in what, after all, amounts to a similar 
pseudo-qualification to that mentioned above: it is only Birkin's subjective voice. But, 
once again, that voice is not significantly challenged and its prejudices remain. 
Indeed, the other effect of tying these views to the character of Birkin is that they are 
shielded from criticism. Because they are ground in Birkin's experience there is no 
logic to question, no analysis to analyse, only Birkin' s observations of what he 
'knows' about the women in his life: 
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She was on a very high horse again, was woman, the Great 
Mother. Did he not know it in Hermione .... And Ursula, 
Ursula was the same .... He saw the yellow flare in her eyes, he 
knew the unthinkable overweening assumption of primacy in 
her. She was unconscious of it herself. (200) 
Such appeals to his own private world are somewhat tricky to refute (although they do 
risk simply being dismissed) due to their remove from contestable, verifiable 
argument: Birkin knows these people better than they know themselves, and hence 
knows better than the reader, who has nothing more to go on than Birkin's appraisal 
of things. In the succeeding paragraphs there is a subtle but distinct shift in the 
narrative focus, moving from references specific to Birkin to a more general, 
all-inclusive 'we' which insists upon the identity of the reader's situation with that 
which the text goes on to describe. Having compelled the idea of its common interest 
with the reader, the narrative voice, carrying a certainty hardly matched elsewhere, 
then forces through the apparently authorised history of male-female relationships: 
Why should we consider ourselves, men and women, as 
broken fragments of one whole[?] It is not true. We are not 
broken fragments of one whole. Rather we are the singling 
away into purity and clear being, of things that were mixed. 
(200-01) 
It seems this voice encompasses knowledge of prehistory: 'In the old age, before sex 
was, we were mixed, each one a mixture'; and of the future too: 'There is now to 
come the new day, where we are beings each of us, fulfilled in difference' (201). Such 
is the passage's self-assurance that logical argument is entirely dispensed with in what 
becomes akin to a -religious sermon; and, as befits a sermon, the answer to our 
problems on earth drops from the sky, ready-made: there simply will be 'pure man' 
and 'pure woman', each 'with its own laws' and forming a perfectly counterpoised 
103 
arrangement: 'Each acknowledges the perfection of the polarised sex -circuit. Each 
admits the different nature in the other' (201). And that is that (a 'polarised 
sex-circuit' which, as it happens, conveniently replicates dominant ideas of separate 
public and private spheres for separate sexes). 
After this metaphysical excursus we are brought back to earth with a 
bump by the revelation: 
So Birkin meditated whilst he was ill. He liked sometimes to 
be ill enough to take to his bed. For then he got better very 
quickly, and things came to him clear and sure. (201) 
This tardy avowal that what appeared to be the intervention of an omniscient narrator 
is, after all, still the reflections of Birkin comes as no little surprise. The text is again 
trying to have it both ways: on one hand, the disclosure of the passage's 'author' may 
help to bolster faith in Birkin as a site of potential resolution of the text's tensions; on 
the other, by ostensibly reconsigning (a still authoritatively privileged) Birkin to the 
hubbub of other competing voices, the text attempts to palliate the passage's rather 
raw didacticism in attributing it to a character in a bout of sickness. But all this is at 
risk of being sabotaged by the sheer strangeness of the implied, yet unacknowledged 
changes of viewpoint. This strangeness is the inevitable outcome of the text 
simultaneously having to accommodate both its dominant ideology and its lack of 
confidence in it. The resultant anti-feminism, which appears somewhat jammed into 
the narrative here, together with the coy refusal conclusively to sanction it. ends up 
threatening to explode the text's superficial cohesion: the narrative, which at first 
glance moves with a smooth assuredness, reveals on closer inspection its laboured 
mechanics. 
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The same overworked quality is detectable in the interior monologue ~ ~s 
principal diatribe against what is seen as a narrow, domesticated society which 
amounts to 'a whole community of mistrustful couples' (199). When this attack upon 
the 'community' shifts to a more protracted vilification of the 'merging ... clutching ... 
mingling' (200) nature of male-female relationships themselves, we glimpse 
something of the ideology at work within the writing. Chiefly notable is the move 
from a problem of distinctly societal proportions to the downscaled vagaries of 
personal relations. It is this which flags a vision of society as being formed by 
autonomous individuals, their private concerns and their intimate relationships. Any 
sense of some determining social formation, on the other hand, imposing itself upon 
these individuals and shaping their lives, is erased. This process of reasoning from 
society to the individual incorporates a method of limiting social problems to a 
personal locale - which in turn also limits the possible source for any solution. 
Formulating a question which it feels comfortable answering, the text distorts and 
straitens a recognition of social disintegration and isolation, redefining it in terms of 
individual men and women - with any more comprehensive social reality conveniently 
obscured. And thus, once defining the essential problem as the 'mingling' and 
'merging' of a couple, then the answer is self-evident: they must be made 'single and 
clear and cool', fulfilling the 'process of singling into individuality' (200, 201). It 
would seem that the text believes there is nothing wrong with individualism that more 
individualism cannot fix. But of course, this polarised singleness has one obvious 
drawback: it potentially leads to a world even more fragmented and insular than the 
'community of mistrustful couples'. This remains an intractable problem. and the 
text's scathing attack upon the constraints of modem society and the narrowness of its 
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privatised worlds is compromised by its inability to advance an alternative which does 
not collapse back into the same individualistic scheme. 
In an article Lawrence wrote in 1927, posthumously entitled 'Germans and 
English', it is worth noting the important difference in a similar exposition of the 
atomised society. 'The Englishman', the essay argues, 
is proud of the fact that he belongs to a nation of isolated 
individuals. He is proud of being one island in the great 
archipelago of his nation. ... He wants no one to touch him, 
and he wants not to touch anybody. Hence the endless little 
private houses of England, and the fierce preservation of the 
privacy. [19] 
There is a change of angle in this account due to the logical concurrence of the 
individualistic Englishman with the community of private houses. Women in Love, by 
contrast, sets such individualism, represented in Birkin, in opposition to an atomised 
society, without any basis for doing so, other than to protect the ideology of liberal 
individualism, while firing bombs at the world that is its material counterpart. Thus 
we have the private houses assailed as 'disjoined, separatist, meaningless entities' by 
Birkin, who yet desires to be 'single in himself (199). In short, Birkin's charismatic 
individualism is set against the anonymous mass of individuals that is capitalist 
society, as produced by liberal individualism a la Birkin. 
Indeed, this circularity is emphasised when, later in 'Man to Man', we find 
Birkin proposing his own version of a relationship insulated from the wider world, 
telling Gerald: 'Instead of chopping yourself down to fit the world, chop the world 
down to fit yourself. - As a matter of fact, two exceptional people make another 
world' (205). This apparently hypocritical domestication of the world might, though. 
initially appear rather more progressive. Birkin could be seen as proposing that. 
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instead of constricting yourself to the rigours of the modem world, that world should 
be changed to accomodate the needs of its people. If so, he would be echoing the 
feelings expressed by Ursula in The Rainbow as she tours the colliery town of 
Wiggiston with her uncle Tom, the colliery manager. Tom coolly outlines what 
Ursula perceives to be the worst of the place: the miners, he says, 'believe they must 
alter themselves to fit the pits and the place, rather than alter the pits and the place to 
fit themselves' .[20] Ursula's opposition to her uncle's detached acquiescence and the 
entire industrial environment is unequivocal. She tells him: ' You think like they do -
that living human beings must be taken and adapted to all kinds of horrors. We could 
easily do without the pits.'(2)] Although somewhat callow, this at least urges the need 
for real material change to make the world a place fit for people to live in. And it is 
this commitment which in fact marks the extremely different sentiments of the two 
novels rather than any similarity. Birkin's chopping down of the world does not 
demand actual social change so much as a change in attitude. Whereas Ursula saw 
Wiggiston and imagined a bigger, better world, Birkin wants to reduce the world to 
the cropped horizons of his personal life. The contrast becomes even more apparent 
when the Ursula of the second novel observes the 'repulsiveness' of Beldover and 
virtually replicates uncle Tom's attitude to Wiggiston, claiming: 'It doesn't concern 
me' (361). Ursula agrees to Birkin's prescription for a better life: 'One needn't see. 
One goes one's way. In my world it is sunny and spacious' (361). The facile strategy 
of turning a blind eye to the world is substituted for the more arduous task of 
changing it. The exclusion of the world lying beyond the prerogative of the self marks 
the collapse of faith in any collective social reform, and discloses the paltry response 
of the text to the world that it rejects. It spurns a society consisting of private couples 
but suggests instead a relationship of 'two exceptional people' (205); it perceives 
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social degradation and at once washes its hands of it. All of which fails to bring it 
beyond the industrial capitalist milieu that it purportedly opposes. The tackling of 
repugnant social realities is replaced with a solipsistic 'liberation' of personal 
wish-fulfilment, the material fact of the world not mattering so much as how it is 
perceived by the individual. 
So when Graham Holderness says that Women in Love works by 'focusing 
on the social system', [22] he is stretching a point which barely applies even to the 
examination of the mining industry in 'The Industrial Magnate'. The 'focus' of the 
novel is resolutely upon individuals - individuals whose individuality is measured 
only to the extent of their removal from society. Birkin and Ursula are the apotheosis 
of this type of individuality, and so it is logical for the text to conclude with their 
completed trajectory outside of society. Holderness though, having pronounced the 
novel's 'significant pattern'[23] as that which follows Gerald/society, is left to dismiss 
the text here for not doing what he says it does. Raymond Williams identifies Women 
in Love's concern with the individual in an earlier essay which notes how Lawrence 
classifies his characters, a priori, as either 'quick' or 'dead', as privileged with 
individuality or automatically condemned to 'society' .[24] Both Holderness and 
Williams recognise that Birkin's individualism can only lead to a dead end, but, 
whereas Holderness sees Birkin and Ursula as merely 'pressed into insignificance' ,[25] 
Williams detects the destructiveness which they signify. Commenting upon the 
'perfection of the polarised sex-circuit' (201), Williams notes how it involves the 
rejection of all extra-generational relationships, and particularly proscribes having 
children: 'Anything that can be described as creation would break it, for there would 
be a new living fact which is more than "proud singleness".'[26] Certainly, Birkin's 
recommendation to 'chop the world down to fit yourself (205) would appear not to 
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leave anything recognisable as a 'world' at all. Birkin's metaphor is simply a 
continuation of the prevailing process of appropriation and destruction apparent, for 
example, in Hermione's feminine tyranny (22, 300), and Geralds's enslavement of 
nature and the colliers (223-4). Birkin's response to the destructiveness of society is to 
will the consummation of that destruction, to negate the entire world. Thus Williams 
perceives Women in Love as breaking from society 'in the deeper sense that Lawrence 
will not even oppose what he opposes, will not enter that dimension at all' . [27] But if it 
does not tackle society head-on, it does so indirectly by manifesting the same 
contradictions of the world it seeks to chop away. Birkin's world-chopping metaphor, 
in particular, vividly summarises liberal individualism's rhetoric of self-emancipation, 
simultaneously with the destructiveness and alienation which it actually produces. 
And the tearing apart of life's personal and social dimensions exposes the hopelessly 
schizoid nature of the novel's dominant ideology, promising a 'world' which does not 
go beyond the self, while refusing to face the wretchedness of a society built upon that 
paradox. 
Not that Women in Love is blindly optimistic. On the contrary, it parades 
its pessimism, particularly via the discourses of Birkin. Throughout the novel he 
regularly attests to the necessity and desirability of the complete annihilation of 
humanity: 
After all, what is mankind but just one expression of the 
incomprehensible. And if mankind passes away, it will only 
mean that this particular expression is completed and done. 
That which is expressed, and that which is to be expressed, 
cannot be diminished. There it is, in the shining evening. Let 
mankind pass away - time it did. The creative utterances will 
not cease, they will only be there. Humanity doesn't embody 
the utterance of the incomprehensible any more. Humanity is a 
dead letter. Let humanity disappear as quick as possible. (59) 
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Birkin correctly perceives humanity's relative position in the universe: we are not 
made in God's image as the apotheosis of creation, but are just one created form on 
which the universe does not in the least depend. But this recognition of our 
post-Darwinian humbleness only serves to illustrate the possibility of mankind's 
eradication; the key reason for actually calling for it lies in the suggestion of 
humanity's complete exhaustion of its creativity. The denial of man as a creator 
necessarily denies the possibility of a human-built system that could replace the 
enslavement of industrial capitalism. At the same time, the text consistently reaffinns 
the depravity of the present social system and the need to be free of it. Thus, the 
painfully logical solution is to condemn both man and his machine, abolishing 
humanity itself along with its corrupt social formation. So there can be no 
Rainbow-like vision for Birkin or Women in Love. The closest parallel in the fmal 
chapter resolutely posits the new germination beyond humanity: 
God can do without man. God could do without the 
ichthyosauri and the mastodon. These monsters failed 
creatively to develop, so God, the creative mystery, dispensed 
with them. In the same way the mystery could dispense with 
man, should he too fail creatively to change and develop. The 
eternal creative mystery could dispose of man, and replace him 
with a finer created being: just as the horse has taken the place 
of the mastodon. 
It was very consoling to Birkin, to think this. (478-9) 
It might not be so consoling for the rest of us, however. The fundamental inadequacy 
of this vision is exposed earlier, in Chapter XI, 'An Island', where Birkin propounds 
to Ursula his idea of a better world being a human-less one. His ideal is doubly 
negative for, besides the theoretical negation of human life, there is the lack of any 
purpose or possibility of conceiving it. This is pointed out by Ursula, but is implicit in 
Birkin's own words. When he tries to think of the 'lovely things' that would populate 
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the new world he can only vaguely surmise 'things straight out of the fire' (128). The 
absurdity of this as a response to the world is self-evident. Yet although Ursula 
dismisses it as a 'phantasy' (128), admitting to its entire impracticability, the text does 
not dispute its allure. Ursula does at one point protest against Birkin's condemnation 
of the entire species, insisting that 'there are good people' (126); but this is merely an 
example of how her criticisms can actually serve to bestow his views with an aura of 
credibility, here inviting him to elaborate upon how there might be people 'Good 
enough for the life of today' but who will be redundant in the future (126). 
Confrrmation for the authority of Birkin's view is then given by Ursula's remarkable 
assessment that, although it is only a fantasy, the dream of eradicating the whole of 
humankind is nevertheless a 'pleasant' one (128). Ursula finds Birkin' s VISIOn 
unsatisfactory because it is wishful thinking, not because it is unattractive. 
Such enthusiasm for the extinction of humanity appears little short of 
sadistic. Indeed, the description is peculiarly appropriate because the text's railing 
against humanity bears much resemblance to that of the Marquis de Sade. Compare, 
for instance, Sade's own minimisation of our evolutionary importance with that of 
Birkin, above: 
new constructions wrought by [Nature's] hand, were our 
species to be destroyed absolutely, would become again 
primordial intentions whose accomplishments would be far 
more flattering to her pride and to her power .... Why! what 
difference would it make to her were the race of men entirely 
to be extinguished upon earth, annihilated! She laughs at our 
pride when we persuade ourselves all would be over and done 
with were this misfortune to occur! Why, she would simply 
fail to notice it. Do you fancy races have not already become 
extinct? Buffon counts several of them perished, and Nature, 
struck dumb by a so precious loss, doesn't so much as 
murmur! The entire species might be wiped out and the air 
would not be the less pure for it, nor the Star less brilliant, nor 
the universe's march less exact.[28] 
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Besides a similar contempt for humanity, there is also evident the same Romantic 
reverence, as in Birkin, for a Nature which comprises complementary creative and 
destructive forces - creation continues even as it is destroyed. In Women in Love, 
Ursula may occasionally represent an oasis of hope for a human future, but that 
perspective is very much marginalised by the 'dark river of dissolution' (172) running 
through the text via Birkin, Gudrun and Gerald, and even Ursula herself. And as with 
Sade, the merit conferred upon destruction threatens to overwhelm all other values. 
Sade, for example, can argue that murder fulfils a Natural law: 
'Tis our pride prompts us to elevate murder into crime .... we 
have believed Nature would perish should our marvellous 
species chance to be blotted out of existence, while the whole 
extirpation of the breed would, by returning to Nature the 
creative faculty she has entrusted to us, reinvigorate her .. ..I29J 
But no less perverse appears Birkin's own observation on murder: 
No man ... cuts another man's throat unless he wants to cut it, 
and unless the other man wants it cutting. This is a complete 
truth. It takes two people to make a murder: a murderer and a 
murderee. And a murderee is a man who is murderable. And a 
man who is murderable is a man who in a profound if hidden 
lust desires to be murdered. (33)[30J 
Both views are so far beyond human values and so serenely accepting of human 
annihilation that they provoke instinctive objection. The reader automatically inclines 
to agree with Gerald's opinion of Birkin's theory of murder: 'pure nonsense' (33). 
Undeniably, as a means of rectifying problems in the human world these 
inhumane perspectives are non-starters. But if useless and perverse as agents of a 
prospective better world, these views are still perhaps rather useful and sane 
112 
expressions of their own contemporary worlds. We will return to Sade later, but as for 
Birkin's idea of the 'murderee' who seeks to be murdered, it becomes eminently more 
reasonable if understood within the context of the Great War. What perhaps is most 
astonishing about that debacle is not simply its slaughter of millions, but the apparent 
complicity of millions of people in that slaughter. In Britain alone, by the time 
voluntary recruitment ended in March 1916, a total of two and a half million men had 
volunteered for the regular forces and TerritorialsYI] If Women in Love's Romantic 
dialectic is skewed towards destruction rather than creation, so was the world that 
produced it. Holderness has examined how the war is an absent presence in the text, 
implicitly represented in 'the violence emanating from society in the novel'. [32] This 
violence pertains to the 'absent subject' of the war which, in turn, draws revealing 
parallels with the 'present subject' of peacetime society,[33] highlighting the chaotic 
violence underlying the civilised order of industrialism and bourgeois society. 
Voicing the destructive energies of peacetime society which capitalist ideology 
attempts to silence, the text turns that destruction against the world perpetrating it. 
This might only amount to firing bombs at society but, Lawrence would argue, 
metaphorical bombs, as well as very real ones, are all that this world deserves. 
The destructive impulses in the world of the novel, then, can be read as 
those of the war, but also of pre-war society and even the society emerging after the 
war. In order to incorporate all of this simultaneously, the text effects a strange 
telescoping of temporal context. Less than two pages into the novel we are told that 
Ursula is twenty-six (8). Taken with internal dating from The Rainbow (Ursula has 
just turned sixteen at the beginning of the Boer War, October 1899) and the fact that it 
is spring, this strongly suggests the year 1910.[34] However, two pages from the end of 
the novel Ursula is reminded of the Kaiser's statement of 1915, regarding the Great 
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War: 'Ich habe es nicht gewollt' (479 ['I didn't want it']). Given this, and given that 
the characters are able to move freely around Europe, the date at which the novel 
closes must be post-war. From start to finish, however, the narrative is contained 
within one year, not nine or ten. But this need not and should not be seen as an 
attempt to escape history, for the text still pays obeisance to it, albeit in a form that 
resists conventional histories. It is superfluous to ask whether the novel's world is 
pre-war or post-war because it simply does not take the war as a pivotal moment in 
history. Rather than an exclusively pre-war world or post-war world, the novel 
displays a world in which warlike brutality is endemic. l35] In this way, Women in Love 
can be read (in part) as being, not a retreat from history, but a valuable corrective to 
histories which present the war as an enigmatic cataclysm which threw an essentially 
peaceful, harmonious world into violent disorderY6] Lawrence's text, exposing the 
misnomer of 'peacetime', shows that barbarity and oppression do not merely arrive 
with war, but are part and parcel of the persisting social formation. 
Still, for all the condemnation of modern society, it may be said that the 
actual social existence of the main characters, within that industrial-capitalist 
structure, barely impinges upon the novel. The working lives of Birkin, Ursula, and 
Gudrun hardly figure at all and that of Gerald is compacted into 'The Industrial 
Magnate'. We are told that Birkin is a school-inspector, based in Nottingham (53), but 
this detail is raised only to be immediately forgotten. Birkin' s job does not seem to 
encroach upon his life at all - far from it, we find it allows him a good deal of freedom 
to move around the country (53). Apart from this rather unusual perk of a 
regionally-based job, we learn and see nothing of his work. He does visit Ursula's 
classroom during a botany lesson; but any sense of their working lives conveniently 
melts away to allow a typically abstract and obscure discussion, on catkins and 
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consciousness (38-45), which becomes increasingly remote from the realities of 
quotidian life. All this risks the sort of portrayal of society suggested above: one 
seemingly formed by individuals and their personal relationships. But while this is 
indeed the conclusion to which the text readily concedes, it does not entirely evade the 
social level of life. The emphasis on personal life is mitigated by an awareness of its 
interaction with society. Admittedly, much of this concerns an exploration of how the 
personal life might be completely extricated from society; however, in the process, the 
text does point up the difference between an essentially unchanging human nature and 
the identity constructed for us and assigned to us by the social system in which we 
live. 
What emerges is a perception of the relationship between culture and 
nature which elicits how culture appropriates the natural as a means to pass off its 
partisan interests as innocent and neutral: in other words, it demonstrates ideology at 
work. A particularly good example of this occurs in Chapter V, 'In the Train'. Gerald, 
asked by Birkin as to his purpose in life, answers: 'I suppose 1 live to work, to 
produce something' (56). Birkin has just previously mocked Gerald's emptily 
mathematical value of productivity, telling him: 
That is why you work so hard at the mines. If you can produce 
coal to cook five thousand dinners a day, you are five thousand 
times more important than if you cooked only your own dinner. 
(55) 
But Gerald accepts this in good spirit, and his relative social importance too. He sees 
himself at the forefront of a collective effort to improve the material quality of life for 
all. When Birkin mocks his regard for material things and asks to what purpose he 
intends to put them, Gerald replies magnanimously: 'We haven't got there yet .... A 
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good many people are still waiting for [them]' (56). Gerald thus sees himself not only 
as productive but also as progressive - the same identity that his capitalism chooses 
for itself. Birkin, though, allows us another view of Gerald: 
Birkin watched him narrowly. He saw the perfect 
good-humoured callousness, even strange, glistening malice, in 
Gerald, glistening through the plausible ethics of productivity. 
(56) 
Now, it would not be impossible to take both views of Gerald to be 'true', in that 
Gerald's version relates to his visible, external life, while that of Birkin perceives the 
deeper, more covert 'psychology' (a surprising reversal of what might be expected). 
This characterisation bears some resemblance to Freud's psychoanalytical composite 
of an animalistic and potentially destructive 'id', reined in and repressed by the need 
to work and create.[37] But unlike the ostensible political neutrality of Freud's model, 
Lawrence's depiction of Gerald is more clearly a vehicle for political contention. This 
becomes evident in the assessment borne out by the text as a whole that, in this 
instance at least, Birkin is in the right and Gerald is wrong. This is not to say Gerald is 
not a hardworking industrialist who successfully modernises his father's business and 
makes it more profitable; but the 'spin' that he puts on it is misleading. 
Gerald's self-image as a productive, progressive businessman, associating 
private wealth with public welfare, is shown to be a cloak to a more destructive and 
brutal ising essence. Thus in the account of Gerald's undertaking of the collieries, in 
'The Industrial Magnate', the mirage of productivity is replaced by a view of the 
driving motive of profit. [38] And the reader is left in no doubt whence Gerald's profits 
are derived: 
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In a thousand ways he cut down the expenditure, in ways so 
fine as to be hardly noticeable to the men. The miners must 
pay for the cartage of their coals, heavy cartage too; they must 
pay for their tools, for the sharpening, for the care of lamps, for 
many trifling things that made the bill of charges against every 
man mount up to a shilling or so in the week. It was not 
grasped very definitely by the miners, though they were sore 
enough. But it saved hundreds of pounds every week for the 
fmn. (230) 
Gerald, thinking of the former Hindu tradition of suttee, also considers the merits of 
burning colliers' widows on their husbands' funeral pyres to save giving them free 
coal (230). This palpably gives the lie to the idea of Gerald as some kind of social 
benefactor, increasing his wealth at the same time as enabling the colliers to gratify 
their own 'desire for something higher' (55). What, today, would be called 'wealth 
creation', is shown to be nothing more than a powerful individual exploiting the 
many. 
But Gerald is not simply portrayed as a devious 'fat cat': although it may 
form part of the picture, moral censure of Gerald is merely incidental to a more 
insightful social critique. This critique, centring on the reprehensibility of the entire 
industrial-capitalist system, locates Gerald firmly within that system, not only in terms 
of his actions as an industrial magnate but, just as significantly, in terms of his 
internalised values. He is shown to be both proponent of, and subject to, the system's 
self-justifying strategies. And while Gerald may deceive the colliers over their 
additional expenses, he is revealed as deceiving himself as to the system's worth. In 
other words, that which Gerald takes for reality the text allows us to see as ideology. 
Lawrence's 'psychological' characterisation of Gerald, then, besides 
describing his 'inner being', shows the often complicated relationship between what 
are elsewhere discussed as 'private self and 'social being' (103). Indeed, the text's 
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handling of psychology in general is shaped not so much by an interest in personal 
idiosyncrasies per se, as to reveal their greater significance within the broader 
framework of society. The private self of Gerald is shown to be bound up with his 
social milieu. The inner workings of the individual are closely identified with the 
workings of his mining industry and, reciprocally, the 'spirit' of the industrial world 
in general is adumbrated in the figure of Gerald. 
I use the word 'adumbrated' to suggest how industrialism is represented in 
Gerald while also being obscured, 'overshadowed' by its representation in this way. 
An illustration of this can be provided by Chapter IX, 'Coal-Dust', in which Gerald 
battles to check the protests of his mare in the presence of the oncoming train at the 
railway crossing. The scene, juxtaposing two modes of transport, readily suggests the 
conflict between the modem industrial world and the remnants of an earlier age: the 
horse, echoing the world of the stagecoach, is confronted with the railway, the classic 
symbol of man's industrial triumph over nature. The opposing forces are nicely 
expressed: 'The mare rebounded like a drop of water from hot iron' (110). As for 
Gerald himself, though seated on the horse, he is unmistakably associated with the 
unremitting power of the locomotive. His very face appears metallic: 'glistening', 
'shining', 'sharpened'; and he controls the horse 'magnetically', 'with an almost 
mechanical relentlessness' (110-11). More than the train itself, Gerald exemplifies the 
idea of industrialism's immense power, remorselessly annexing all that comes into 
contact with it. The horse too eventually submits to behaving 'mechanically', having 
become 'encompassed' by Gerald (111-12). It is this pervasive, all-encompassing 
quality, however, which is problematic for the text's representation of industrialism. 
Industry is presented as remorselessly destructive and as conquering all before it: 
whether materially, in tenns of the colliers; aesthetically, as regards the colliery 
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towns; or ideologically, as with the capitalist, Gerald. The fearsome invincibility of 
this monster would appear to allow only two feasible positions to be adopted towards 
it: submission or flight. Gerald takes the first option and, in a different manner, so 
does Gudrun, while Ursula and Birkin choose the latter, deciding to escape their jobs 
and live on Birkin's private income. The problem here is that, while neither Gerald's 
wholehearted embrace of modern capitalist values nor Gudrun' s similar enchantment 
with modern aesthetic ideas[39] provide any detailed perspective on that modern 
industrial world to which they are supposed to be responding, the flight of Ursula and 
Birkin supplies just as little illumination. One position is immersed in a crude apology 
for industrialism, blandly dismissing any reservations about it, such as those 
expressed by Birkin in 'In the Train'; and the other rejects wholesale 'the dying 
organic form of social mankind' (132), and seeks to cut free from it altogether. In fact, 
both positions involve Birkin's maxim: 'chop the world down to fit yourself (205). 
Such a truncated view of an unresponsive world may well aid the sense of ontological 
security of an individual within it, but it also cuts short any account of just how this 
supposed breach between man and his world has come about. 
Both Birkin's strategy of chopping down the world and the author's 
technique of representing it as the individual writ large leave a society whose 
workings are as obscure and enigmatic as the minds of the characters. Thus, in 
Chapter XVII, 'The Industrial Magnate', the development of the mining industry is 
presented in terms of the passage from the 'mournful, sympathetic' paternalism of 
Thomas Crich, whose 'mines were nothing but the clumsy efforts of impure minds' 
(217, 223), to the 'destructive demon' of his son who, with 'no emotional qualms', 
establishes 'a new order, ... satisfying in its very destructiveness' (229, 231). The 
miners themselves, 'reduced to mere mechanical instruments' by Gerald (230), are 
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similarly reduced by the text to a barely sentient organism, blindly awaiting somebody 
to give it direction. We may begin to see how the representation of society in terms of 
the individual, while suggesting the private self as a social phenomenon, also allows 
for a countermovement in which potential social analysis is abridged to the arbitrary 
idiosyncrasies of a particular character. Hence, while able to enrich the depiction of 
society, as with the striking interplay of Birkin and Gerald in 'In the Train', this 
method of characterisation can just as easily impoverish it, as in 'The Industrial 
Magnate'. Indeed, much (though not all) of Women in Love represents an attempt to 
blot out society altogether, either by dissolving it into the individual (most notably 
Gerald), or attenuating it as the vague background to the self-exile of Ursula and 
Birkin. This means that society's organisation and value-system, which the text 
avowedly opposes, are somewhat obscured: the text, in effect, shields its own targets. 
Criticism of the social formation is curtailed by the text's refusal to incorporate 
society in any other way than as something to be set in opposition to, and to be 
abandoned by, the free individual. 
Regarding 'The Industrial Magnate', although drawn from historical events 
and outwardly concerning the collieries, it seems clear that Lawrence, in fact, is not 
really interested in the actualities of the mining industry (details, for example, of how 
the miners work and of the issues causing industrial dispute are minimal and vague), 
and certainly not concerned to produce a blow-by-blow history of the industry. In fact, 
the ultimate concern of the novel in general necessitates a privation of society and of 
history. (40) The text's ideology is grounded on an assumption of the primacy of the 
individual; that in a chaotic world it is still the individual human being who can 
provide the best model for an integrated, coherent world. and that society is (or should 
be) merely the aggregate term for independent individuals pursuing their own 
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interests. The text's own historical moment, however, would appear to deny such 
individualism. At the time of Women in Love's composition the idea of the sovereign 
perfection of the human individual was becoming increasingly untenable: Darwinian 
theory was gaining widespread acceptance, Freud's writing on the unconscious 
revealed a divided and contradictory self; society was assuming an increasingly 
collectivised existence (and self-destruction) with the emergence of monopolistic, 
mass industries, the ftrst 'total war', and revolutionary class-action. Of course, much 
of this is detectable in Women in Love - in the quasi-Freudian indetenninacy of the 
characters, for instance, and the intensiftcation of the labour process in 'The Industrial 
Magnate'. Even so, the text incorporates all this in a way that does not threaten the 
sovereignty of the individual. 
A striking example of the perceived threat to this individuality occurs near 
the end of 'The Industrial Magnate'. Gerald, having perfected the profttability of the 
mines, effectively renders himself redundant. Dispossessed of a job, he is bereft of a 
sense of his own identity: 
once or twice lately, when he was alone in the evening and had 
nothing to do, he had suddenly stood up in terror, not knowing 
what he was. . .. He had to keep himself in reckoning with the 
world of work and material life. And it became more and more 
difficult, such a strange pressure was upon him, as if the very 
middle of him were a vacuum, and outside were an awful 
tension. (232-3) 
This would seem to be an acknowledgement that we are what we are, to some extent 
at least, because of what society makes us or allows us to be. I n d e e d ~ ~ here the 
'outside' world is all-powerful and the separate individual reduced to an empty shell. 
This attestation to G e r a l d ~ s s lack of autonomy is, however, only incidental to an 
attempt to preserve the possibility and exemplariness of the autonomous individual. 
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To this purpose the text's ambiguous conflation of society and individual comes into 
play. The nullity felt by Gerald can be seen simply as the inevitable effect of the 
spiritual emptiness of the industrial system that has engulfed him. But, on the other 
hand, that system's previous absorption within the character of Gerald consequently 
denies its nature as something preter-personal. Its historicity, as something which 
initially accentuated, but which now restricts, human individuality, is obliterated by 
the figure of the individual itself. Furthermore, conspicuously external to this tangled 
nexus of Gerald and industrial society is the mercurial Birkin. Amid Gerald's crisis 
we are told that only Birkin can keep 'the fear defInitely off him', but that even then, 
'Gerald must always come away from Birkin, as from a church service, back to the 
outside real world of work and life' (232). Whereas Gerald defines himself in terms of 
his connection with society, Birkin is defmed in contrast to society. He inhabits a 
place that is spiritually apart from 'ordinary' life. This juxtaposition of the 
destructiveness of being within society with the possibility of existing peacefully 
outside it allows the relationship of individual and society to be presented not as a 
matter of fact, but as a problem. The idea of individuality as something determined by 
the choices and opportunities that we do or do not take, offered to us on the basis of 
our position in society, and from a complex network of such choices and 
opportunities allowed and limited by the society we live in, is superannuated by a 
more rudimentary individualism: one that is to be expressed through the single, 
apparently simple choice of extricating yourself from the dangerous web of society 
altogether. 
Birkin's and Ursula's decision to give up their jobs and depart from society 
is, with all its unlikeliness, an example of this godlike self-sufficiency which reduces 
questions of human identity to a facile principle of just being oneself.[41] The 
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circularity of this axiom is indicative of the text's rather desperate effort to maintain 
the myth of the self-governing, self-fulfilling individual. It is doubly necessary, 
though, for a text which has completely given up on its society and any better form of 
'social mankind' (132) emerging from it. The only hope, beyond willing absolute 
human destruction, is to conjure individuals who are pre-primed with a nature that 
transcends their society's parameters. Significantly, Lawrence himself, with Frieda, 
would subsequently pursue a similar course to Ursula and Birkin, in flitting around 
the world; but, whereas his fictional couple are self-dependent thanks to Birkin' s 
convenient private income, Lawrence remained clearly bound to society by a need to 
earn money in order to live; and that he chose to do this through writing doubly 
affirmed his position within an eminently social world, against which he was shaped 
and 'made' individual. l42] In contrast, Ursula and Birkin must live in freedom from all 
such connections and their spontaneous individuality is constructed to allow them to 
do so. 
However, the problem the text faces here is that in removIng the 
'background' of society you remove the very thing that makes an individual 
'individual'. Far from being a bold assertion of personal identity, such a rupture 
between individual and society only threatens to obliterate identity altogether. The 
fact that this is apparent in the newly redundant Gerald, for example, attests to the 
text's Janus-faced nature - perpetuating a myth of spontaneously generated 
individuality while conceding its insufficiencies. It is as though Lawrence, writing in a 
condition of antipathy to society, creates an account of individuality as a means of 
fortifying himself, only for that account to risk buckling under the pressure of 
circumstances that he remained inevitably within, and of the world to which he 
continued to exist in relation. The text is imbued with this contradictory drive that 
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seeks to marginalise the wider social world but which merely succeeds in drawing 
attention to it. This is nowhere more apparent than at the novel's close, with Birkin 
and Ursula, having already shed their jobs, now shorn of their only friends, Gudrun 
and Gerald. The release from these ties brings no corresponding sense of freedom, 
only an impression of emptiness. This feeling of having missed out, rather than of 
fmding a successful way out, is displayed in Birkin's grief at the death of Gerald; and 
it is more than one man that has been lost: the loss of Gerald figures for the loss of 
society which permeates the final scene. Here we are given the lovers' 'world', buried 
away in Birkin's cottage, simply as a dialogue between the couple, devoid of any 
physical detail. The resultant effect of bickering, disembodied voices is curiously 
appropriate to two lives set aimlessly adrift from everything except an acute and 
acutely confused sense of self. Thus the immanence of the social world is felt in its 
palpable absence. And yet, self-destructive modern society has been marked all along 
as the very thing that must be escaped if fulfilment is to be found; so the mood of the 
text's conclusion, which implicitly yearns for a more concretely social world, appears 
rather contradictory; and Birkin, who explicitly defends the principle of a union with 
Gerald, would seem to justify Ursula's censure of his 'perversity' (481). 
This point has been taken up by, among others, Peter Widdowson, and I 
broadly agree with his perceptive analysis of the novel's ending: 
just at the moment of the novel's closure, Birkin, it would 
seem, 'recognises' the flaw in the ideology of liberal 
individualism: that it is both impossible and futile to live 
without - in both senses of the word - social being. What the 
novel points up, by thus running so close to the extremity of its 
own ideology, is the latter's ultimate inadequacy .... He cannot 
have a relationship with 'Society' and be a free individual, and 
in any event Society is doomed by the terms of its own 
definition in the novel - its inherent deathliness. Ursula, of 
course, is right: it is 'a theory, a perversity, false, impossible' 
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in respect of the 'world' the novel has proposed; but the novel 
at that moment recognises its own awesome negative logic, 
and flinches. When Birkin says 'I don't believe that', he 
(Lawrence? the novel?) is rejecting the entire fiction that has 
preceded the statement. [43] 
I would qualify this only by saying that it is not quite the 'entire fiction' that is denied: 
throughout the text there runs an underlying sceptical attitude towards (its own) 
suggested notions of the divisibility of the personal and the social, and the possibility 
of free individuals leaving society behind. Earlier, for example, Birkin himself meets 
Gerald's convenient pigeonholing of women's private and social selves with the 
admonition: 'Don't you laugh so pleasantly till you're out of the wood' (103). This 
guarded maxim suggests the complexity of the nexus of individual and society, and 
the text's difficulty in formulating a credible and coherent response to its own 
questioning of the implications of modem society for the individual. Birkin' s final 'I 
don't believe that' echoes this in that it resists Ursula's claim that a union with 
Gerald/society is necessarily 'false, impossible', while pointedly not saying just how 
Birkin does believe such a union might be brought about (481). His statement, then, is 
less a rejection of all that has preceded than it is a reaffirmation of the text's 
paradoxical vision: one that pleads the necessity of an escape from society and yet 
simultaneously harbours suspicions as to its desirability, and even to its possibility. It 
is also worth adding that although Ursula is largely 'right', 'in respect of the ''world'' 
the novel has proposed', to dismiss Birkin's hankering after a further union, her 
alternative is equally unsatisfactory. What she offers is a romantic relationship with 
Birkin in which they are hermetically sealed from any need or desire for contact with 
the outside world. Thus she demands of him: 'Why aren't I enough? ... You are 
enough for me. I don't want anybody else but you' (481). This kind of seclusion is 
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exactly what the text has previously railed against, or at any rate, what Birkin has, 
with the narrative voice in tacit agreement. We might be reminded of his aversion to a 
world seen as 'a whole community of mistrustful couples': 
The way they shut their doors, these married people, and shut 
themselves in to their own exclusive alliance with each other, 
even in love, disgusted him. ... insulated in private houses or 
private rooms, always in couples, and no further life, no further 
immediate, no disinterested relationship admitted .... (199) 
The prospective life envisaged by Ursula differs only in that, by the end of the novel, 
any sense of community is so remote that there only remain themselves to mistrust. 
Of course, this vastly reduced horizon of human experience is all that the 
text as a whole seems able to offer too, as a direct consequence of its reaction against 
the same perceived narrowness of the 'community'. Thus, from several directions, the 
text runs itself into a cul-de-sac. Ursula and Birkin make their escape from society, 
but what is left for them now? Earlier, Birkin has declared: 'we will wander about on 
the face of the earth, ... and we'll look at the world beyond just this bit' (362). This 
appears still to be their intention, according to the note of temporariness struck by the 
introduction to the final scene: 'Ursula stayed at the Mill with Birkin for a week or 
two' (481). However, this closing glimpse of the couple, shut away at the mill-house, 
retrospectively casts an unconvincing light on the previous rhetoric of liberation; and, 
more detached from the world than Lawrence himself ever was upon his own travels, 
it is hard to see them gaining anything like the same self-liberating experience, given 
that such experience necessitates some relation to the world that they have disposed of 
as an irrelevance. In this, the text markedly differs from a long tradition of stories, 
from that of Moses to Star Wars, in which individual flight from an unjust society is 
only the prelude to an inevitable return to try to create a better one.l44) Such stories 
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recognise the fmal insufficiency of a life 'outside' society and that individual 
fulfilment requires the framework provided by a wider social milieu. As suggested 
above, Women in Love also cannot help hinting at these same things; b u ~ ~ even so, it 
cannot explicitly countenance contact with the social world it envisages, still less 
contemplate its rehabilitation. This results in the text having to turn a temporary 
expedient (exiting society) into a fudged solution, for which the myth of the 
self-sufficient individual is necessary to dodge the full negative implications of such 
isolation. But, of course, it is the same idea of individual sovereignty that has helped 
drive the text towards this dead end in the fIrst place. The vicious circle of proposing 
the problem as its own answer is only challenged by the text's lack of faith in itself. 
The lonely figures at the end of the novel, exuding an air of defeat and patent loss of 
direction, appear as travesties of what the text may otherwise wish to claim for the 
capabilities of the individual. 
But, in one way, it is very apt that Ursula and Birkin end the novel in the 
place which they do. The converted mill-house, originally a place of work and 
production, has become a domestic residence. It is, therefore, a fitting symbol for a 
novel that either omits the need to produce or, as with Gerald, represents it as 
something to be escaped from. This evasion of labour is apparent when Birkin begins 
furnishing the mill in Chapter XII, 'Carpeting'. A sharp distinction is made between 
the value of 'doing' and that of simply 'being'. Hermione, who measures the rooms, 
and Mrs Salmon, who prepares tea, are presented as possessed of a paltry nervous 
energy in their 'gaiety' at having 'something to do' (136). For Hermione, it 'was a 
great joy to her to do things, and to have the ordering of the job' (137). Ursula, by 
contrast, 'hated the palaver Hennione made, she wanted to drink tea, she wanted 
anything but this fuss and business' (138). The pejorative context given to words such 
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as 'job' and 'business' indicates just how completely the novel rejects the world of 
work and production. Ursula's and Birkin's highest purpose is simply to 'be', which 
is just as well, considering that withdrawing from society leaves them nothing at all to 
do. 
One of the most striking things about the text's notion of individuality is its 
proposal that some people are more individual than others. 'We are all different and 
unequal in spirit', Birkin tells Hermione at Breadalby (l03), adding that this principle, 
as opposed to democracy, should form the foundation of a new state. This suggests a 
non-cooperative, wholly alienated anarchism which, reflecting the alienation already 
diagnosed in society, and not altering its economic relations beyond a desultory 
redistribution of the 'world's goods' (104), would presumably result in reproducing 
much the same social formation. The origin and nature of our spiritual differences are 
left undefined. But there is a definite value judgement within the text, working upon 
these supposed differences, and the outcome is a division between those good few 
spirits possessed of a distinct individuality - who include, in different ways, the four 
central characters - and the crass multitude of others, characterised as skulking 
together in groups, amorphous and half-mindless, who - like the 'common' couple in 
'A Chair' - are present mainly as objects of the former set's perceptions. Although no 
clear reason is given as to how this division has come about, its form is readily 
identifiable with the class divide in capitalist society, given a Romanticlliberal gloss: 
a select band of 'enlightened' (and generally middle-class) individuals are the only 
hope of regenerating a world and its insensible populace (who, just coincidentally, are 
poor) from an oppression and decay essentially spiritual in character. But even this 
faint hint of a Fabian-type of social reform is overwhelmed by the novel's unbending 
anti-collective ethos, with Ursula and Birkin seeking their own better life and 
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abandoning the canaille to a policy of everybody for themselves. It is also the case 
that the absence of any real explanation for the present social formation corresponds 
to capitalism's own silence, which implies 'things are as they are and that is that', and 
suggests the vagaries of chance as an apology for the necessary fact of the majority's 
deprivation. 
But if Lawrence's philosophy works as a defence of hierarchical social 
formations, it is far from uncritical of contemporary capitalism. In his well-known 
letter to Russell of 15 July 1915, Lawrence, recognising the malaise of capitalist 
society, recommended a good dose of aristocracy: 
The idea of giving power to the hands of the working class is 
wrong. . .. There must be a body of chosen patricians. . .. The 
whole must culminate in an absolute Dictator, and an 
equivalent Dictatrix. [45] 
This is, perhaps, not so much outright reaction as it is misconceived radicalism. It 
resembles Ursula's call in The Rainbow for an 'aristocracy of hirth' to replace the 
current 'aristocracy of money' .[46] And the aristocracy that Ursula envisages and sees 
herself as belonging to is not so much of the feudal variety as of a Nietzschean type, 
whereby, supposedly, society benefits from exceptional individuals shattering the 
petty prejudices of the 'herd'. [47] Lawrence, then, is not merely yearning nostalgically 
for the old aristocracy, but he is, I think, searching for an image of individual freedom 
once offered but now rescinded by capitalism. Hence The Rainbow's contrast of the 
essentially servile 'children of men' and the free and aristocratic 'Sons of God' . [48] 
In Women in Love this scheme of things persists in a much more 
pessimistic form - unsurprisingly, perhaps, when it has to take into account a real 
world where the masses volunteer for their own destruction before the leaders 
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conscript them for the same purpose. However, m Ursula's harsh treatment of 
Skrebensky in the earlier novel and Gerald's suppression of the colliers, for instance, 
there is a comparable self-justified licence and lack of compunction. Qualities such as 
these point up some remarkable similarities with another radical aristocracy, that of 
the Marquis de Sade. Whereas Sade's 'Unique Beings'[49] are emblematic of the 
energies of liberation (and oppression) unleashed by the bourgeois revolution of 
eighteenth-century France, Lawrence's 'Sons of God' can be seen as a call to revive 
the same forces in early twentieth-century England. Both systems divorce their heroes 
from an anthropomorphic God and ally them instead to a more pantheistic vision that 
abrogates any feeling of responsibility to the 'unenlightened masses' - expressed in 
Sade as an apology for terrorism and in Lawrence in Birkin's and Ursula's removal 
from society. Again, both subscribe to a view of the world as being driven by a 
dialectical process of destruction and creation, whereby that which destroys is held 
useful and necessary in order to allow Nature to create again, in new and better forms: 
for Sade this justifies murder, and in 'The Industrial Magnate' it perhaps explains 
some of the fervour in the account of Gerald's perfection of a deathly industrial 
world. [50] 
The underlying resemblance between the aristocrats of Sade and Lawrence 
IS perceptible from an essay by Maurice Blanchot. Blanchot is writing of the 
tyrannical nature of the Unique Being, but he might easily be describing Ursula's 
self-asserting obliteration of the spiritually dead Skrebensky or Gerald's conquest of 
the submissive colliers: 
For the Unique Person, all men are equal in their nothingness, 
and the Unique One, by reducing them to nothing, simply 
clarifies and demonstrates this nothingness. ... the creatures he 
encounters ... are less than things, less than shades. And when 
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he torments and destroys them he is not wresting away their 
lives but verifying their nothingness, establishing his authority 
over their non-existence, and from this he derives his greatest 
satisfaction. [51] 
But after all, such delirious negation could never alone satisfy the world of Women in 
Love. Indeed, 'great man' ('Magnate') though he is, Gerald's rule must strictly be 
temporary, as he himself is part of the deadly machine world that inevitably destroys 
itself; and Ursula's youthful violence is largely absent from her characterisation in the 
second novel. It is of course this quite different Ursula and, perhaps especially, Birkin, 
who are the real aristocrats of Women in Love. Nevertheless, the contrast to their 
Sadean counterparts is just as revealing as any similarity. The older standard-bearers 
of individualism and liberty may inspire fear and abhorrence, but they also represent 
an awareness of limitless potential and the power to realise it. Ursula and Birkin, on 
the other hand, far from authoritatively establishing their own world, are dispossessed 
- having to 'live in the chinks' left to them by others (361). The reason for this retreat 
surely lies in the differences between the two writers' historical moments: Sade is 
writing in a time and place of revolutionary energy, during a vigorous declaration of 
bourgeois individualism; Lawrence's novel emerges from a world in which a 
stagnating economy has propelled its country into a war of mass destruction, and 
where the Defence of the Realm Act and the Military Service Act confmn the current 
expendability of basic individual freedoms. 
Hardly surprising, then, that the figure of the free individual subject is no 
longer looked upon with awe, but instead with something closer to pity. That this is 
detectable in the text's individualistic ideology is testimony to the fact that, although 
running against the grain of a reality which rejects such individualism as unworkable, 
it is not so naive or fanciful as to ignore it entirely. There is actually a good deal of 
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worldliness apparent in one tacit criterion for Lawrence's individuals: that of 
possessing money. It is easier to live as a free, self-sufficient person when you have 
financial independence, either through owning a string of coal-mines or having a 
private income. In 1914, Lawrence had written more openly of the connection 
between individuality and economic security in Study of Thomas Hardy, in which he 
also suggested society could be altered to enable drastic cuts to the working day, thus 
allowing people time for self-actualisation. [52] The less optimistic period of Women in 
Love, however, sees hopes of social change largely discarded, and a perceived need 
for the case to be made for the desirability, even possibility, of the free individual 
itself. 
Unable to commit himself to any political alternative, Lawrence is forced 
into tortuous ideological manoeuvres which seek to show a clear division of 
individual from society and, likewise, a 'natural' individualism (in fact a capitalist 
ideological construction) as an escape from a corrupt modem world (capitalist reality 
itself). To add to the difficulties, then, in performing this magic trick, is the flat 
contradiction between the text's insistence on the independence of the individual from 
society and its compulsion to acknowledge the financial and therefore social situation 
of its characters. Birkin, for instance, on first telling Ursula of his desire to get clear of 
society, reveals to her that he has a private income of £400 per year (132). This 
information is required for the purpose of persuading the reader as to the feasibility of 
Birkin's and Ursula's escape; but to admit to economic necessity is to draw the pair 
back into a social context, the very thing being revoked. The resulting compromise is 
an ensuing silence regarding Birkin's money, the effect of which, however, is only to 
intensify the impression of its fairy-tale unreality, appearing out of nowhere and 
disappearing again as is convenient. Of course, the text's handling of Birkin's £400 
, 
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does closely resemble the appearance of the private income in capitalist 'reality': it 
seems to exist of its own 'natural' volition, the product ofnobody's labour, recipient's 
or otherwise. It is far removed from the more sordid aspects of commerce. This is 
why, for instance, in E.M. Forster's Howard's End (1910), the Schlegels, whose 
private incomes buy them time to be cultured and to indulge the lower classes, can 
afford a moral superiority to the Wilcoxes' hard-headed businessmen. So too in 
Women in Love, Gerald's collieries fIrmly associate him with capitalist society, while 
Birkin's private income is his ticket out of it. But such distinctions are spurious: it is 
precisely because of businessmen such as Gerald, extracting profits from the 
exploitation of others, that private incomes can be generated at all. [53] It might be said, 
then, that it is the 'deathliness' endured by the masses (such as Gerald's colliers) 
which provides the material for Birkin's and Ursula's new life. But instead of 
addressing this apparent confederacy with an industrial world that the text professes to 
oppose, the text chooses to obscure it. In the end, Women in Love's allegiance to 
(what was once, at least) a major ideological selling point of capitalism - the free 
individual subject - cannot help but draw the novel, however 'unwillingly', into 
defending the capitalist system itself. Thus we get what is, more or less, a complete 
reversal of the philosophy in the Study: whereas that work at ieast suggested that, 
amongst other things, it is because of possessing money, which obviates the need to 
work, that some people can achieve self-realisation, Women in Love - in glossing over 
the same factor while emphasising Birkin's essential spiritual difference - can leave 
the impression that, because he is to a degree already self-realised, he is more 
deserving of £400 per year than the unconscious majority, who presumably could not 
put it to such advantage. Plainly, Lawrence's fIltering of capitalist ideology through 
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the second ideological screen of his individualistic philosophy does nothing to remove 
so typical an apology for the inequalities necessary to capitalism. 
I should make clear, here, that I am not simply saying that a commitment, 
from Lawrence, to socialism would automatically 'rescue' a text otherwise 'doomed' 
to conservatism. What I am saying is that Women in Love's critique of society is 
contradictory because of its adherence to individualism, and is severely restricted in 
some ways as a result. In other ways, however, this contradiction allows for a more 
perceptive critique than in the first place, and it is this which gives the text its 
particular appeal. In drawing forth some of the pluses and minuses of this 
contradictory critique, it is worth looking at another text whose criticism of society 
succeeds where Women in Love's does not, but which also works in a manner similar 
to the successes of Lawrence's critique. 
Bel-Ami (1885), by Guy de Maupassant, shows, not individuals 
establishing their individualism outside of society, but a society dominated by 
individualism, where almost anybody has a chance to make the most of himself 
(although this involves accruing wealth and social status rather than Ursula's and 
Birkin's relinquishing of social contact). In one sense, Bel-Ami depicts the 
liberal-individualist dream of a radically 'open' society of social mobility, as Georges 
Duroy, an ignorant, provincial ex-N.C.O., makes his way to become the rich, 
sophisticated Baron Du Roy de Cantel. But it is this dream which Maupassant attacks, 
for, no matter how brutish, talentless and contemptible a person is (and Duroy is all 
these in great measure), with ambition he may still prosper; on the other hand, hard 
work and ability guarantee nothing. 
One of the most interesting points about Bel-Ami is that Maupassant does 
not simply concentrate on his anti-hero's villainy, but pays rather more attention to 
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emphasising his success. At the end of the novel, when we might anticipate Duroy to 
suffer some form of conventional judgement, he achieves his greatest triumph. The 
magnitude of his success is stressed all the more by what seems a deliberate attempt 
by Maupassant to increase our expectation of Duroy getting his deserts. Immediately 
before the concluding scene, we witness one of Duroy's most reprehensible episodes 
when he savagely beats up his mistress, Clotilde. Far from punishment, however, 
Duroy meets with the realisation of the fantasy of his earlier, poverty-stricken period: 
he does indeed marry a wealthy banker's daughter in a coup 'which would realise all 
his hopes at once' .[54] This, together with his new status as cynosure of all Paris, and 
even the promise of a continued affair with the forgiving Clotilde, impresses upon the 
reader how wonderfully society's anarchic individualism can be made to work for the 
right (or wrong) person, and, as a consequence, exposes just how terrible is that 
society. Bel-Ami, in fact, works in a manner similar to that identified by Barthes. By 
focusing on society as it is, with absolutely no suggestion of an alternative to it, the 
text makes all the stronger a case for needing an alternative in reality. Seeing a world 
that refuses to see its own rapaciousness makes the reader intensely aware of the need 
to change it. 
Maupassant shows, not only how human relationships are reduced to the 
mechanics of commercial exchange - what for example, Duroy can gain from 
marriage to Madame Forestier and vice versa - but emphatically identifies the 
indissolubly social nature of personal relations. Duroy's personal life (like that of 
every character) is clearly intertwined with the social nexus; his (non-)working and 
societal careers can be plotted directly via his encountering his erstwhile army 
comrade, Forestier; his subsequent marriage to, and then divorce of. Forestier's 
widow; and his final wedding to Mademoiselle Walter. Taking the opposite line to 
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Lawrence, Maupassant illustrates that there can be no purely personal relationship 
between two people, mediated outside of society, but that all relationships are tainted 
with society. And we see that individualism, even of the most alienated kind., is 
something that occurs within society, and is only meaningful within that context: it 
cannot be, as advocated by Women in Love, a possible alternative to society, because 
it is a defining feature of this society itself. 
The impossibility of such an escape beyond society is impressed all the 
more by Bel-Ami's realisation of society's omnipresence. In Duroy's rise from squalid 
workers' lodgings, through the sleaze of political journalism, to the dominating 
corruption of high fmance, we gain a real sense of the extent of society's duplicities, 
its hidden poverty, sham morality, and superficial respectability. Lawrence's 
representation of society, on the other hand, in the psychology of Gerald, involves an 
immediate circumscription of society. To the extent that they are not Gerald, Ursula 
and Birkin are outside of society from the start, and, hence, breaking with society is 
presented as not only desirable, but also as the easiest thing to do. As a consequence, 
Women in Love lacks the explicit intensity of Bel-Ami's sense of the great need for 
social change - which is generated precisely because Maupassant makes no attempt to 
suggest there could be an alternative to social life: society, in some form or another, is 
where individuals must live. Thus, in a reverse of Ursula's and Birkin's trajectory, 
Duroy's personal dissatisfaction with the world, early on in the novel, when he is 
unemployed and penniless, is ended by his further immersion within society and by 
his social success. In Women in Love this is the route taken by Gerald, who is a 
success in terms of his job, social status and wealth. But, for Lawrence, such worldly 
achievements are rated at less than zero. Gerald's social success only signifies his lack 
of independent being, and dooms him as just another of society's automata. Unlike 
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Women in Love, Bel-Ami acknowledges the value of the material life, that material 
ease and the obtaining of pleasure are worthwhile things to strive for. The problem is 
that these things are often not merited by the people who have them most, and 
Bel-Ami depicts the irrational way in which wealth and pleasure are apportioned. 
Most importantly, it shows that at the heart of this irrationality lies the philosophy of 
liberal individualism. Describing a world in which everybody must look out for 
themselves, Bel-Ami shows how this philosophy of freedom, which Lawrence so 
cherishes, works through oppression and coercion to support those people in positions 
of power and those who are ready to exploit others. 
Maupassant shows clearly what it means to be on either side of this 
division of power. Near the novel's beginning, we find the penniless Duroyobserving 
the cafe-dwellers of Paris with resentment: 
he looked at the men sitting drinking at the tables, all of them 
able to quench their thirst as and when they pleased. He walked 
briskly on past the cafes with a jaunty air, summing up at a 
glance, by their appearance or their dress, the amount of money 
each of them was likely to have in his pockets. And he was 
seized by a feeling of anger against all those people sitting there 
so contentedly. [55] 
We again see this gaze of the marginalised at the end of the novel, only this time 
reversed, as the rich and successful 'Du Roy' steps out of the church on his wedding 
day: 'The people of Paris were watching him and envying him. '[56] This reversal of the 
envious gaze and object of envy marks the comprehensiveness with which Bel-Ami 
displays society's basic contradiction, as we move from life in the invisible, 
unacknowledged abyss of poverty, to the ostentatious display of society's success. 
In Women in Love. although we see both these sides to society, the novel's 
main protagonists, Ursula and Birkin. are never located finnly in relation to either. 
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Ursula and Birkin wash their hands of the poverty which they see around them, but 
they also feel no attraction for, and do not properly fit in with, the more ostentatiously 
affluent milieu in the novel. As the Brangwens arrive at Willey Water, for instance. in 
Chapter XIV, for the Crich family's 'Water-Party', we are told: 'on the highroad, 
some of the common people were standing along the hedge, looking at the festivity 
beyond, enviously, like souls not admitted to paradise' (157-8). This is the same gaze 
as in Bel-Ami, of those who lack, and want to have. It is never a part of Ursula's or 
Birkin's nature, not particularly because they are admitted to this wealthier world, but 
because they have as much scorn for it as is implied for 'the common p e o p l e ~ ~ who are 
taken in by what is evidently a fools' 'paradise'. Ursula and Birkin neither gaze 
enviously upon bourgeois society, nor comfortably reside as cynosures within it. 
Ursula is always happiest away from this world of upper-middle-class 
self-celebration, alone, 'peaceful and sufficient unto herself ... at the centre of her own 
universe' (165); Birkin can play along with displays of middle-class charm and 
civility, but he is never entirely at ease, 'with his affected social grace, that somehow 
was never quite right' (158). The only thing which does seem 'quite right' for Birkin 
and Ursula is the final limbo which they inhabit at the mill. The final absence of the 
world beyond Ursula and Birkin only makes explicit the social dislocation that is 
implicit all along. 
But because of this total remove from society and that which it can offer, 
Women in Love is impeded in criticising what present society cannot offer and how it 
fails. Maupassant shows Duroy, the individualist, thriving within a world of rampant 
individualism, and shows that this liberal individualism is synonymous with capitalist 
social destructiveness. Although this kinship of destruction and individualism is 
apparent in Women in Love, in Gerald's deathly entrepreneurialism. the text refuses to 
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acknowledge it. Instead, Gerald, who would appear to fit the liberal individualist 
ideology perfectly, is represented as opposed to it. Lawrence's escape route. here, is 
the prioritisation of 'being' over 'doing': Gerald's inner essence (or lack of one), as a 
mere appendage to industrial society, is deemed predominant over his existence as an 
entrepreneurial businessman, revolutionising his mining business, and remaking it in 
his own image. The text thus uses the deadening social phenomenon of Gerald's 
enterprise to emphasise in contrast the vital individualism of Birkin and Ursula· an , 
individualism which is beyond social processes, outside the realm of economic 
production. This is the text's defining contradiction: it can only rescue liberal 
individualism in a form that entirely empties it of its purpose. And, paradoxically, this 
cul-de-sac after all provides a potential route beyond current social values, although in 
a different way than originally intended. The very implausibility of Women in Love's 
alternative to society reduces that alternative to as much of an absence as the actually 
absent alternative in Bel-Ami; and, as with Maupassant's novel, this palpable absence 
of any real opposition to such a destructive society insists on the need for it in reality. 
So, if an apology for capitalist hierarchies is suggested by the text's own 
hierarchies, then the apology is contradicted by what the text reveals: a pair of 
middle-class dropouts with little to show for their money. This divergence of what is 
claimed for the individual and what is actually shown is a major contributor to the 
text's openness; it is, then, an openness resulting in part from the attempt to enclose 
the individual from society. The paradoxical effect of this drive towards closure is 
evident in the text's many intellectual discussions - if 'discussion' is an accurate term 
for what, instead of an exchange of ideas, more usually amounts to egoistic 
self-projection and unshakeable opinion-airing which simply disregard any opposing 
argument. In Chapter II, 'Shortlands', for example, there is a debate about nationality 
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and patriotism. Hennione argues that these things are reducible to commercial 
rivalries that may lead to further antagonism; Gerald maintains such rivalries are 
'necessary incentives to production and improvement', and introduces an analogy in 
defence of the importance of private property: 
If I go and take a man's hat from off his head, that hat becomes 
a symbol of that man's liberty. When he fights me for his hat, 
he is fighting me for his liberty. (29) 
Birkin, who has been steering his own course between these two characters, then 
takes up the analogy to argue that the opposite is true - that property and liberty are 
quite different things: 
surely it is open to me to decide, which is a greater loss to me, my 
hat, or my liberty as a free and indifferent man. If I am compelled 
to offer fight, I lose the latter. It is a question which is worth more 
to me, my pleasant liberty of conduct, or my hat. (29) 
The discussion peters out with frivolous jokes about 'old hat' and the like, which is, 
after all, more in keeping with the occasion, a wedding reception; but the way that 
significant topics are raised (national rivalry in the time of an imperialist war, 
property during a period of social unrest) and contrary positions drawn, only for little 
subsequent development and an abrupt end, is typical of the characters' succeeding 
discussions. Also relevant here, to the novel's disputatious dialogue in general, is an 
objection Hennione makes to the metaphorical style of argument, asking Gerald of his 
'hat': 'But that way of arguing by imaginary instances is not supposed to be genuine. 
is it?' (29). Hennione has a point: analogies may provide persuasive illustrations but 
they do not really prove anything without a sound argument to establish a fact in the 
first place. Yet, remarkably, arguments in Women in Love (particularly those of 
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Birkin) often hang upon analogies alone. There is little concrete reasoning to be 
developed even if attendant characters were conducive to doing so. This lack of 
synthesis conforms to the schema of the isolated, independent individual and, in 
particular, as we are drawn into his interior deliberations, helps to set Birkin apart 
from the world he is to leave behind. I suggested earlier how some of Birkin's 
observations, based upon personal experience which we are not always privy to, are 
made rather difficult to refute; but, for the same reason, it is rather easy to repudiate 
them: closed off from the dialectic of social exchange, Birkin' s vision remains largely 
insulated from the critical probing of other characters, at the cost of also being cut off 
from the opportunity of directly answering these criticisms. Consequently, the text 
does not, indeed cannot, convince the reader to accept Birkin's philosophy 
unhesitatingly. And it is this chasm between different viewpoints which questions the 
authority of Birkin's more than any opposing view itself. The same applies to the 
other characters, as the lack of a real interaction of ideas (between the protagonists, 
not in the reader's response) leaves a plurality of competing perspectives. 
If we return to Chapter IX, 'Coal-Dust', and Gerald reining in his horse, we 
find another example rendered not only in dialogue but also from a more strikingly 
dramatic tableau. The scene's power and the scene itself is generated by the three 
different perspectives of its audience; the most significant, ostensibly, being those of 
Ursula and Gudrun. Ursula, acutely aware of the mare's terror and its physical 
suffering from Gerald's spurs, spontaneously adopts a position of humane outrage at 
the perceived brutality: '''And she's bleeding! - She's bleeding!" cried Ursula, frantic 
with opposition and hatred of Gerald' (112). She goes on to tell the crossing's 
gatekeeper: 'He's a fool, and a bully. Does he think it's manly, to torture a horse? It's 
a living thing, why should he bully it and torture it?' (113). This perhaps most closely 
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resembles the reader's own intuitive moral response, a response further encouraged by 
apparently authorial comments on the episode's ugliness: 'It was a repulsive sight' 
(111). A problem arises, however, in that for Gudrun the same ugliness is a source of 
strange attraction. What Gudrun experiences here is less immediately transparent than 
in her sister; it is a more unthinking, passionate reaction (which in Lawrence often 
signifies a deeper, fundamental truth). The sight of the horse, we are told, twirling 
around from the counterpoised forces of its own fear and Gerald's. constraint, 'made 
Gudrun faint with poignant dizziness, which seemed to penetrate to her heart' (111). 
After Gerald rides away and the sisters continue their walk home, the impression left 
upon Gudrun becomes more definite: 
Gudrun was as if numbed in her mind by the sense of 
indomitable soft weight of the man, bearing down into the 
living body of the horse: the strong, indomitable thighs of the 
blond man clenching the palpitating body of the mare into pure 
control; a sort of soft white magnetic domination from the loins 
and thighs and calves, enclosing and encompassing the mare 
heavily into unutterable subordination, soft 
blood-subordination, terrible. (113) 
Gerald's demonstration of power is both terrible and alluring, with the language 
clearly suggesting the sexual nature of the attraction. Bearing in mind Gudrun' s 
general feistiness, this cannot simply be awe of the dominant male; it rather appears 
that she identifies with the use of that dominating power in a case of vicarious sadistic 
pleasure. This corresponds with the fascination subsequently expressed for the 'foul 
kind of beauty' of the colliery town (115), and its inhabitants who all possess 'a secret 
sense of power, and of inexpressible destructiveness' (118). Furthermore, it is 
consistent with the text's recurring sadistic suggestion of the necessity of perfect 
destruction, whether in Birkin' s vision of a humanless future or in Gerald's flawlessly 
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oppressive industrialism. In short, it is not so easy as it might first appear to decide 
which of these two quite separate, discordant perspectives is authoritative - or, in fact, 
whether either is. 
There is one more viewpoint which, although easy to neglect because of 
its spareness, is significant in its contrast with its more contentious counterparts. The 
gatekeeper's account is without any moral or emotional dimension and carefully 
refuses to join in Ursula's conjecture as to Gerald's psychological motives for treating 
the horse so harshly. After some thought he replies to her prompts: 
I expect he's got to train the mare to stand to anything .... A 
pure-bred Harab - not the sort of breed as is used to round here -
different sort from our sort altogether. They say as he got her 
from Constantinople. (113) 
Superficially, this seems no more than tactful chit-chat. But, in the midst of Ursula's 
and Gudrun's metaphysical transports, it is worth being reminded of more mundane 
considerations. What the unpretentious gatekeeper does is to refocus the episode (seen 
by the artistic Gudrun as 'like a vision isolated in eternity' [112]) within a social 
context. The horse is not just the natural 'sensitive creature' that Ursula takes it for - it 
is also a cultural object, inextricably bound to the human world, bred for commercial 
reasons and purchased as a status symbol. Neither is Gerald's behaviour necessarily 
the manifestation of his own 'indomitable' will, as Gudrun instinctively feels it to be. 
As the gatekeeper points out, a new horse has to be broken in; and this is the general 
rule for all inhabitants of the modern world. To borrow Birkin's metaphor, it is a 
world which ruthlessly chops things down to fit it, including Gerald himself. In their 
perception of events by the railway-crossing, Ursula and Gudrun present a version of 
Birkin's somewhat solipsistic solution to this problem by chopping down the world to 
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fit themselves; and, as with Birkin's prescription, I think it is intended that the reader 
find an authoritative reading of the scene within these two viewpoints. Yet, for all that 
they dominate the passage, both views cannot help but implicitly suggest the same 
unsatisfactory narrowness of perspective as Birkin's philosophy. Indeed, these 
intensely personal reactions may well have threatened to tilt the scene into melodrama 
if not for the restraining check of the gatekeeper's view. It seems to me that this is the 
main intended purpose of the third account - to provide the sisters' flights of fancy 
with a degree of prosaic ballast - but which is, however, only fulfilled at the expense 
of unintentionally destabilising the cynosure of Ursula and Gudrun. Wider social 
realities, which the sisters' viewpoints close out, to the point of creating an isolated 
experience of one man and his horse, are allowed back in through the gatekeeper's 
resolutely non-personalised review of events. This in turn allows a 'subversive' 
reading of Ursula and Gudrun as not constituting the choice to be made (as the text 
would have it) between humane values and the fulfilment of destruction respectively, 
but merely two equally fallible attitudes within a much broader field of contention. In 
effect, the text's individualistic ideology, here expressed in the sisters' separate, 
isolated perspectives, creates a potential formal weakness in risking an excess of 
sensationalism. The counterbalance found in the matter-of-fact gatekeeper, however, 
only raises further difficulties for the ideology itself, threatening to explode the 
polarised finitude of the sisters' views against the societal backdrop of a vaster, more 
complex array of possibilities. And thus the spurious 'open-endedness' of Ursula and 
Gudrun becomes truly open in spite of itself. 
One of the sharpest illustrations of the way the text inadvertently throws 
open divergent readings and re-shackles 'free' spontaneous individualism to an 
irrepressible social reality occurs soon afterwards in the same chapter. Further on their 
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walk home the sisters are watched by two workmen mending a road. The fact that the 
perspective shifts here to accommodate the men's point of view suggests that we 
should indulge their 'sinister' (114) appraisal of the sisters somewhat more than the 
women themselves reasonably might. Their brief discussion concerns their valuation 
of the sisters' (especially Gudrun's) sexual attractiveness. The elder man looks 
lustfully at Gudrun and declares he would give a week's wages in exchange for five 
minutes with her; but the younger man sees and thinks differently, looking at the 
sisters 'objectively, as if he wished to calculate what there might be, that was worth 
his week's wages', before deciding he would rather keep his money (115). It is 
probable that in the contrasting attitudes Lawrence is making a point about the 
atrophy of sensual passion in newer generations and, in so doing, suggesting the 
pervading degeneracy of the modem world. A similar argument is made in 
Lawrence's later, unreliably nostalgic essay, '[Return to Bestwood]' : Lawrence 
laments how, in his youth, the miners were possessed of 'a strange power of life', and 
filled with 'the zest and the wildness of life'; but the miners of his own generation, he 
contends, are piteous ghostlike creatures, filled only 'with a sort of hopelessness' . [57] 
There appears to be a corresponding lack of aspiration in the younger road-mender, 
who clings timidly to the idea of the wages allotted him, an acquiescent cog in the 
deadening industrial machine. Similarly, the elder man is suggestive of a better world 
where 'the zest and the wildness of life' are accorded some worth. In his tacit 
rejection of wage-slavery for a more highly-valued experience of physical passion he 
forms part of the text's criticism of modem (in)sensibility. However, comparatively 
attractive though his virility may be, his attitude remains as enmeshed within the 
confines of capitalism as that of his apathetic workmate. Once again the pressure of 
society forces itself in through the back door, with the same gesture that promises to 
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transcend the value-system of the market simultaneously entangling him up in it: he 
can only assign Gudrun (or five minutes with her) a value in monetary terms - this 
measure is, after all, the socially recognised standard. The man's attitude might be 
meant to be seen as laudable, but it remains cast entirely within the realities it 
supposedly rebels against: they cannot be got away from or changed simply through a 
different state of mind. And here once more, the text's frustrated drive to assert the 
transcendence of individuals' passions over the mechanical social system results in 
contradictory readings. Yes, we can view the elder road-mender as representative of a 
liberating, self-assured sensuality, but, on the other hand, his scope for expressing it is 
'naturally' confmed to the market conventions that reduce human relationships to 
mere exchanges of commodities (after all, he does begin by asking his workmate of 
Gudrun, 'What price that, eh?' [114]). In this vacillation the elder road-mender 
provides an appropriate emblem for a text attempting to escape its own milieu and 
unavoidably failing to do so. 
Women in Love's attempted escape from society lies in its essentially 
idealist and individualistic critique of it. This still allows some genuinely perceptive 
criticisms of capitalist ideologies, but elsewhere prevents the text from properly 
engaging with the social realities it opposes. Its implied notion of individuality as 
something opposed to society, rather than as something produced in society, allows its 
heroes to turn their backs on society as a ready-made panacea to its corruption. It 
attempts safely to enclose a new world within the individual; or, at least, within the 
relationship of Ursula and Birkin. However, all that it can show in the couple's 
diminished, directionless finale irrevocably shatters this vision. The gulf between 
what the text claims for the individual and what it shows of it, together with the sheer 
impossibility of its vision of social destruction, are finally the very failures that enable 
146 
it to succeed in a different way. It is its vain struggle against society that makes 
Women in Love such an interesting, pivotal moment in Lawrence's writing. Whereas 
afterwards, authoritarianism or esoteric mysticism would increasingly shroud this 
impasse between individual and society, here, the crux of Lawrence's individualism is 
at its most exposed, and no less so for the text's strategies of shoring it up. By 
drawing attention to the chinks in the novel's own ideological screen, the novel 
obliquely reveals the deficiencies of the capitalist framework of which that ideology 
remains an issue, and so adds an unintentional auxiliary to the text's intentional 
rejection of industrial capitalism. Instead of accepting Holderness's judgement of the 
post-societal Ursula and Birkin as 'insignificant' ,[58] we should see that their 
significance derives from demonstrating the very futility of their exit from society. 
The unseeing tenacity with which they and the text as a whole adhere to 
individualism, as an oppositional code to the capitalist world, is what finally points up 
the need to challenge capitalist ideology, besides the material fact of capitalism itself. 
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those of war. As Holderness writes, of the anonymous, obedient colliers in 
'The Industrial Magnate' : 'The miners who accepted the industrial and 
bureaucratic modernisation of their industry, and the soldiers who voluntarily 
enlisted and marched willingly to the living death of the Western Front, 
became almost indistinguishable' (Holderness, p. 208). 
See Sigmund Freud, Metapsychology - The Theory of Psychoanalysis: 
Pelican Freud Library: Vol XI, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984). 
It may be suggested that Gerald is driven by something other than profit. 
Indeed, the text informs us that his motivation for taking over the mines is 
not money, but 'the pure fulfilment of his own will in the struggle with the 
natural conditions. His will was now, to take the coal out of the earth, 
profitably. The profit was merely the condition of victory, but the victory 
itself lay in the feat achieved' (223-4). What this seems to boil down to, 
though, is that Gerald is motivated by power over others itself - for which 
money/profit is the medium. The chapter begins with an implicit, discourse 
on the power generated by the possession of money, with details of Gudrun' s 
economic situation linked to the freedom of movement it gives her. 
See her involvement with the sculptor, Loerke. She also departs for Dresden 
at the end of the novel, a city to be associated with modem and deathly ideas 
in Lady Chatterley's Lover. SeeD.H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley's Lover, 
ed. Michael Squires (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994), pp. 6-9. 
This is not to say it casts off its own historical moment, as argued above, and 
by Holderness, with particular regard to 'The Industrial Magnate'. 
As Ursula says, to a sympathetic Birkin: 'Why should you always be doing? 
... It is so plebeian. I think it is much better to be really patrician, and to do 
nothing but just be oneself, like a walking flower' (125). This simile itself 
suggests the novel's contradictory notion of individualism: a flower that 
walks would most certainly not 'be itself - it would be cut off from the 
source of its nutriment and would wither and die. 
Even at his most alienated - living in a country he wished to leave, uncertain 
of a readership after the banning of The Rainbow - Lawrence still attested to 
the inevitably social practice of writing: 'one goes on writing, to the unseen 
witnesses' (D.H. Lawrence, letter to Barbara Low, 1 May 1916, Letters: Vol 
II, p. 602). 
Peter Widdowson, 'Introduction' to Widdowson, p. 23. 
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[44] See Exodus i-iii. In Star Wars, the aptly-named Han Solo, having quit service 
to the Empire and anyone but himself, is called back to social participation 
by the Rebel Alliance's efforts to deliver everyone from imperial oppression 
(George Lucas, Irvin Kershner and Richard Marquand (dirs.). Star Wars 
Episodes IV-VI (USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1977-83). 
[45] D.H. Lawrence, letter to Bertrand Russell, 15 July 1915, Letters: Vol II, p. 
365. 
[46] Lawrence, The Rainbow, p. 427. 
[47] See, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-5), 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969), pp. 51-2. 
[48] The distinction is made by Ursula, who outlines the differences in her (albeit 
mistaken) appreciation of Skrebensky's 'nature of an aristocrat': 'Here was 
one such as those Sons of God who saw the daughters of men, that they were 
fair. He was no son of Adam. Adam was servile. Had not Adam been driven 
cringing out of his native place, had not the human race been a beggar ever 
since, seeking its own being. But Anton Skrebensky could not beg. He was in 
possession of himself, of that, and no more. Other people could not really 
give him anything nor take anything from him. His soul stood alone' 
(Lawrence, The Rainbow, p. 271). 
[49] See Maurice Blanchot, 'Sade' (1949), in Sade, pp. 37-72. 
[50] For examples of arguments as to the necessity of destruction in either writer 
see Sade, pp. 231,238,304, and Lawrence, Women in Love, pp. 128, 172-3. 
The dialectic of creation/destruction - briefly outlined in the 'Prologue' (wr. 
1916) to Women in Love (505-6) - is also discussed in two contemporaneous 
essays, 'The Crown' (originally written in 1915, revised in 1925), and 'The 
Reality of Peace' (1917); see, respectively, Reflections, pp. 253-306 (469-79 
for the 1915 variants) and 27-52. 
[51] Sade, p. 55. 
[52] On why Hardy and 'every imaginative human being' has a 'predilection' for 
aristocrats, Lawrence comments: 'And this because the aristocrat alone has 
occupied a position where he could afford to be, to be himself, to create 
himself, to live as himself. That is his eternal fascination' (D.H. Lawrence, 
Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays, ed. Bruce Steele [Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985], p. 46). 
[53] A point emphasised by George Bernard Shaw in his play, Widowers' Houses 
(wr. 1892), with the concluding rapprochement of slum landlord, Sartorious, 
and the previously scornful Harry Trench. Trench's image of middle-class 
decency and respectability is shattered by the revelation that his private 
income is derived from a mortgage on Sartorious' s property and by his 
subsequent refusal to risk his supposed economic independence by 
withdrawing from Sartorious's business schemes. Trench's complicity in the 
social degradation that he denounces is bluntly explained to him by 
Sartorious, in Act II: 'When I, to use your own words, screw, and bully, and 
drive these people to pay ... I cannot touch one penny of the money they give 
me until I have first paid you your seven hundred a year out of it. ... It is 
because of the risks I run through the poverty of my tenants that you exact 
interest from me at the monstrous and exorbitant rate of seven per cent, 
forcing me to exact the uttermost farthing in my turn from the tenants' 
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(George Bernard Shaw, Plays Unpleasant [1898], ed. Dan H. Laurence 
[Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2000], p. 72). 
[54] Guy de Maupassant, Bel-Ami, trans. Douglas Parmee (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1975), p. 63. 
[55] Maupassant, pp. 27-8. 
[56] Maupassant, p. 416. 
[57] D.H. Lawrence, '[Return to Bestwood]" in Phoenix II: Uncollected, 
Unpublished, and Other Prose Works by D.H Lawrence, ed. Warren Roberts 
and Harry T. Moore (London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 263-4. 
[58] Holderness, p. 215. 
CHAPTER TWO 
'WHERE NOW? WHO NOW? ••• UNBELIEVING': KANGAROO'S PURSUIT 
OF THE UNKNOWN AND THE UNNAMEABLEJI] 
My sometime friend Belaqua enlivened the last phase of his 
solipsism ... with the belief that the best thing he had to do was 
to move constantly from place to place. He did not know how 
this conclusion had been gained, but that it was not thanks to 
his preferring one place to another he felt sure. ... one was as 
good as another, because they all disappeared as soon as he 
came to rest in them. The mere act of rising and going, 
irrespective of whence and whither, did him good. 
Samuel Beckett[2] 
If Women in Love points up the need to challenge capitalist ideology, besides the 
material fact of capitalism, then it is a useful primer to Kangaroo (1923). In 
Kangaroo, the material world recedes even further beyond the horizon of its principal 
character. Richard Lovatt Somers, a writer, who, like Birkin and Ursula, has given up 
society and (at least for the time being) work, arrives in Australia with his wife, 
Harriett. Bruce Steele notes: 'Hugh Kingsmill suggested, in D.H Lawrence (1938), p. 
174, that the initials R.L.S. were an allusion to Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-94), 
who had visited Sydney and the South Coast near Thirroul in 1890.'[3] A comparison 
between Kangaroo and one of Stevenson's adventure stories certainly proves 
revealing. For, although Somers is offered actual adventure by the rival political 
groups he encounters, his story is a 'thought-adventure' (279), one of ideological 
clashes; and, with little material bearing, it might be said that the text and its 
protagonist remain at sea. 
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In Stevenson's The Beach of Falesa (1892), John Wiltshire arrives at a 
South Seas' island to re-establish his fIrm's trading post. Tricked by his competitor, 
Case, into 'marrying' an out-islander who is tabooed by the natives (again through 
Case's deceptions), Wiltshire finds that he has no customers, and no labour to harvest 
the copra that his company requires in the fIrst place. Compelled to fall back upon his 
own means, Wiltshire makes the copra himself and thereby actually profits (the 
natives have been watering the copra, making it weigh heavier, so as to inflate the 
price)}4] Though it is Kangaroo's hero who avers, 'Seems to me you may as well sink 
or swim on your own resources' (63), Somers is floating along on a private income 
and the interest thereon[5] - resources produced by other workers and traders. Whereas 
Wiltshire produces, Somers decidedly does not: he fails, indeed, to produce even 
literature during his stay. So it is that Wiltshire's situation, even and especially when 
tabooed, demands proper negotiation of societal life; whereas, whatever predicament 
society poses for Somers, he can remain as marginal and transitory as a tourist to all 
the settlements he passes through. Despite being courted by political leaders, Somers 
attends just one rally, where Willie Struthers, a Labour leader, calls for greater 
equality of remuneration. From this, Somers concludes that the working classes 'are 
conscious of nothing save that they are workers' (324). There is more to life than 
work, argues Somers, and of course he is right: but, in the present world, any life 
requires a monetary income to support it. Somers belongs to the lucky few who have 
money without work; others have to get that money through work;[6] and. in 
demanding their fair reward, it is surely the workers who are actively seeking to 
change those circumscribed conditions that make the majority of people so 
cash-conscious. Somers/ Kangaroo/Lawrence, meanwhile, who reject these politics, 
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on the basis that even broaching the issue of material oppression proves self-limiting, 
would rather sail free of such concerns. 
Somers offers a sharp contrast to Ursula Brangwen' s battles, in The 
Rainbow (1915), with the social world of the workplace. Her job as a schoolteacher 
establishes a relationship with the outer world, and a beneficial dialectic: 'It was 
always a prison to her, the school. But it was a prison where her wild, chaotic soul 
became hard and independent.'[7] The problem with which many of Lawrence's later 
characters have to contend is: what becomes of independent individuality when the 
individual has escaped this 'prison' of society? Kangaroo suggests one outcome when 
Somers is visited by his new neighbour, Jack Callcott. As he talks, Somers appears 
not unlike the flickering image of an actor on an early cinema screen: 'Perhaps it was 
difficult to locate any definite Somers, anyone individual in all this ripple of 
animation and communication. The man himself seemed lost in the bright aura of his 
rapid consciousness' (38). The impression that his social interaction is a showy 
performance that is somehow false is sustained by Jack's suspicion that Somers is a 
'mountebank' (38). 
It is questionable whether Somers's identity, his individuality within a 
social context, ever does materialise, and this is because he remains so wilfully 
abstracted from society. In particular, when faced with the contest for his political 
allegiance, between Australian Labour and the nationalist Digger clubs of ex-soldiers, 
he finds that the only resolution is, effectively, to do nothing, to confirm his distance 
from both parties. There is a parallel here, with Stevenson's Wiltshire, who is caught 
between Falesa's European and European-influenced trading community, towards 
which he is instinctively drawn but which proves a debased mockery of civilisation. 
and the native islanders, who generally remain subject to Wiltshire's personal 
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apartheid to the end, but upon whom, nevertheless, his economic venture depends. 
This last consideration proves a crucial difference from Somers's situation: Wiltshire 
has a material connection with his milieu which necessitates the negotiation of its 
various social groups and values. Indeed, this connection provides the route to 
resolving his dilemma. The only real threat to Wiltshire's trading success is, likewise, 
the only danger to the peaceful well-being of Falesa: the trading-post of Case, the 
corrupting and destructive influence of which is suggested by the contraband alcohol 
and guns from which Case is most likely to profit. [8] This identity of interests means 
that Wiltshire has to consider alliances, such as with the Catholic priest, Father 
Galuchet, or with the old chief, Faiaso, that fall well short of his ideals. [9] Such 
compromise would appal Somers, who, for example, fastidiously rejects Australian 
socialism for its appropriation of the 'spiritual love of Christ' instead of the dark 
God's 'sensual passion of love' (202). 
Wiltshire eventually establishes trade with Maea, a young chief who has 
his own grievance against Case because of their rivalry for the same woman. 
Accepting that his life is threatened by his own rivalry with the murderous Case, 
Wiltshire knows that his economic commitment to Maea engenders a commitment to 
destroying Case, and thus is set the course of the remaining narrative. In contrast to 
Kangaroo, however, the cardinally important thing for Stevenson's story is not that its 
hero's choices are morally and philosophically justified (Wiltshire'S readiness to 
exploit the natives and to use physical violence remain shrouded in the same dubiety 
that prompts Somers's rejection of all social codes and political arguments); but it is 
that Wiltshire, more simply, is faced by a material realm with which to grapple, 
besides a metaphysical one, and therefore a sphere in which he is compelled to act 
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effectively. Somers, on the other hand, concerned little by material necessity, need do 
nothing. 
For Wiltshire, the bridge between individual and society is further 
facilitated by his internalisation of (Western) social values. He sees that part of his 
commission in the South Seas is to bring the natives 'civilisation': 'They haven't any 
real government or any real law, that's what you've got to knock into their heads' )10] 
But in the nineteen-twenties, Somers finds that: 'In Australia authority was a dead 
letter. There was no giving of orders here; or, if orders were given, they would not be 
received as such' (22). Whereas English imperialism had previously 'kept the world 
steady', it is now itself tottering from a world that is 'sick of being bossed' (63). 
Somers is disarmed ideologically from that self-assured imposition of a new world 
order to which Wiltshire is party. The only way that Somers can conceptualise his 
relation to the world is in a form of libertarian individualism, the debilitated nature of 
which may be best summed up by his abortive self-affirmation: 'I have done no 
wrong, whatever I have done. That is, no wrong that society has to do with. Whatever 
wrongs I have done are my own, and private between myself and the other person. -
One may be wrong, yes, one is often wrong. But not for them to judge' (250). This 
last determination appears, after all, to be in tune with what Somers sees as the 
anti-authoritarian spirit of Australia; but it is, in fact, merely a derivative of 
Wiltshire's much more vigorous libertarian ideology ('It would be a strange thing if 
we [white men] came all this way [to the South Seas] and couldn't do what we 
pleased')(IJ] - an ideology that in the fITst place is materially founded upon comnlercial 
power and, secondly, is underpinned by the values of Empire. Bereft of such supports, 
Somers's version is in no position to exploit the situation that he finds in Australia: 
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rather, his position as an isolate individual is threatened with exploitation by the 
collectivist ideologies of the Diggers and Labour. 
It is largely because Somers is so reluctant to accept the expiration of 
libertarian freedom, that the principal struggle within Kangaroo concerns 
philosophical and political ideas and the threat of Australia imposing itself upon 
Somers. In The Beach of F aiesa, by contrast, whose main characters are materially 
and ideologically impelled actually to live up to the free individual ethic, the emphasis 
is upon a struggle to negotiate human relationships and to impose oneself and one's 
laws upon the world. Wiltshire's wry assessment that Case 'had the brains to run a 
parliament' [12] not only comments upon his rival's management of Falesa's native 
political institutions, but, moreover, points up the fact that, despite such a capability, 
his primary concerns are commercial: action to secure material interests precedes 
argument about it. Contrastingly, Somers is primarily concerned with philosophical 
speculation, and, divorced from action, his life is tantamount to a talking shop. 
Kangaroo offers its own brief account of the different experiences of 
nineteenth-century adventurer and twentieth century 'thought-adventurer' when it 
refers to the God of Exodus, 'Visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children' (284). 
The Victorians' colonial project has plundered the world and bequeathed the gutted 
remains to its descendants: 'They cooked the tit-bits, we are left with the carrion' 
(284). Especially sickening to Somers is the conviction that the imperialists have 
discounted the possibility of there being anything alien which might not be explained 
and assimilated by their own culture: 
the wondrous Victorian Age managed to fasten the door so 
tight, and light up the compound so brilliantly with electric 
light, that really, there was no outside, it was all in. The 
Unknown became a joke: is still a joke. (285) 
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But not for Somers. Leaving a Europe that has been shattered by war and crippled 
economically, it is reasonable that Somers should be alert to an alternative social 
ethos which could offer a new direction. The problem Somers faces, however, is that 
those people who can find no place for themselves in Britain now have more 
difficulty than their predecessors, such as Wiltshire, in discovering anything much 
different in the former outposts of the British Empire. Thomas Carlyle's panacea for 
social conflict in nineteenth-century Britain, namely emigration in order to create 
'sure markets ... among new Colonies of Englishmen in all quarters of the Globe' ,[13] 
has been to a great extent administered. 
The profoundly different circumstances faced by Wiltshire and Somers is 
made evident by a comparison of two confrontations with fear. Wiltshire's first 
experience of the taboo is when a group of natives gather around his house one 
morning, silent and motionless, staring at him. He is scared because 'what scares [a 
man] worst is to be right in the midst of a crowd, and have no guess of what they're 
driving at'.[I4] For Wiltshire, the 'Unknown' is certainly not a 'joke'. Yet Wiltshire's 
fear of the native crowd outside his door is not a bad illustration of the Victorian 
attitude as depicted in Kangaroo: the horror of the unfamiliar and the attendant desire 
to render it 'known' and under control. So it is that Wiltshire sets upon what he archly 
calls a 'voyage of discovery' ,liS] to find and subsequently destroy the devil-shrine by 
which Case exploits the native's superstitions. Of course, Wiltshire is quite prepared 
to exploit the natives in his own way, and his actions perhaps support Kangaroo's 
postulation that European emigration has merely spread the original conflict. When 
Somers breaks with the Diggers' leader, Ben Cooley (Kangaroo), he is consumed by a 
terror that he first sees as being endemic to Australia (211). Having recalled his 
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wartime experiences in England, though, he surmises that 'since the year 1918 ... deep 
in his unconsciousness had lain this accumulation of black fury and fear'; fear and 
fury which erupt in Australia, most likely because of his 'contact with Kangaroo and 
Struthers, contact with the accumulating forces of social violence' and 'feeling again 
that queer revulsion from the English form of democracy' (260). Somers's fears, 
contrary to those of Wiltshire, are of the known world; not of potential violence, but 
of violence that is all too familiar. And while Wiltshire's circumstances compel him 
to try to change them by making known the unknown, Somers's fearfully known 
European culture, spreading itself around the globe, only seems to prompt continual 
flight. 
The fruitlessness of this flight is perhaps indicated by how Kangaroo 
summarises its own barren progress: 'Chapter follows chapter, and nothing doing' 
(284). But this is immediately followed by the self-justification that Kangaroo's 
subject, after all, is a 'thought-adventurer'. [16] David Lodge has taken a similar line in 
likening Women in Love to a 'philosophical adventure story whose chief characters 
are questing, with religious fervour, for some new, ultimately satisfying way of life, at 
a moment of crisis for civilization' .[17] We may readily assent to this as an analogy, 
and as one which holds for Kangaroo. But it is only an analogy, and although these 
novels are similar in certain respects to an adventure story, they remain very different 
in others. It is useful to recall, here, the necessary scepticism when faced with 
Lawrence's self-conceptualisations. So, for example, while, Steele surmises that 
'When, just before beginning Kangaroo, DHL referred to the "South Seas" and 
described his projected novel as a "romance", he could have had Stevenson in mind' 
(361 n. 10:8). it is perhaps more helpful if we bear in mind Stevenson's perceptions of 
an English distaste for romance literature. 
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English people of the present day are apt, I know not why, to 
look somewhat down on incident, and reserve their admiration 
for the clink of teaspoons and the accents of the curate. It is 
thought clever to write a novel with no story at all .. )18] 
Despite Kangaroo being a New World away from England, and although Somers rails 
at the idea of 'being back in an English farm-house in the Midlands, at Sunday tea', 
this is, nonetheless, what he finds in Australia, 'with hardly a change' (36). And 
(notwithstanding the belated riot between Diggers and Labour supporters) Kangaroo 
finds little incident to disturb its accent upon Somers's theosophical sanctimony. 
I do not wish to suggest that, beneath a cunning disguise, Kangaroo is 
actually a 'conventional' English novel (whatever that may be). Rather, it appears to 
be a curious hybrid whose classification depends upon what criteria are applied: from 
one point of view, it is quite possible to fmd that 'Kangaroo readily falls into the 
category of American romance';[19] but, at the very least, I would add that it brings a 
complicated Englishness into the bargain. Lawrence may have told his agent that he 
intended to write a romance, [20] but his text suggests to the reader a different literary 
realm. Paradoxically, to fortify ourselves against Lawrentian question-begging, we 
need only pursue one stage further the Lawrentian method of using Lawrence's ideas 
about art to interpret his art: that is to say, employ the even more incestuous procedure 
of considering Kangaroo via Kangaroo's view of literature. "I don't wonder they 
can't read English books', says Somers, upon acquaintance with the literary tastes of 
his fellow users of the Mullumbimby Arts Library: 'All the scruples and the emotions 
and the regrets in English novels do seem waste of time out here.' This is because, 
Harriett muses, if (as they believe of the Australians) 'you don't have any inside life 
of your own it must seem a waste of time' (190). Kangaroo, of course, conspicuously 
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'wastes' its time with the internal life of Somers; and, while its geographical setting is 
primarily 'out here' in Australia, its metaphysical territory remains overwhelmingly 
'back there', among the perceived Englishness of scruples, emotions and regrets, 
which frequently pertain to the country of Somers's birth. 
Although Somers claims to have been 'broken off from the England he 
had belonged to' before arriving in Australia (259), he only lays to rest the ghost of 
England at the novel's very end, as he is about to leave. It is when Somers is filled 
with longing for the country that he has newly decided to quit that he can relinquish 
his yearning for the country and continent he left previously. A genuine attachment to 
Australia does not replace an attachment to England and Europe, but, rather, nostalgia 
for the recent past (endemic to Kangaroo )[21] supersedes nostalgia for the more distant 
past. This contrasts with The Beach of Falesa's Wiltshire, who admits to having 
looked forward to setting up business in England once again, but censures such an 
attitude for neglecting the very real grounds for staying in the South Seas. [22] Wiltshire 
exchanges settlements, but Somers entirely lacks such a sense of rootedness: he only 
exchanges one set of regrets for another. And this overscrupulousness is particularly 
self-deprecatory because his regrets primarily concern moving on - the only course of 
action that he seems able to pursue. 
Like Beckett's Belacqua in my epigraph, Somers neurotically propels 
himself from place to place. In this respect he also reflects Stevenson, as regarded by 
Lawrence: 'Idiot to go to Samoa just to dream and get thrilled about Scotch bogs and 
mosses. No wonder he died. '[23] But Lawrence shared Stevenson's belief in travel as 
an end in itself, regardless of where or how one ends up: the crucial difference 
concerns how they construed that purpose. Notwithstanding Lawrence's critique, 
Stevenson's opinions of travel carry the vigour of an optimist. Explaining that' It is in 
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virtue of his own desires and curiosities that any man continues to exist with even 
patience, that he is charmed by the look of things and people, and that he wakens 
every morning with a renewed appetite for work and pleasure', Stevenson asserts that 
travel manifests, satisfies and whets this appetite which is essential to human life: 'for 
to travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive, and the true success is to labour'. [24] 
Stevenson writes at a time when heroic deeds are possible on the fringes of the 
'civilised' world (at least in the imagination), but, during the next forty-five years, 
those fringes appear to have been pushed ever further back, and the plausibility of 
such purposive action in the nineteen-twenties has diminished with them. So, whereas 
Stevenson accentuates travelling 'hopefully', Lawrence maintains: 'Travel seems to 
me a splendid lesson in disillusion'. [25] His pessimism can reach such a Beckettian 
pitch that he perceives the purpose - if it may be so called - of travel to be the 
destruction of hope and aspiration: 'to cure me of the illusion of other places' . [26] In a 
world which has become inordinately known and domesticated, there seems little 
place for Stevenson's 'desires and curiosities' . 
Yet, before we accept such world-weariness as an accurate world-view, 
we should remember that Lawrence was, to different degrees throughout his writing 
life, ideologically distanced, and socially and materially removed from the very real 
struggles of most of the people in that world - the working classes. This is still more 
the case with many of the leading characters in the works under discussion, few of 
whom are much pressed by the need for labour and its attendant rigours. It could be 
said that they are denied another of the grand purposes which Stevenson saw to be 
fulfilled by travel: 'to feel the needs and hitches of our life more nearly; to come 
down off this feather-bed of civilisation, and find the globe granite underfoot and 
strewn with cutting flints' y7] Birkin and Somers 'feel the needs and hitches' of life 
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not nearly so much, for example, as the 'hunger marchers' who marched upon London 
throughout the twenties and thirties, and who decidedly felt their journeys to be of 
purpose (protesting at unemployment and penurious benefits). [28] And, back in the 
literary life, H.G. Wells published, in the same year as Kangaroo, Men Like Gods. [29] 
In this novel the depressed, politically frustrated Mr Barnstaple sets out upon what is 
initially intended as a holiday, with no greater end than to get away from his regular, 
wretched life. After a vision of what humanity might achieve in a socialist future, he 
returns from his trip with renewed purpose. Mr Barnstaple becomes, like Wells 
himself, a committed socialist; likewise, Somers inherits his own creator's far less 
distinct socio-political sentiments, together with less assurance in the concerted 
efforts of collective humanity. Somers, declaring that he wants 'to send out a new 
shoot in the life of mankind', is forewarned by Harriett of the likely outcome of his 
involvement with Australian political activists: 'getting yourself mixed up with these 
impudent little people won't send any shoots, don't you think it. They'll nip you in the 
bud again, as they always do' (69). The arrested nature of Kangaroo's narrative would 
appear to substantiate this admonition. Whereas Stevenson finds travel invigorating, 
and Mr Barnstaple discovers new vistas of human potential, Somers's self-realisation 
seems directly under attack from the new worlds offered to him. 
Kangaroo depicts a world plunged into an ideological abyss, bluntly 
presenting post-war humanity's meagre faith in the purposefulness of its own 
existence. Whether in the form of the Labour Party or the fascistic Digger movement, 
conscious, collective efforts to improve society appear, if not potentially pernicious. 
then hopelessly fantastical for want of cohering, convincing convictions. Jaz 
Trewhella (himself affiliated to both political sides) tells Somers: 'seems to me we 
live from hand to mouth. as far as beliefs go' (129). Struthers touches upon the origin 
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of this epistemological crisis (probably unintentionally) when companng it to 
economic disaster arising from the war: 
What they call knowledge is like any other currency, it's liable 
to depreciate. Sound valuable knowledge today may not be 
worth the paper it's printed on tomorrow - like the Austrian 
Krone. (194) 
It is in 'The Nightmare' chapter that Somers will come to acknowledge that the cause 
of his current malaise is his suffering as a non-combatant at the hands of the British 
authorities during the war. In ascertaining merely this much, he is well ahead of many 
who fought in the conflict, such as Digger 'Master' Jack Callcott, who can only offer 
Somers the type of circular obfuscation which would not be out of place in Beckett: 
'You think Labour is a menace to society?' [Somers] returned. 
'Well,' Jack hedged. 'I won't say that Labour is the 
menace, exactly. Perhaps the state of affairs forces Labour to 
be the menace.' 
'Oh quite. But what's the state of affairs?' 
'That's what nobody seems to know.' 
'So it's quite safe to lay the blame on,' laughed Somers. 
(41-2) 
Such bewilderment is accompanied by confused or failed action as Labour, 
'frightened to death' by the idea of revolution (159), Ben Cooley, similarly wanting to 
'blow the house up without breaking the windows' (160), and then Somers himself, 
warned by Struthers not to 'funk at the last minute' from the offer to contribute to a 
'constructive Socialist paper' (202, 200), are all seen as shrinking from their 
opportunities to influence how society is organised. 
On the other hand, Somers is distinctly opportunistic in his 'philosophical' 
twists and turns. He finds these necessary to maintain a semblance of credibility for a 
liberal individualism whose inadequacy he seems to suspect himself: he realises that 
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he is 'isolated', but, simultaneously, loathes the bonds of 'affection', 'love', 
'comradeship', being 'mates' and 'mingling', which loom within the collectivist and 
corporatist ethics of Labour and the Diggers (107). A favourite way of evading this 
impasse is a professed yearning for the 'mystery of lordship'. This 'other mystic 
relationship between men, which democracy and equality try to deny and obliterate' 
(107), provides an expedient refuge from the political groups threatening to impinge 
upon his insular autonomy. Positing mystic lordship as a possible socio-political 
alternative enables Somers to justify to himself his aversion to being a Digger 'mate' 
or socialist 'comrade', and, so too, speciously exonerates his maintained isolation; at 
the same time, this lordship is so mystically beyond rational conception, so distant 
from present reality, as to pose no real threat to Somers's independence from all 
non-libertarian ideology. 
Such opportunism, after all, is appropriate to an ideology of 
entrepreneurial capitalism, itself anarchic, unstable and tom with contradiction. There 
is, however, a further, and critical, contradiction of libertarian individualism in 
Kangaroo (and in Lawrence's work, more generally): despite the novel's inability to 
directly acknowledge this affinity of textual ideology and social reality (the 'whole 
gay course' that it wishes consigned 'to hell' is Western capitalist-industrialism) the 
connection is nevertheless recurrently exposed. It is perceptible even in the motivation 
for Somers's entire Australian venture. Like a businessman seeking to invest in a new 
market, Somers speculates upon 'young' Australia. He has arrived in order to 'start a 
new life and flutter with a new hope' (19): not to 'settle', but 'flutter', which suggests 
both restless confusion and gambling. As to any precise reasons for his arrival there, 
he tells Jaz, 'maybe it was just a whim' (62);[30] and, sure enough, he has landed in 
Sydney on 'the fanciful notion that if he was really to get to know anything at all 
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about a country, he must live for a time in the principal city' (20). He rejects the 
capitalist enterprise in its social realisation, but its often capricious and nebulous 
modus operandi remains lodged in his personal behaviourYI) 
It is remarkable, then, that while such flimsy notions guide Somers's life, 
he yet sees himself as drawn from the 'responsible' class of European society, as 
opposed to the 'irresponsible' (21). Besides questioning Somers's self-knowledge, 
this also asks questions of the social system of Europe - which Somers regards as 
'established on the instinct of authority' (22). What legitimises the rule of the ruling 
classes if they are not 'responsible'? For Somers, it seems that 'a strong boss at the 
head [of society]' is to a great extent justified simply for being masterful, before any 
consideration is taken of what the boss commands and why (22). The contrasting type 
of social responsibility which Somers senses in Australia, one divorced from overt 
demonstrations of power, characterised by 'gentleness', only makes 'his spirits sink' 
(276): 'You've got to have an awakening of the old recognition of the aristocratic 
principle, the innate difference between people' (277). The bedrock of his social 
thinking is not so much a concern with justifying social authority, still less a concern 
with social justice based on equality and equitableness, but instead appears to be a 
desire for emphatic authority per se (though, one suspects, one that does not impose 
on himself too much). Neither is this desire for authority disdained by the text as a 
whole - indeed it is a desire for that authoritativeness which the text itself cannot 
confer: the question, for instance, of the extent to which the general narrative 
genuinely supports Somers's view is somewhat problematical because, while on the 
one hand, the narratorial voice does envisage society in terms of 'great individuals' 
who are innately qualified leaders, and a 'vast, prostrate mass' who require firm rule 
(302), it cannot, on the other hand, account for such a division in any way other than 
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Somers's own style of mystification, and merely asserts the necessity of balancing the 
'two great telepathic vibrations which rule all the vertebrates', consisting of a 'cold 
exultance in power, isolate kingship' and 'enveloping vibration of possessive and 
protective love' (300). This rather echoes the drift of Somers's and Cooley's thoughts 
upon 'benevolent tyranny' (112); but, crucially, there is in neither instance substantial 
justification for such leadership, only insistence. It is a rare example of a text's 
omniscient narrator concurring with a character's viewpoint, only to have the effect of 
withholding any impression of its authoritativeness. Somers's opinions may be 
reiterated with the conventionally accepted authority of the narrator, but the repetition 
only shows upon what meagre foundations rest both his postulations and that 
conventional 'authority'. 
When Somers resolves to remain withdrawn from human affairs, he 
resorts to eulogising the emptiness of the Australian wilderness in an attempt to make 
his own solitude more plausible: 'It's wonderful to feel this blue globe of emptiness 
of the Australian air. It shuts everything out' (204). Such are his final circumstances 
(and, it could be argued, these change little from the novel's beginning), relating to 
the empty space of Australia rather than to its people, a vacant space himself: '''I'll go 
empty," said Richard .... "It's wonderful to be empty'" (204). Despite Cooley's and 
Struthers' flagrant failings, they, at least, wish to give purposive control to human 
society, wishing to engage in transforming the vacant liberty of Australian democracy, 
whereas Somers cannot. While complicity in the existing state of affairs is evident in 
Labour's social democratic reformism and in the Diggers' ultimately conservative 
agenda for keeping Australia safe from either socialist revolution or capitalist 
financial disaster, both parties are sufficiently committed to alternative ideological 
ground in order to try to move society in different directions; Somers, by contrast, 
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only moves away from society as he turns from all ideological commitment, with the 
one possible exception of a lasting reliance upon an anti-societal libertarian 
individualism. 
This libertarian attitude has remarkable affinities with the anarchic social 
disorder that Somers fears at the start of the novel, and which both Struthers (195) and 
Cooley (207) see as the growing menace to human society. But to make the 
resemblance explicit would be to acknowledge the destructive circularity of Somers's 
individualism. So, although Somers readily affirms the association between an 
increasingly deadening, imprisoning society and the 'exploded ideal' of 'democratic 
liberty' (90), and thus indicts the political system of liberal democracy, capitalist 
society's formative ideological component of libertarian individualism remains 
beyond reproach. Nevertheless, the futility of Somers's efforts to remain clear of 
'society', to any progressive end, is borne out by the passage of the narrative. The 
death of 'free' England (we could say, of 'free' market entrepreneurial capitalism and 
the 'free' individual, though Kangaroo does not), the death of the England which 
Somers 'had belonged to' (258, 259), is signalled by the war; in peacetime, Somers 
leaves, arriving in the New World of 'free Australia' (again, we could add, the world 
of a younger, smaller scale, entrepreneurial capitalism), but only to fmd that it holds 
the same fears for him as does latter-day England's 'mob-like authorities' (259). That 
this is so, Somers is able to surmise, is perhaps because of his 'queer revulsion from 
the English form of democracy' that is similarly to be found in Australia (260); and, 
again, Somers comes to perceive that the only challenge to 'the ultra-freedom that 
frightened him', manifested by Struthers and Cooley, is a 'social violence' 
corresponding to that which he suffered during the death of 'free' England (260); this 
resemblance is confirmed by his subsequently dubbing both radical parties the 
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'vengeful mob' (265). Instead of admitting to the condition of libertarian 
individualism as something superseded, as something that has either evolved or 
degenerated into the social form of liberal democracy, and something which 
collectivist political forces seek to transform altogether, Somers holds faith in his 
libertarian creed by (and with ironic appropriateness, single-handedly) reverting to its 
most socially-hostile form. A salient metaphor in Kangaroo figures human society 
and the human condition as a ship at sea; we are told that, during the war, this ship 
becomes 
submerged. Then out swarm the rats and the Bottomleys and 
crew, and the ship of human adventure is a horrible piratic 
affair, a dirty sort of freebooting. 
Richard Lovatt had nothing to hang on to but his own soul. 
So he hung on to it, and tried to keep his wits. If no man was 
with him, he was hardly aware of it, he had to grip on so 
desperately, like a man on a plank in a shipwreck. The plank 
was his own individual self. (222) 
It is, of course, open to question whether society actually is shipwrecked, or if, more 
realistically, Somers, in disgust at the 'crew', has rather jumped ship. In fact, it is 
quite evident that Somers's society is still managing to stay afloat, like Kangaroo 
itself, which follows its course despite the narrator's assertion that 'Chapter follows 
chapter, and nothing doing' (284). It is merely the case that society is not sailing in the 
direction that Somers (or Lawrence) would wish for - even though its repugnant 
mercenary nature, described as 'a horrible piratic affair', is, after all, in keeping with 
old-style libertarian individualist philosophy, as demonstrated by the ruthless 
exploitation of free markets by nineteenth-century 'robber barons' . 
Contemplating the sea following an interview with Cooley, Somers wishes 
himself still further removed from current human affairs, only to expose his own 
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ruthlessly predatory nature. He imagines a life like that of a bird of prey or a ganne4 a 
life spent in 'cold separation', and only returning to humanity as a gannet dives for 
fish, 'in a swift rapacious parabola .... and away again, back away into isolation' 
(138). What emerges in all this, is that same circularity as found elsewhere. It is 
significant that Somers's hopes, here, of 'a real new way to take' beyond industrial 
capitalism ('the mechanical earth', 'a world of slaves' [138]), only find expression in 
atavistic images. It is implied that Australia is a land belonging to a time outside 
European development, but the only opportunities it apparently provides are for 
reversion pure and simple, or for dragging it into the European scheme of things. 
Somers finds it dispiriting that the New World is socially, economically and 
politically, merely developing along the old lines of Europe; but a similar state of 
affairs exists on Somers's spiritual plane, where he too is inspired along those same 
old lines. It is remarkable, for example, that Somers's alternative to the 'mad struggle' 
of modem Australians with 'material necessities and conveniences' (131) should be 
articulated in such predatory and grasping metaphors. This 'new way' of the gannet is, 
actually, libertarian individualism on a life-support machine. The artifice of the 
language is a decrepit ideology's artificial respiration, maintaining its ethos in a 
mystifying temporal chaos: the past, posited as a future possibility, by a man 
overwhelmed by the present - it is difficult to see exactly how this relates to the 
existing world. But then that is the point: this libertarian individualism's metaphorical 
distance from actuality is necessary to strip it of its real human context and social 
significance - namely, as something outmoded and finished, and, more importantly. 
conducive to the current social corruption. Yet, inevitably, however indirectly, the 
affinity with the present world of depredation is betrayed: 
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Beneath every gannet that jumps from the water ten thousand 
fish are swimming still. But they are swimming in a shudder of 
silver fear. That is the magic of the ocean. Let them shudder 
the huge ocean aglimmer. (138) 
The dislocation of Somers's libertarian individualism (and Lawrence's, for 
that matter) from its material manifestation, in capitalist exploitation and mass 
oppression, does not regenerate it as a variant ideology which may be exculpated from 
complicity in the same social degradation with which Lawrence's work takes issue. 
Rather, the bourgeois romance that posits libertarian individualism as the purest, most 
absolute freedom is reaffirmed: it is a freedom available to an exclusive few - the 
'true man', as Kangaroo chooses to put it, who stays faithful to his 'individual 
integrity', having the 'courage ... to face his own isolated soul, and abide by its 
decision' (213). What does not seem to occur to either Lawrence or Somers, as they 
reflect here upon the war that they courageously decided not to become involved in, is 
that those who did volunteer for the front would largely have done so believing that 
they were 'true men', courageously preserving their own sense of 'individual 
integrity'. There is nothing in Kangaroo to justify the assertion of Somers's greater 
integrity; the fact of the matter is simply that he is set against the majority, both for 
good reasons (recognising the prosecution of the war as 'a reign of Terror' [213]), and 
for bad ones (failing to recognise the existence of unemployment and poverty as quite 
sound motives for the 'ghastly masses' of volunteers [214]). But Somers's isolation 
becomes its own warranty: working upon the code of the market that assumes 
something's potential value is in direct proportion to its suggested scarcity. a 
conspicuous, yet finally rather unproductive, singularity is turned into a matchless 
superiority. In a not dissimilar way, entrepreneurial capitalists rationalise their 
economic elevation above the majority. Thus it is that, in such a manner. Lawrence 
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has the mine-owning Clifford Chatterley, in the fITSt version of Lady Chatterley's 
Lover (written in 1926), defend the material inequalities evident in a comparison of 
his Wragby estate and the colliery towns: 
'Wragby is a ship that still sails on in the voyage of discovery 
of new human possibilities. It sails ahead, and the miners' 
dwellings wash along like dirty little craft, in the wake .... ' 
... There would never be more than a few, comparatively 
few leaders and onward seekers. And these would always be 
'gentry'. And they must always have ultimate control over 
property. Must! Otherwise there would be no proud ships to 
dare the unknown seas, all would be a flat-bottomed squalor of 
nowhere-goers. (32) 
While Lawrence leaves little doubt as to the bogus nature of Clifford's rhetoric, 
Somers's opinions of the masses are very much in key with those of his creator. Yet 
the convictions of both characters appear specious in similar ways. The withdrawn 
Somers offers as little hope for the 'discovery of new human possibilities' as does 
Clifford; indeed, he would be aptly summed up by Constance Chatterley's description 
of her soon-to-be abandoned husband: '[he] knows how to draw into his own shell, 
and feel virtuous and noble and injured. '[33] Spoken by someone who possesses 
sufficient means to take economic chances without hazarding total ruin, Clifford's 
spiel upon the valour of risk-taking, pioneering capitalists is somewhat inflated -
especially when considered against the fortitude required for a life of working-class 
labour and 'squalor'; and, likewise, the distinction between the volunteers' 'courage 
to face death' and Somers's allegedly much rarer 'courage ... to face his own isolated 
soul' (213) seems a transparent attempt to hide an obvious lack of dynamism in 
Somers's conduct (although not purely his own fault), in comparison with those who 
fought on the Western Front. Another characteristic shared by Somers and Clifford is 
that the few of the capitalist elite and those of Somers's spiritual elite are necessarily 
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exclusive: Clifford's lordly material existence is only bought at the price of poverty 
for the many; and the nobility of Somers's 'independent' soul can only be maintained 
negatively, as a contrast to the postulated 'foulest feelings of a mob' (225). And so, 
regardless of Somers's (and Lawrence's) express disdain for private property and 
industrial-capitalism (46), his conceptions of and hopes for life customarily reproduce 
the inequitable, predatory hierarchies of the current social system; and, in the 
metaphor of gannets and fish, they do so while bestowing the reputed legitimacy of a 
natural order which guarantees the survival of the (supposedly) fittest. 
Somers's vision belongs, after all, to the capitalist ethos that produced the 
war - the philosophy of free competition between initially relatively small concerns, 
which developed the realities of international monopoly that manifested themselves in 
the 'war for the division of the world', as Lenin put it in 1920: 'a war for the purpose 
of deciding whether the British or German group of financial marauders is to receive 
the lion's share' y4] Or 'gannet's' share, we could add, because, although Lawrence 
would readily agree as to the mercantile origins of the warpS] his own libertarian 
individualism was actually catalysed by his aversion to the mob-mentality of the 
war; [36] and so too, in Kangaroo, Somers similarly opposes the spirit of the war by 
resolving to keep true to his 'isolated soul'. Consequently, the novel can only 
acknowledge the war as assaulting the liberty of the individual in the capacity of a 
phenomenon entirely independent of individual liberty, and not as a product of 
capitalist transition beyond free markets and the free individual altogether.[37] It cannot 
recognise the relation of individualist ideology to the military conflict. Rather, the text 
affirms the virtue of Somers's continued belief in 'the freedom of the individual' 
(227), and instead condemns the corresponding political structure of liberal 
democracy: 'No man who has really consciously lived through this [war] can believe 
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again absolutely in democracy' (216); 'English liberalism had proved a slobbery 
affair, all sad sympathy with everybody, and no iron backbone, these years' (226). So 
Somers blames the public for not choosing the right leaders, the method of choosing 
them, and the political leaders themselves for not guiding the nation with the right 
methods or in the right direction; but he is far less inclined to question the 
fundamental business itself - that of prosecuting wars somehow. It is quite the 
contrary: 'He knew that men must fight, some time in some way or other' (213). And, 
in some respects, this acquiescence appears to extend to the affairs of capitalist 
society generally, because it is as though Somers baulks most at the people who are 
managing the 'business concern' that forms the nation and less at the business itself 
(compare Lawrence, note 35). Even so, he still detests 'the industrialism and 
commercialism of England, with which patriotism and democracy became identified' 
(214); it is just that his aversion both to the present political leadership and to possible 
change from the public 'below' does not leave much scope for forging an alternative. 
Consequently, Somers adopts his 'anomalous call: "Listen to me, and be 
alone'" (282). A call that proclaims a leader, only to immediately renounce 
leadership, sums up the paralysing contradiction that is Somers, and Kangaroo itself. 
This ensnarement between individualist belief in 'every man [being] by himself, 
alone 'with the dark God' (282), and conviction in the necessity of a 'supreme 
responsibility', a 'communion in power', offering 'Sacrifice ... to the men in whom 
the dark God is manifest' (283), is parallel to contemporary capitalism, which has 
seen the necessary supplementation of free-market libertarianism with the overarching 
absolutism of monopolistic power. And, as Lenin identified: 
Monopoly is exactly the opposite of free competition; but we 
have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before 
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our very eyes, creating large-scale industry and eliminating 
small industry ... manipulating thousands of millions. At the 
same time monopoly, which has grown out of free 
competition, does not abolish the latter, but exists over it and 
alongside of it, and thereby gives rise to a number of very 
acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. [38) 
Such conflicts abound in Kangaroo, one of the most remarkable being the glaring 
contradiction of Somers's condemnation of the passive opposition to the war of the 
'well-bred, really cultured classes': 
They shirked their duty. It is the business of people who really 
know better to fight tooth and nail to keep up a standard, to 
hold control of authority. Laisser-aller is as guilty as the actual, 
stinking mongrelism it gives place to. (217) 
Disregarding the fact that minimal interference in social and economic affairs is a 
long-established convention of the superannuated 'free' England to which Somers 
elsewhere professes his attachment (258), he suggests that it is an obligation of the 
fully individualised to fully exert their power; that they move, as it were, from their 
small-scale private spheres to establishing their order in the large-scale public world, 
holding control of the 'squirming millions' (257). And such criticism of the old liberal 
elite appears increasingly hypocritical when it is considered that Somers (himself of 
the individuated, cultured class) finds that he is unable to define or pledge himself to a 
serviceable ideology of socio-political authority, precisely because of his 
individualism, and, furthermore, resolves to adopt the same 'laisser-aller' attitude as a 
direct consequence of reckoning with his own experiences during the war: 'Humanity 
could do as it liked: he did not care'; 'damn his own interfering, nosy self (265, 272). 
So it is that, by dint of Somers's own social criticism, this new life of determinedly 
detached disinterest is shown to remain intimately connected and implicated in the 
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'stinking mongrelism' which it allows to thrive. The discrete purity of Somers's 
libertarian individualism, secluded from the corruption of society, is fundamentally 
thrown into question. 
The fact that Somers is often criticised by the narrator may suggest a 
divergence between the standpoints of Lawrence and his character, and that Lawrence 
is quite conscious of the unavailing circularity of Somers's quest for a new, socially 
disengaged individuality. However, any distinction becomes less clear if we bear in 
mind that Lawrence himself frequently felt the compulsion to try to lead a similar 
life.[39] It could be the case that Kangaroo is a self-parody, but, despite the instances of 
narratorial disparagement, it seems to this reader that Somers is still the focus for our 
sympathies (besides his wife, Harriett, who would actually be at least as happy as her 
husband, withdrawn from the world, 'knowing nobody' but each other [67]). Perhaps 
the reason why any sympathy remains with Somers is precisely that there is as little in 
the world of Kangaroo for us as there is for him which could convincingly plug the 
ideological hole opened up in his crisis. So, in effect, he wins our sympathy by 
default: there is nothing particularly appealing in Somers himself, but then there is 
neither much of appeal in the people and politics about him. 
A more constructive appraisal of this situation is suggested by Macdonald 
Daly's contention that 'Richard Lovatt Somers is a prototype of the nomadic, restless, 
rootless postmodernist subject':[40] the text's ideological wilderness prefigures our 
own age of, supposedly, collapsed faith in those belief-systems, or 'metanarratives', 
which purport to give the 'True' meaning of human life and legitimate its direction; 
belief-systems such as socialism and nationalism, for example. There is certainly a 
strong prima facie case for considering Kangaroo as our contemporary; and it is 
worth adding, indeed, that it offers a number of parallels with postmodernity which 
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may be seen not merely as an evidential foreshadowing of our present prescribed 
condition, but as suggesting the dubious nature of the diagnosis itself. So, for 
instance, we may consider the fact that Somers's scepticism exists within a society 
where many people (Labour, the Diggers) clearly do feel that there are worthwhile 
things in which to believe and struggle for: this is not dissimilar to the current 
scepticism shown by narrow political elites of the West for such a concept as 
nationalism, for example.l41 ] 
The novel sketches in another contradiction of postmodemity with the 
contrast of Somers's indulgent, laisser-aller view of the political crisis, which holds 
that the opposing parties are not fighting over anything that is really worthwhile 
stirring oneself about, with his repeated protest at the violence in society that 
repeatedly assaults such libertarian principles; and this contrast is strengthened with 
direct evidence, too, of the quite uncompromising brutality of the political contention 
itself, as depicted in the fight in Canberra Hall between Labour supporters and 
Diggers, in which Somers himself is momentarily consumed by a desire to kill the 
ex-soldiers (314). We may find in postmodernity that, not dissimilarly, rhetorical 
libertarianism is circumscribed in actuality: it may be quite acceptable, for example, 
to use Lenin as an authority in an academic essay, but the slightest hint of leaning 
towards him as an authority for organising social life is likely to prompt a starkly 
illiberal response from the dominant powers (thus with the USA's 'destabilisation' of 
the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, for example). Both our world and that of 
Kangaroo show a disjunction between a refined 'laisser-aller' pose and hard political 
reality. Additionally, because of Somers's disengaged pluralism, condescending to 
accept the existence of variant political ideologies (albeit as symptoms of an 'old 
ideal' [265]) while never once committing himself to contribute to political change, 
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his philosophical soul-searching remaIns just that - a pitiably self-regarding, 
fruitlessly abstract meandering; and one which appears to be paid for, after all, by a 
private income - revenues from his own literal investment in the capitalist system that 
he reviles. In this much again, we may see that he is cut from the same template as 
postmodernism, if we regard the latter as an ideology which, on one hand, demands 
difference, a generous pluralism, the shattering of oppressively imperialist 'universal' 
values, while, on the other hand, doing so from conspicuously limited sites (Western 
universities and culture industries, for example) and within the unchallenged 
meta-narrative and 'universal' values of Western capitalism. Both Somers and 
postmodernism stress the importance of the relative, conceiving a decentred hybrid 
world, but they do so to the extent that this view itself becomes an unquestionable 
absolute: thus, just as postmodernism often seems to propound the relativity of 
everything but itself (which remains the world view),[42] the fragmented, relativistic 
individualism of Somers finally asserts: 'the self is absolute. It may be relative to 
everything else in the universe. But to itself it is an absolute' (280). Both Somers and 
postmodernism strive towards monopoly even as they call for plurality and 
micro-politics (,Listen to me, and be alone' [282]): they can both be seen as cultural 
products that reflect capitalism's contradictory development into a monolithic 
imperialism at odds with the residual free enterprise that is its essence. And, 
apparently remorselessly reproducing itself as it endlessly deconstructs and 
re-deconstructs 'illusorily' unified subjects, postmodernism, so it may be suggested, 
in sympathy with the processes of capitalist decay,[43] nevertheless does so with a 
tendency for falling intellectual profitability - as does Kangaroo, 'extending itself 
gratuitously, prolonging its own nothingness ad nauseam' .[44] 
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The textual effect, therefore, is to point up the mortification of the ideal of 
the proud, single, individual, in that, far from playing the inspirational creature who is 
self-liberated from shipwrecked society, Somers only achieves the passivity of 
driftwood. In fact, it could be argued that postmodernism itself has yet to move 
beyond such passivity, 'drifting the face of the sea' (259) of a broad but empty 
academicism, so to speak. F or instance, Kangaroo once more prefigures 
postmodernism in that, despite its (inadvertent) debunking of independent 
individuality, it remains unable or unwilling to finally move beyond an individualist 
ethos. Terry Eagleton has remarked thus upon the work of the feminist 
post-structuralist, Julia Kristeva, who proposes a 'semiotic force which disrupts all 
stable meanings and institutions': 
the dismantling of the unified subject [is not] a revolutionary 
gesture in itself. Kristeva rightly perceives that bourgeois 
individualism thrives on such a fetish, but her work tends to 
halt at the point where the subject has been fractured and 
thrown into contradiction. For Brecht, by contrast, the 
dismantling of our given identities through art is inseparable 
from the practice of producing a new kind of human subject 
altogether, which would need to know not only internal 
fragmentation but social solidarity ... )45) 
Such a point of arrest seems to be arrived at already in Kangaroo, although, to be fair, 
the novel does posit the necessity of social integration, at the same time as it tries to 
salvage a credible heroic individualism: 'It is the individual alone who can save 
humanity alive. But the greatest of great individuals must have deep, throbbing roots 
down in the dark red soil of the living flesh of humanity' (302). The fact remains, 
however, that neither project can be sustained, with the vain attempt to fasten together 
individual integrity matched by a pessimism as to establishing social communion, in 
the present world, at least. What occurs, instead, is a postmodernist repeated 
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'dismantling' of 'illusory' unifieds, as Somers seeks a solid basis for social order, 
only to fmd it melting into air. So Jack Callcott, for instance, who, as a leading 
proponent of the Diggers, would appear to represent a new order, social unity and the 
hope of purposive action, ends up causing only disorder through his blind bloodlust of 
the 'atavistic white' (321), as he disrupts the Labour meeting at Canberra Hall. The 
extent of his divided self has already been pointedly revealed by his wife's reflection 
that the 'stalwart' Jack is nonetheless 'like a piece of driftwood drifting on the strange 
unknown currents in an unexplored nowhere, without any place to arrive at' (75). 
Significantly, it is, of course, precisely this desultory image which characterises - for 
all his bluster about the condition of the world - Somers's identical lack of agency in 
changing it (222, 259). 
If no new hope is found in the new people whom Somers meets, then 
some inspiration seems to be offered by new locations, not least the cottage that he 
and Harriett borrow from the Callcotts at Mullumbimby. The house supplies a 'cool 
and fresh and detached' ambience which corresponds with Somers's ideal of the 
discrete, independent subject (147). However, even the edge of the Pacific Ocean 
provides nowhere for a unified individual to remain aloof from the pressing concerns 
of the world. There is an early suggestion of the place's own independent unity being 
dismantled when one of the house's veranda doors is opened and 'the noise of the sea' 
enters, 'frightening, like guns' (81); and, sure enough, it is by this sea that Jack 
propounds the values he learned in the army as an exemplary guide for reshaping 
society (89). The values of the war which nearly destroyed Somers and sent him half 
way round the globe persist; that which broke Somers's belief in collective human 
enterprise now returns to shatter the illusion of his isolate integrity. 
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So it is that, when Somers does contemplate his problems concerning 
society, social negotiation is supplanted by the suggestion of a battle against 
humankind: 'I must fight out something with mankind yet. 1 haven't fmished with my 
fellow-men. I've got a struggle with them yet' (68). The noticeable focus, here, upon 
his own being, is maintained even as he problematises his social alienation - it is 
regarded in wholly personal terms: 
1 want to do something with living people, somewhere, 
somehow, while 1 live on the earth. 1 write, but 1 write alone. 
And 1 live alone. Without any connection whatever with the 
rest of men. (69) 
The relentless fIrst-person pronoun, countered only by an awareness (tantamount to a 
dismissal) of the world beyond him as 'the rest', further points up Somers's 
detachment, even as he supposedly begins to address the problem. That all this is, in 
fact, rather self-indulgent introversion is nailed home by his wife, who reminds him of 
the one connection which he does have: 'Don't swank, you don't live alone. You've 
got me there safe enough, to support you' (69). His marriage is the only thing that 
supplies Somers's existence with worldly significance, and Harriett is the only person 
willing to underpin his spiritual aspirations with a necessary consideration of 
practicalities. But the only effect of Somers's attempts to envision better relations 
with others is to risk the severance of this last meaningful association. 
The reason why the Somerses' marriage does not end up on the rocks, 
though, becomes evident in the chapter entitled 'Harriett and Lovatt at Sea in 
Marriage', in the recapitulation of the very strife which their relationship endures. It 
seems that Somers's belief in his prevailing, absolute individualism can only be 
maintained, paradoxically, by establishing his " ascendency , over another - Harriett: 
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'so that he could refute her, deny her, and imagine himself a unique male' (175). 
Indeed, everything else beyond Somers's own person must be thus subjected, or, if 
this is not possible, rejected. The resultantly contracted sphere which Somers's 
individualism must inhabit is suggested in his sophistical retrieval of a last reassuring 
'universal' value: 'the self is absolute. It may be relative to everything else in the 
universe. But to itself it is an absolute' (280). It is striking that this 'absolute' is 
expressed as a relation ('to itself), and all such self-relations, after all, are absolutes -
there is nothing special about the self; but it is, of course, somewhat easier to maintain 
universal values when you thus circumscribe your universe. Indeed, the formula for 
this absolute is a prescription for rejecting 'everything else', because, while he just 
may be able to persuade himself of the possibility of subjecting Harriett (though she 
remains far from convinced), the rest of the world proves more refractory. 
In accordance with his societal relativism, Somers's response to the 
practical problems caused by social coercion during the war is simply to deny their 
critical importance to the course of his 'inward fate' (222); and, having established 
this pseudo-sovereignty, he is primed to dismiss the concomitant psychological 
hazard by inverting his initial intuitive response to his victimisation, and so regains a 
sense of individual integrity: 
'Even if I commit what they call a crime, why should I accept 
their condemnation or verdict. Whatever I do, I do of my own 
responsible self. I refuse their imputations .... ' 
So, when ever the feeling of terror came over him, the 
feeling of being marked-out, branded, a criminal marked out 
by society, marked-out for annihilation, he pulled himself 
together, saying to himself: 
, .... let me never admit for one single moment that they may 
be my judges. That, never. I have judged them: they are 
canaille. I am a man, and I abide by my own soul. Never shall 
they have a chance of judging me.' (250) 
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Viewed from this slant, it is as if the antipathy between society and Somers is a 
reciprocal struggle between equals in power, while the putative authority of the 
narrative voice suggests the pre-eminent legitimacy of Somers's interior domain, with 
the dictum that one has to 'fear one's own inward soul, and never to fear the outside 
world, nay, not even one single person, nor even fifty million persons' (250). My 
issue with this is not that such argument so obviously flies in the face of reality (it is a 
quite understandable tactic in such conditions), but that it is regarded as sufficient in 
itself for coping with a world which so easily countermands individual autonomy, 
and, moreover, that it is considered serviceable in circumstances generally. Although 
this attitude emerges during the war, it is remembered and consolidated by Somers 
(and by the author himself, after very similar wartime experiences) years afterwards; 
and what proved expedient during that earlier crisis is held to be valid and vital to his 
current well-being in Australia. 
But there is a greater crisis affecting Kangaroo's post-war society in 
general: it, too, has yet to find a way of sufficiently extricating itself from the war. 
Rather than building, in Somers's words, 'a way for the afterwards' (68), society 
would appear only to hold faith with attitudes, principles and institutions which bear 
semblance to those of the recent conflict. The Diggers want to maintain militaristic 
values in civil society, and, while Labour's rhetoric speaks of revolution, its belief in 
future social change goes no further than the hope that someday people may 'feel the 
same [spunk] again' which they felt during the war (195). The war, which destroyed 
so much, now remains as the most inspiring example of a socially uniting experience. 
This situation is fraught with problems, not least because the status of the 
war as a catalyst and marker of the disintegration of socially uniting ideas is 
repeatedly asserted throughout Lawrence's work. In the "Epilogue' (written in 1924) 
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to Movements in European History, he summarised the new world thus: 'Our great 
idea, during the last hundred years, has been the idea of Progress. .. . We none of us 
believe in our ideals any more. Our ideal, our leading ideas, our growing tip were shot 
away in the Great War. '[46J SO it is, that, in Lady Chatterley's Lover (1928): 
All the great words, it seemed to Connie, were cancelled for 
her generation: love, joy, happiness, home, mother, father, 
husband, all these great dynamic words were half-dead now, 
and dying from day to day. [47J 
And, in Tuscany, Lawrence reflects: 
though it is bad enough to have been of the war generation, it 
must be worse to have grown up just after the war. One can't 
blame the young, that they don't find that anything amounts to 
anything. The war cancelled most meanings for them. [48J 
However, to suggest in this way that his own view of the war is the universal view is 
somewhat to exaggerate. One thing, for example, to emerge from the war was 
Russia's Bolshevik Revolution - a 'leading idea' of 'Progress' for many people, not 
least for the younger generation (whose ideals, though, are customarily disregarded as 
reprehensibly naive).l49J In his 'Epilogue' to Movements in European History, 
Lawrence dismisses the Revolution as no significant development itself, merely the 
consequence of Tsarist Russia having yet to rise from its 'temporary grave' yOJ But it 
could be said with greater credibility that it is Lawrence who still tends the grave of 
the Whiggishly high-minded England that was, if not buried, then served with the last 
rites by the war's demolition of H.H. Asquith's Liberals. Kangaroo certainly seems 
haunted by the faded dream of a more decent, gentlemanly, governing class; of the 
'right' kind of aristocracy, but an aristocracy, nonetheless: 
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some sort of a new show: a new recognition of the 
life-mystery, a departure from the dreariness of 
money-making, money-having, and money-spending. It meant 
a new recognition of difference, of highness and of lowness, of 
one man meet for service and another man clean with glory, 
having majesty in himself, the innate majesty of the purest 
being, not the strongest instrument, like Napoleon. (303) 
Such grand phraseology tends to disclose that which it is usually designed 
to conceal: the woolly thinking behind a 'new show' that can never be realised beyond 
rhetoric. It is grandiloquence that leaves, untouched, the world of irresolution and 
depressingly modest ambitions against which it seeks to rebel. But, if one is unhappy 
with the current state of affairs, and yet spurns comparatively well-developed 
ideologies and political movements which profess to the aspiration of procuring great 
change, then this is the world that one must inhabit. 
Lawrence, though, remains tom between accepting reduced human 
circumstances, and railing against such acquiescence by means of big, but empty, 
gestures. This tension seems to run through Lawrence's post-war novels, but it is 
especially strong in Kangaroo: it is apparent in the pointed contrast between the little, 
cosily-named cottages in which Kangaroo's Australians live and the text's 
disquisitions upon the vast empty space of the Australian wilderness; and it is 
epitomised in Somers's trademark call: 'Listen to me and be alone' - a call for 
solidarity in the idea that it is best to break with all such human communion. 
It is in recognising his need to detach himself from society that Somers 
comes up with his antithetical interpretation of the expression 'fly in the ointment': 
'I am a fool,' said Richard to himself, 'to be floundering round 
in this easy, cosy, all-so-friendly world. I feel like a fly in the 
ointment. For heaven's sake let me get out. I suffocate.' (279) 
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However, this proposed break for freedom immediately suggests its own 
inconsequentiality when Somers allows that 'If you're going to get out you must have 
something to get out on to': the only 'something' that he can supply is his 'own self 
(279). The metaphor proposes the sort of improbable gymnastics which perfectly 
accord with the endless intellectual somersaults required to uphold this 
self-supporting individuality. It suggests that denial of the outside world which is 
identified by Beckett in my epigraph: as the feckless Belacqua attempts to evade a 
sense of impending punishment from the 'Furies', his 'solipsism' renders each 
prospective new place 'as good as another, because they all disappeared as soon as he 
came to rest in them'. The entire world exists only as an object of the individual's 
consciousness, its separate independence obliterated by a delusively rampant ego, in 
much the same way as, in my previous chapter, we saw Birkin console himself, at the 
end of Women in Love, with a vision of the obliteration of humanity. In contrast to 
this prospective genocide, however, 'getting away' perhaps represents, if not actually 
a source of hope, a pis aller in the face of an inimical world that, otherwise, allows 
little space for individual freedom. 
'Disillusion' is, however, what Lawrence often found with each 
peregrination: no more so than upon his own return to London, at the start of 
December 1923. Lawrence was only all the more conscious of his distaste for urban 
England when he wrote to a friend in New York: 'Here I am back in London. It seems 
very dark, and one seems to creep under a paving-stone of a sky, like some insect in 
the damp. '[51] His reaction to the metropolis may provide a fitting description of life in 
polluted, wintry London, but it is also of a piece with the abhorrence that 
commentators over the past century had expressed at increasing urbanisation and in 
. 1· [52) And· La · perceiving a more fundamental process of SOCIal dec lne. In wrence s 
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attitude at this time, the decline had reached the point of pitching English culture in its 
entirety into the abyss. While staying in Hampstead, he wrote: 'London - gloom -
yellow air - bad cold - bed - old house - Morris wall-paper - visitors - English voices -
tea in old cups - poor D.H.L. perfectly miserable, as if he was in his tomb. '[53) 
Quintessential markers of Englishness, not least William Morris's attempts to restore 
England's beauty, are, simultaneously, markers of decay. 
Lawrence was not alone in thinking this. In Aldous Huxley's Antic Hay, 
London is similarly seen as a haven for 'darkness, disorder and dirt' . [54) The efforts of 
the previous generation to beautify England are ridiculed: 'Poor Aunt Aggie with her 
Arts and Crafts, and her old English furniture. And to think she had taken them so 
seriously! '[55) And the contemporary architectural critic, A. Trystan Edwards, similarly 
cites among the chief agents of degradation those nineteenth-century designers who 
most wished to change society for the better: the Arts and Crafts movement is 
dismissed as a 'costly vulgarity', and a Ruskin-designed, red-brick, gabled house, set 
amid a row of stuccoed, more classical buildings, is likened to 'a pointed and 
discoloured tooth in the midst of a pearly white row having the normal square-shaped 
tops' . [56) It seems that part of the very 'tradition' of protest at the squalor of England's 
cities, to which Lawrence, Huxley and Edwards could be seen to be contributing, is 
now being repudiated as part of the gloominess that it set out to dispell. This in itself 
raises no problem for the social critic, providing his criticism can find another 
platform upon which to establish itself. Edwards founds his case upon a sure assertion 
that our cities would benefit from rediscovering the 
sedate and comely forms of the 18th century houses [which] 
are a perfect embodiment of the social spirit. They belong to 
the community, they are born of the discovery that in domestic 
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architecture individuality is most securely established when 
houses defer to a common cultural standard. [57] 
In Antic Hay, the lack of such a standard produces a milieu of chaotic absurdity; 
nevertheless, there are standards from which individuals seek to improve their lives. 
It is just that, whether it be Theodore Gumbril' s wish for the influence and material 
successes of 'the Complete Man', his father's grand dream of building Wren's 
London, or Casimir Lypiatt's imitation of a Renaissance man, all such efforts have a 
paltry outcome and fail to connect with wider society. [58) In Kangaroo, by contrast, all 
ideals and objectives are inherently dubious, and, without any model for changing the 
present world, there exists the real risk that social criticism will mutate into a 
denunciation of sociality itself. 
And so it is that Somers feels attracted to the random scatter of Australian 
bungalows, 'all loose from one another' (346). Whereas Edwards allows the civic 
value of having at least 'a few buildings expressing majesty and repose [so as to] give 
additional stability and self-confidence to the community ... and stimulate it to further 
architectural efforts', [59] such a sense of social permanence and pattern appears, for 
Kangaroo, to be lost with the war. The strewn buildings to which Somers comes to 
feel attuned, look to him 'like packing-cases' at the end of the novel (344), suggesting 
his own life - and Lawrence's - spent alternately storing himself away and shipping 
out. 
In considering the architecture of Kangaroo, it is worthwhile digressing in 
order to take into account Tony Pinkney's contrast of what he sees as The Rainbow's 
articulation of gothic values and Women in Love's classicism. Pinkney's allegiances 
are to what he sees as the all-inclusiveness of The Rainbow: 
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premising [those allegiances] centrally on the claim that 
though The Rainbow can indeed fruitfully 'contain' [the 
classical-modernist values of] Women in Love, Women in Love 
can only undialectically expunge The Rainbow, sloughing off 
both English-regional realism and Gothic modernism in the 
process. [60] 
Women in Love is adjudged the lesser novel for its encyclopaedic enumeration of 
modernist art forms, which amounts to a classicist 'drive towards totality';[6I] 
somewhat contradictorily, perhaps, Pinkney endorses The Rainbow precisely because 
of its comprehensiveness: its drive 'to concede [classicist modernism's] limited, 
merely relative validity within an over-arching Gothic modernism'. [62] What these 
texts are purportedly trying to accomplish is interesting: to 'contain' the other, its 
opposite. It seems evident, to me, that both novels offer different reactions to the 
monopolistic impetus of contemporary capitalism: 'not [to] abolish' its 'opposite' -
free competition - but to exist 'over it and alongside of it'[63] (the 'opposites' being, 
for The Rainbow, classicist values, and, for Women in Love, Gothic modernism). It 
would seem merely the case that The Rainbow achieves this ideological imperialism, 
whereas Women in Love cannot. And, considering my previous chapter upon Women 
in Love, it becomes apparent why this must be so: Women in Love's attempt to 
reclaim free individualism as the proper condition of human affairs must, by its very 
nature, simultaneously endeavour to escape from and abjure any overarching, 
monopolistic development. 
I do not see, here, any clear justification for Pinkney's preference for The 
Rainbow. More simply, it can be pointed out that both novels seek to legitimise a 
particular idea of social hierarchy. After all, their architectural sympathies correspond 
to upper-class tastes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A recent study 
has found that the 'greatest Goths among Victorian millionaires turn out to be 
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representatives of old families'. [64] Buildings in the gothic style could be seen as 
embodying the survival of the ancien regime, its display of the acquisition and 
expenditure of new wealth. Not dissimilarly, The Rainbow's gothic sympathies are for 
the 'over-arching' old order of 'Truth' that has to be born anew, sweeping away the 
recent industrial 'corruption';[6S] and Ursula could be a spokeswoman for the old 
landed families when she objects to the corruption of the genuine 'aristocracy of birth' 
by the industrial revolution's arrivistes, merely 'ruling in the name of money' . [66] 
Women in Love's classicism involves a similar attempt to legitimise 
hierarchy. The problem for Women in Love, however, is its anticipation of 
Kangaroo's assertion that 'in 1915 the old world ended' (216).[67] Women in Love 
finds it more difficult to establish the precedence for its hierarchical vision, to root 
itself in the naturalising soil of the past. The 'history' of the world of Women in Love 
may ostensibly be contained in The Rainbow, but, with its narrow temporal context 
and segmented episodes, the 'sequel' seems conspicuously divorced from the 
evolving narrative thread of its precursor. Women in Love is analogous to those 
nouveaux riches, produced by the industrial revolution, who, at some remove from the 
traditional lineage of lordly families, felt compelled to ensconce themselves therein by 
the synthesis of upper-class accoutrements. Classical architecture, which 'has 
generally been the vernacular of the ruling classes', was the overwhelming choice of 
the nouveaux riches as 'new money played safe' in constructing its own mansions that 
were 'rooted in the imagery of power' . [68] But, whereas the nouveaux riches possessed 
genuine power, too, from their industrialised business concerns - exactly the opposite 
of the author's interests - Lawrence's new elite appear bereft of real power. Women in 
Love's new rootless aristocracy of Birkin and Ursula would wish to claim to be the 
best of the current world, opposing Gerald's industrialism; but they have nothing to 
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back their claim, exactly because they wish to claim nothing from a putatively inferior 
world. And they seem unable to give anything to it: even Gudrun remains aloof from 
the worldly world, her artefacts attracting favourable comment but not selling. [69) 
Even so, both The Rainbow's and Women in Love's architectural 
sympathies have a more direct relation to hegemony than may first appear. The 
structure of Women in Love is formed by a collection of events, depicted in vivid 
relief (Gerald diving into the lake in 'Diver', or reining his horse in 'Coal-Dust') 
which Pinkney perceives as belonging to a classical aesthetic that is divested of 
gothic's 'organic accretions'. [70) I would add that this corresponds with the emphatic 
individuality of the nouveaux riches, and their capitalist accomplishments, deprived, 
as they are, of all but the most rudimentary window-dressing of aristocratic history 
and tradition. In contrast, The Rainbow's womb-like Gothic, which Pinkney sees as 
'enthusiastically swamping' individual events in the gestation of 'consequences 
beyond their own intensity' ,£11) is rather like the immersion of old-style aristocrats in 
centuries of family legacy.[72) 
At odds with all this is Kangaroo's deliberate eschewal of the architecture 
of the ruling classes. Kangaroo's chapters, which succeed each other like the 'bits' of 
the Sydney Bulletin, paying scant regard to demonstrate a 'consecutive thread' (272), 
could be seen to scorn that aristocratic concern for legitimate lineal descent. The 
bungalows of its settlements have none of the 'upstairs importance' symptomatic of 
England's class-system (109); their form is determined by their function as a home, 
rather than functioning to effect submission, as with gothic's naturalising of 
dominance. or neo-classicism' s legitimising of an elite. Furthermore. these 
bungalows, which Somers comes to like, are seen initially as 'close together and yet 
apart. like modern democracy' (11). So, there is possibly some recognition that demos 
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potentially offers a means to avoid the unpleasant choice between personal 
engulfment and societal alienation. But it can only be the most tentative hint, because, 
although Kangaroo attempts to break free from those monopolistic drives achieved in 
The Rainbow and expressed indirectly in Women in Love, without negotiating the 
relation of its own anarcho-authoritarian individualism to the monopoly that ensued 
from such individualism in history, it is unable to evolve a further principle that 
would serve to distinguish a different path to take: it establishes, in effect, a 'freedom' 
which cannot express itself because it has nowhere to go, nothing to say - a silence 
that testifies, after all, to the determining absent presence of monopoly. [73] 
Somers find that his freedom can only be expressed in the negative: ' You 
have to go through the mistakes', he concludes (347), and the extent to which 
Kangaroo tries to catalogue them is as comprehensive as any imperialistic impulse in 
The Rainbow and Women in Love. Thus, the novel's opening chapter finds Somers 
and his wife still adhering to, and working through, the old mistakes of Europe. 
Harriett regards Sydney's bungalows, with loathing, as 'little dog-kennels', while 
Somers mocks her longing for something preposterously grand by suggesting that she 
wants her new country to consist of 'old chateaus [sic] and Tudor manors' (13). 
Indeed, Harriett long harbours a dream of a New World made up, not of cities, but of 
'beautiful, manorial farm-houses and dainty, perfect villages' (191); and neither, for 
that matter, is Somers beyond pining for Renaissance cathedrals and 'thatched 
cottages' (19). Such cottages, in their 'perfect villages', complete with lordly manor 
house, present a picture of the secure private unit that is yet connected to, and further 
protected by, the social significance of a thoroughly decent England. The war has 
exposed this picture as a travesty. In 'The Nightmare' chapter, we see the almost 
literally chocolate-boxy bliss of the Somerses' wartime Christmas, spent at their 
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cottage in Cornwall with two American friends, torn apart by the intrusion of a 
police-sergeant. The police-sergeant, 'decent' enough himself (217), is nevertheless 
acting under direction of the 'military canaille' who continue their harassment of 
Somers by interrogating and eventually deporting his American male friend (224-5). 
As the American woman makes fudge, against the backdrop of a black rainy night, a 
moment of snug domesticity is crushed by hostile outside forces: 
Into the cosy cottage room, with the American girl at the fIre, 
her face flushed with the fudge-making, entered the big, burly, 
ruddy police-sergeant, his black mackintosh-cape streaming 
wet. (224) 
But once the 'black walls of the war', which remorselessly 'come, in, in, in' and 
threaten to push Somers into the pit (257), are removed, the sheltered cosiness 
promised by England's cottages appears pointless anyway: the Oxfordshire cottage, to 
which the Somerses have moved in the meantime, becomes 'tame', a 'nowhere' 
(258). Pre-war ideological constructions have collapsed into a black-holeP4] 
In Australia, the house to which the Somerses first move, with its 
accumulation of 'bits of old paper and tin cans' (26), is a 'cottage' altogether unlike 
those idealised creations which Somers recalls of Hampstead Garden Suburb, 
bedecked with 'geraniums and lobelias' (26). The ironically named 'Torestin' (the 
Somerses vacate it within days), proposes a different set of priorities to those English 
abodes, whose dainty perfection supposedly represents security and settlement more 
than any name. Even so, life in these Australian cottages is not immune from 
daintiness. When a visiting neighbour runs home eagerly at the prospect of 
chocolates, bought for her by her husband, Somers immediately thinks of a newspaper 
advertisement: 'Billyer's chocolates sweeten the home' (54). In conjunction with the 
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fudge-making scene in the Cornish cottage, this perhaps fonns a rare instance of 
Kangaroo acknowledging the vitali sing process of production, as compared with the 
mere consumption of that which is peddled to you. The typically saccharine, 
commercialised sentimentality of such advertisements makes 'chocolate-box' a 
perfectly appropriate attributive to what is now an abject, subjected domesticity. And 
it is, in part, the hope of escaping the proximity of a community of couples that 
encourages the Somerses to leave Sydney's 'Torestin' for 'Coo-ee', on the coast. If 
individual homes are no longer defended, but in fact threatened, by the social nexus, 
then it would seem imperative to find a home that is apart from society and represents 
a stand against it. But the name 'Coo-ee' (the call used to attract attention from a 
distance) does not suggest such a place; and, even more ominously, the new residence 
is introduced as being 'well built, solid, in the good English fashion' (81). So, sure 
enough, it is only a matter of time before 'Coo-ee' is blown apart by a cyclone, during 
a black, wet night which recalls those spent on the Cornish coast during the war. The 
connection is emphasised by the description of the couple: 'alone and silent in the 
shell of the house as if in a submarine' (350). In Cornwall, the Somerses had been 
suspected of sending messages to enemy submarines (227); but now it is they who can 
confinn that the 'good English' household has truly descended into the depths of 
treason and devastation. 
One by one, domiciles and lodging places are revealed as offering no 
security against invasion. And this is only to be expected, because in Somers and 
Harriett, Kangaroo inherits the uprooted individualism of Women in Love's Ursula 
and Birkin, an individualism based upon wandering free from social settlement. 
Following on from Women in Love's attempt to rescue individualism from the 
clutches of a hostile society, though, Kangaroo shows deracinated individuals 
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searching for new values to live by. The obvious problem, here, is that, to have any 
practical value in a human world, such values have to be social values, which 
facilitate the individual's negotiation of the society in which he or she must live: and 
admission of this social connection is just the thing that Lawrence's individuals must 
prevent, in order to protect the desiccated purity of their ideas about individuality and 
freedom. 
So it is that, when Somers becomes most attracted to the Australian 
landscape, he is most determined to leave (347). But, in any case, the virtues 
perceived in the countryside and its settlements, by Somers and Harriett, perfectly 
accord with the policy of endless removal. In the Somerses' view, the towns do not 
appear to be 'finished' (273), and are 'temporary seeming' (346); they appear as 
forever emergent (without ever becoming anything definite), and fugitive - the very 
qualities of Somers himself. They are in proportion to Somers's post-war world, 
chopped down to more modest dimensions. Somers eventually recoils from 'the heavy 
established European way of life', with its 'enormous encumbrances of stone and 
steel and brick weighing on the surface of the earth' (346). The demolition of faith in 
old certainties, which was begun in The Rainbow, is completed in Kangaroo. As a 
substitute for his earlier reverential adoration of Lincoln Cathedral, Will Brangwen 
establishes a more aesthetic concern for his local church, undertaking to 'keep the 
church fabric and the church-ritual intact' ;[75] Somers, though, rejects even these 
artistic pretensions: 'the mass of it made him sick, and the beauty was nauseous to 
him. ... He had now a horror of vast superincumbent buildings. They were a 
nightmare. Even the cathedrals. Huge, huge bulks that are called beauty. Beauty 
seemed to him like some turgid tumour.' The pared-down frame of Australia's 
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'flimsy' bungalows indicates the radical surgery that is deemed necessary to treat the 
corrupt tumidity of European culture (346). 
Despite all of this, newly emerging influences from that world are clearly 
detectable in Somers's thought; but where such ideas commonly have distinct social 
concerns, Somers cuts them away from all possible collective impulses and societal 
applications. Thus he expresses his attraction to the emptiness of the Australian 
landscape: 
still so clear and clean, clean of all fogginess or confusion ... 
the frail, aloof, inconspicuous clarity of the landscape was like 
a sort of heaven, bungalows, shacks, corrugated iron and all. 
No wonder Australians love Australia. It is the land that as yet 
has made no great mistake, humanly. The horrible human 
mistake of Europe. And probably, the even worse human 
mistake of America. (347) 
The 'clear', 'clean', 'clarity' which Somers identifies in the Australian landscape, 
smacks of the stark aesthetic of the Bauhaus, [76] which offered a way clear of 
'fogginess' and 'confusion' - but without finding it necessary to despatch humankind 
and its achievements. Throughout Kangaroo, reference is made to Australia's 
freedom from massive edifices: at night, 'the vast town of Sydney' seems to be 
'sprinkled on the surface of a darkness into which it never penetrated' (13); the 
coastal settlement at Wolloona mirrors Somers in being 'not rooted in' (273); the 
Australian bungalows look 'as if they weighed nothing' (343), and we are repeatedly 
informed as to their lack of foundations (273, 342, 346). Walter Gropius extols the 
New Architecture of the Bauhaus for producing a similar illusion of weightlessness: 
.. Instead of anchoring buildings ponderously into the ground with massive 
foundations, it poises them lightly, yet firmly, upon the face of the earth' .(77) It is 
perhaps the case that Somers would not like Gropius's use of "firmly'; and this marks 
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the difference between Lawrence's emphasis upon humanity's corruption of Nature 
and Gropius' s steadfast belief in human progress, over and above what is offered by 
the natural world. The fact that Gropius' s position is the more coherent one, is borne 
out by the Bauhaus's potential to use the advances made possible by Lawrence's 
hated machine-age towards ends that appear quite Lawrentian. [78] Somers's liking for 
the emptiness of Australia is matched by Gropius' s approval of architecture's 
'growing preponderance of voids over solids'; but this improvement is only feasible 
due to the industrial developments that Kangaroo abhors: 
Our fresh technical resources have furthered the disintegration 
of solid masses of masonry into slender piers, with consequent 
far-reaching economies in bulk, space, weight, and haulage. 
New synthetic substances - steel, concrete, glass - are actively 
superseding the traditional raw materials of construction. Their 
rigidity and molecular density have made it possible to erect 
wide-spanned and all but transparent structures, for which the 
skill of previous ages was manifestly inadequate. This 
enormous saving in structural volume was an architectural 
revolution in itself. [79J 
There can be no corresponding revolution in Kangaroo, however: 'Revolutions -
nothingnesses. Nothing could ever matter' (356). The novel is entirely antipathetic to 
that social sphere which something must affect if it is to merit being ascribed the 
sweeping, far-reaching properties that are connoted by the term 'revolution'. Indeed, 
Somers realises his great love of Australia only when he has perceived its people to be 
exactly like himself: 'Rudimentary individuals with no desire of communication'; his 
paradoxical love for people with whom he wishes to have no social intercourse can 
only find satisfaction in the 'disintegration of the social mankind back to its elements' 
(345). 
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Somers suggests elsewhere: 'It's much easier to point to a wrecked house, 
if you want to build something new, than to persuade people to pull the house down 
and build it up in a better style' (207). And so it is just possible, therefore, to see how 
his wished-for social disintegration need not be entirely negative. Indeed, we may be 
helped in this if we consider another contemporary movement in urban planning, that 
of the Garden City, which promoted the idea of greener, more spacious cityscapes, as 
opposed to the contemporary dark, crowded ones. At the forefront of the Garden City 
movement was Ebenezer Howard, of whom it can thus be said: 'In the name of 
progress he called for the dismantling of the very cities that sheltered the most 
advanced centres of art and science. ,(SO] The broad aims of the Garden City may well 
seem appealing to someone who wishes to get rid of ponderous, massive, ugly 
superstructures. But, in fact, this comparison only points up Lawrence's resolute 
resistance to establishing any of his ideas of progress in anything like as clear and 
concrete a manner as did Howard demonstrate his own, at Letchworth and Welwyn 
Garden City (founded in 1904 and 1920, respectively). In Kangaroo, at least, it seems 
that Lawrence would simply leave society dismantled, rather than build towards 
anything else. 
Kangaroo's own reference to Hampstead Garden Suburb makes this much 
obvious. Somers's recollection of its 'pretty' cottages forms a marked contrast to the 
'weary and dreary' scene that he finds upon arrival in Australia (26). But Somers 
comes to like the Australian cottages precisely because of their disintegration of the 
soi-disant 'beauty' of England's towns: the latter is seen to be a sham, as counterfeit 
as the social conscience behind its aesthetic.£sl] And it may be alleged that Hampstead 
indeed was created from an ideal of community which appears rather quaint and glib: 
'From the first, the suburb had high social purposes: as a contemporary put it, it 
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would be a place "where the poor shall teach the r i c ~ ~ and the rich, let us hope, shall 
help the poor to help themselves'" . [82] 
Crucially, though, the counterpointing of Somers's recollection of 
Hampstead to his perceptions of the Australian townscapes does not present a face-off 
merely between social idealism and individualistic cynicism. The casual reference to 
Hampstead supplies one more trigger for a deconstruction of what, in actual fact, is 
Kangaroo's individualistic idealism: the same flimsy ineffectuality that we saw 
exposed against the materially-necessitated individualism of Wiltshire, in Stevenson's 
The Beach of Falesa. Hampstead Garden Suburb (founded 1906) is generally 
considered to be a key turning point and one of the most successful projects of the 
Garden City movement, exactly because 'it was self-confessedly not a garden city, but 
a garden suburb'. Even on a scale of eight thousand houses, it had no pretensions to 
be the kind of independent unity so admired by Lawrence: on the contrary, it was 
thoroughly and 'openly dependent on commuting from an adjacent tube station, which 
opened just as it was being planned' ,£83] This necessary connection to a greater whole, 
and, more particularly, to an industrial centre, is just what Kangaroo does not want to 
accept. The only thing that Somers would replace it with, however, is quite literally 
'nothing'; and, if its pages are not to reflect the blankness of the Australian desert, the 
text is compelled to allude persistently to that connection, if only as the thing that 
must be broken from: it can never be erased entirely. 
The sheer futility and negativism of Somers's attempt to cleanse himself 
of society is most apparent, though, in its wholesale misanthropy. His reflection upon 
the ubiquity of trade, for instance, makes clear that Somers is fleeing humanity itself, 
rather than specific social forms. 
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Ah, a new country! The cabbage, for example, cost tenpence, 
in the normal course of things, and a cauliflower a shilling. 
And the tradesmen's carts flew round in the wilderness, 
delivering goods. There isn't much newness in man, whatever 
the country. (192) 
Somers cannot abide trade, unsurprisingly, because it is a fundamental form of social 
exchange. Somers refuses such exchange throughout the novel, and perhaps this is 
why: for if he were to consider himself a 'man', then his inherent lack of 'newness' 
would of course explode the rationale for his pursuit of the 'Unknown'. What we see 
instead, however, is that in his stubborn preoccupation with the 'Unknown' - which is 
to say, with the non-human - he ends up as one small parasite upon the behemoth of 
monopolistic capitalism. 
A novel that depicts an individual's search for freedom from monopolistic 
capitalism, while trying to suppress the relationship to capitalism of its own idea of 
freedom, is eminently germane to the twenty-first century, when imperialism is 
becoming truly global, often in the name of defending the freedom of the individual. 
Kangaroo remains of a piece with a world that is as straitened as ever between the 
Scylla and Charybdis of the material reality of imperialism and the rhetorical 
seductiveness of individualism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MEASURE US BY WHA T YOU WILL, WE'LL MEASURE YOU A MEASURE 
AND BE GONE: THE RETORT OF LA WRENTIAN SATIRE TO A WORLD 
THAT SEES ITSELF FAIR, NONE ELSE BEING Bf[I] 
No writer ever wrote exactly what he wanted to write, because 
there was never anything inside himself, anything purely 
individual that he did want to write. It's all reaction of one sort or 
another. 
Raymond Chandler[2] 
The end of my chapter on Women in Love observed that Lawrence's work is often 
caught in an impasse between individual and society, and that the later work 
frequently obfuscates the situation with mystical camouflage and the proposal of a 
benign authoritarianism. Kangaroo's deadlock between imperialism and 
individualism, together with its flirtation with the 'mystery of lordship' ,[3] chiefly 
follows this pattern. But another avenue taken by Lawrence's writing, which promises 
to be less impeded by the problems of Kangaroo, is that of satire. Satire customarily 
works to demystify the ways that power is exerted and justified, to allow a potentially 
clearer view of how people, beliefs and institutions exist in relation to each other. 
A neat example is provided by Lawrence's short story, 'The Lovely Lady' 
(1927), which assails two varieties of mystification: that of the ghost story, in which 
the governance of human life is overseen by supernatural forces, and, more 
specifically, the spellbinding power of an ageing mother over her son. Pauline 
Attenborough, the eponymous 'Lovely Lady', whose loveliness, of both physique and 
character, is dependent upon an array of deceptions, has already apparently terminated 
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the love affair of her eldest son, Henry, and consequently the life of Henry himself. 
She has since focused her manipulative forces upon her younger son, Robert, whose 
existence now threatens to become a living death: 'He was fascinated by her. 
Completely fascinated. And for the rest, paralysed in a lifelong confusion. '[4] The 
'rest' includes Cecilia, his cousin, who lives with them and believes that a relatively 
normal relationship with Robert is still possible, if it were not for Pauline's tyranny. 
Pauline's control is loosened after she thinks she hears the voice of Henry's spirit 
(actually Cecilia's imitation through a convenient drainpipe) condemning her as his 
murderer and warning her to let Robert marry before she kills him also. Consumed by 
her sense of guilt and, no less, her gullibility, Pauline withers away and dies. 
We are told that Cecilia 'loathed the supernatural, ghosts and voices and 
rappings and all the rest' (345); and, on one level, 'The Lovely Lady' carefully inverts 
the conventional ghost story. In many ghost stories the material world is merely the 
medium for the workings of the supernatural: here, and particularly for Pauline, who 
is destined to make 'an exquisite skeleton' (339), and whose spirit survives death only 
in the form of the 'Pauline Attenborough Museum' (355), the material world is all 
there is. Indeed, Pauline's self-absorbed materialism proves an even better channel for 
the pseudo-supernatural fakery of Cecilia. The voice from 'beyond', rather than - as in 
supernatural stories - asserting the presence of some hidden 'order', affirms Cecilia's 
presence of mind in taking the opportunity to remove the obstacle to her future life 
with Robert. The human world is under human jurisdiction, and it is thus the affair of 
humans, and not supernatural forces, to change it. The potential problem within this 
recognition, for Lawrence, is precisely that faced by Somers in Kangaroo: for Somers, 
conceiving, never mind establishing, a just social order proves virtually impossible -
hence his retreat into a private mysticism. It is telling, too, that in The Plumed 
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Serpent, Lawrence's novel which, outwardly, most directly broaches the subject of 
societal reform, the legitimacy of political revolution is maintained by its basis upon a 
religious renaissance. [5] However, within the domestic scope of such stories as 'The 
Lovely Lady' the issue of the new order's justness and legitimacy need concern us no 
further beyond the clear impression that Pauline gets nothing more than she deserves: 
Cecilia, in effect, murders Pauline by means no more deceitful and manipulative than 
those used by Pauline herself. 
Pauline's gullibility is engendered by her self-conceited complacency. She 
presents herself in the manner of a 'Mona Lisa who knew a thing or two. But Pauline 
knew more' (340); and, if one side of her narcissistic self-obsession is that she 
exhibits herself as enigmatic and endlessly interesting, the other side is that people 
around her are reduced to banalities: Robert is 'like a fish in a tank' and Cecilia is 'the 
cat fishing for [him]' (351). For Pauline there is no such fishing, because her world is 
readily within her grasp, both materially and cognitively. And so it is that her incipient 
guilt is enough to bestow Cecilia's sham with authenticity. The case is not simply that 
the ghostly voice corroborates Pauline's own fears, but that, reciprocally, because the 
ghostly judgement accords with her own misgivings, its verity is therefore established 
upon what are, for her, the most solid grounds. The supposedly supernatural origin of 
the voice is of little import in comparison to the crucial factor that it refers directly to 
Pauline - as is the normal order for all things, worldly or otherworldly. There can be 
no mysteries for Pauline because, as far as she is concerned, the hidden and 
inexplicable form the very essence of her own character, and that realm which others 
concede as the 'Unknown' 'naturally' renders itself to her as immediately knowable. 
But Pauline gets her deserts for such presumptuousness when her self-belief is 
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exploded by the 'hidden' world (only the despised Cecilia, concealed at the other end 
of the drainpipe) making known her most carefully shielded secret. 
Indeed, that which Lawrence takes as his real target is seen as something 
of much wider importance than the conventions of ghost and murder-mystery stories 
which he also parodies here. 'The Lovely Lady', after all, is in tune with those ghost 
stories, such as Henry James's The Turn of the Screw (1898), for example, which 
thrive upon the ambiguity of supernatural and natural phenomena, and thereby 
indicate the realm of the unknown, the limits that always encompass human 
knowledge and which determine human fallibility. The difference in 'The Lovely 
Lady' is that a pronounced absence of supernatural phenomena combines with 
Pauline's all-too-ready acceptance of the supernatural as a natural certainty to show 
the danger of disregarding those limits. The story attacks that facile solipsism which 
would deny any significance to others - that same quality which is detectable in 
Kangaroo's Somers and Women in Love's Birkin.(6) Furthermore, as if to underline 
Somers's proximity to those he denounces, Pauline's culpability also corresponds 
with that Victorian imperialist disposition, identified in Kangaroo, to reduce 
everything possible within the confines of its own culture and to dismiss anything that 
is inconveniently strange: 'The Unknown became a joke: is still a joke' - but a joke 
which threatens to turn against its makers. (7) So it is that Pauline, whose manipUlative 
'confusion' (342) of Cecilia and Robert fashions a mockery of mysterious otherness, 
is undone by the crudest travesty of otherworldliness. 
In short, the story's teeth are set to work upon the conventional prey of 
satire: self-satisfied complacency, the vanity of human knowledge, and the attendant 
gullibility. It is perhaps not difficult to surmise why Lawrence turned to satire so 
frequently in the 1920s, in his fiction, poetry and essays. To someone ideologically at 
212 
sea, antithetical to dominant modes of theorising and constructing human life and 
society while bereft of faith in emergent alternatives, satire offers some attractive 
reassurances: it exposes belief as credulousness, knowledge as delusion, and authority 
as mere pretence. 
These qualities perhaps suggest the potentially conservative bias of satire: 
if there is no sure way of knowing what action is for the best, if any given creed 
invites derision rather than assent, then how or why try to change anything? The 
contemporary satirist, Craig Brown, has contended that satire is the natural means of 
expression for a writer, such as himself, who is 'ambivalent about everything': 
'Parody's good because it allows you to have your cake and eat it. It's a way of not 
making your mind up.' [8] Such remarks as Brown's, however breezily 
self-deprecatory, would certainly provide an accurate description of that type of 
Lawrentian irony which was discussed in my Introduction and which is exemplified 
by Rawdon Lilly's disclaimer: 'Do you take this as my gospel? ... I should say the 
blank opposite with just as much fervour'. [9] By shrouding his words in an ironic fog, 
Lilly effectively withdraws them from further interrogation: he gives himself a free 
hand to polemicise, and is free, too, from the burden of defending such statements. 
But the consequences of this luxurious freedom are self-negating: for, cut off from the 
dialectics that would seek to establish their sincerity, or otherwise, any ideas 
expressed within such a vacuum are immediately consigned to an epistemological 
limbo. The emphatic manner in which Lilly refuses publicly to 'make his mind up', 
and that of Lawrence at large, in Aaron's Rod, Women in Love and, particularly. 
Kangaroo, may seem designed to leave the recipients of their discourse floundering in 
semantic confusion. Alternatively, as I suggested earlier,(IO] it may be seen that the 
texts' ambivalence often supports a radical 'openness' of interpretation; that is to say. 
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they encourage the postmodem explosion of prescribed certainties and monolithic 
reality: their ambiguities point up not just the arbitrarily restrictive critical practice of 
trying to establish a work's unified coherence, but perhaps indicate, too, the 
arbitrariness of the narrow political and social realities dictated to people. 
Nevertheless, despite this anticipation of the postmodem ethos in its most progressive 
aspect, we can say with certainty, that, like much postmodem culture, such texts, after 
all, reside in a condition of paralysed antitheses which, in its refusal to look beyond 
the contradictory framework of the status quo - besides merely pointing it out - is 
barely less conservative than any putatively 'authoritative' imposition of stable 
meanings and institutions in the first place. 
However, there is another side to Lawrence's deployment of ironic 
ambiguity: besides exploding authoritative readings of his texts (and of the 'world') in 
divergent, contradictory meanings, Lawrence also uses irony's multivocal potential to 
converge several different targets economically within an argument that not only 
seeks to disqualify their conventional authority but also tries to suggest what could 
possibly replace them. This is most apparent in those texts in which satire is the 
predominant mode, notably many of the short stories and poems. The poem, 'Oh 
Wonderful Machine!' (wr. 1929), for example, sardonically mimics the contemporary 
zeal for technology: 
Oh wonderful machine, so self-sufficient, so sufficient unto 
yourselfl 
You who have no feeling of the moon as she changes her 
quarters! 
You who don't hear the sea's uneasiness! 
You to whom the sun is merely something that makes the 
thennometer rise! 
Oh wonderful machine, you who are man's idea of godliness, 
you who feel nothing, who know nothing, who run on 
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absolved 
from any other connection! 
Oh you godly and smooth machine, spinning on in your own 
Nirvana, 
turning the blue wheels of your own heaven 
almighty machine 
how is it you have to be looked after by some knock-kneed 
wretch 
at two pounds a week?[ll] 
The depiction of the machine, as a fetishised, individual unified subject, suggests that 
this enthusiasm has its source in a capitalist ethos; and the subsequent metaphysical 
superlatives not only convey the absurdity of this eulogy to mechanics but also, in 
their very frothiness, allow the development of a number of bubbles which are to be 
burst by the sting in the stanza's tail: capitalism as the ultimate self-perpetuating 
machine; capitalism as offering a new religion that promises to benefit spiritual life as 
it has material life; and the corresponding solipsism of the fmancially 'independent' 
middle-classes (to which belong both Birkin and Somers) who apparently spin on in 
their own way, having attained a higher consciousness than the labouring world left 
behind. (It is an attractive feature of much of Lawrence's satirical poetry and fiction 
that, pointedly eliminating anything akin to an exemplary hero, it appears to free him 
from maintaining the idea of a kind of individual who is superior to the 'masses' of 
society.) The hyperbolical abstractions extend just long enough to threaten to go on 
forever, in the manner that machines are supposed to do; then, literally, the question 
of material reality brings a sudden disruption in tone that reflects a machine being 
brought to an abrupt halt. Those voices which laud the mechanised industrial process 
are loath to acknowledge its ultimate dependence upon human labour. and still less 
disposed to explain how, under current conditions, industrialism is only made 
possible by the workers' disfigurement and poverty. The contradictory nature of this 
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machine-system, which either threatens to destroy those upon whom it is dependent, 
or risks being brought to a standstill by those same people whom it cripples, points up 
the absurdity of abstract notions of 'Progress'. The implied resolution - of a greater 
social awareness, seeing the industrial process as a human process, connecting the 
world of human labour to the wider environment - may well be vague, but then it is 
not satire's function to offer prescriptive remedies (more about which, below). 
Indeed, it is one benefit of satire's ambivalences that Lawrence is divested 
of the frequently unpalatable and indigestible concoctions of his 'philosophical' 
non-fiction. Apocalypse (wr. 1929-30), for instance, takes close to one hundred pages 
before fmally concurring with the burden of his fifteen line poem: 
What we want is to destroy our false, inorganic connections, 
especially those related to money, and re-establish the living 
organic connections, with the cosmos, the sun and earth, with 
mankind and nation and family. Start with the sun and the rest 
will slowly, slowly happen.[l2] 
There is little in the preceding material that elaborates on exactly what is supposed to 
'happen', except for the familiar assertion of our need for 'lordship' and an authentic 
aristocracy that should replace existing, degraded social systems. [13J Still, this prospect 
of an 'organic' nobility offers one interpretation of the concluding stanza of 'Oh 
Wonderful Machine': 
Oh great god of the machine 
what lousy archangels and angels you have to surround 
yourself with! 
And you can't possibly do without them! [14J 
The grubby hierarchy of mechanised industry, we may possibly infer, is no substitute 
for the genuine article. Yet, being satire, and in the business of mocking beliefs rather 
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than propounding them, these lines explicate no such determinate reading beyond 
their condemnation of the present situation. In fact, the stanza could pennissibly be 
seen as calling into question all hierarchical societies, for necessarily abasing people 
in order to establish their false gods. It is, too, a nice irony that the poem's 
mock-hymnal idiom suggests the dubiousness of Lawrence's own vocabulary of 
adoration in Apocalypse. Holding forth on 'the reality of hierarchy', Lawrence 
declares that the souls of men will only be fulfilled if their 'country mounts up 
aristocratically to a zenith of splendour and power' .[IS] The poem's example of 
abstract eulogy, sabotaged by material fact, supports our immediate suspicions as 
regards such prose: namely, that its rhetorical extravagance hopes to supply enough 
suasive force to spare the risk of resorting to the perhaps recalcitrant services of 
reason. 
The ironic destabilisation in 'Oh Wonderful Machine!' of monolithic 
'truths', whether capitalism's (the synonymous advance of industrialism and the new 
Jerusalem) or Lawrence's own (the necessity of hierarchy), together with an 
indication of the underlying 'fact' (that society requires fundamental change) from 
which supposedly more secure statements can emerge, bears relation to Tony 
Bennett's concern for a practicable degree of indeterminacyY6] Naturally, Bennett's 
and Lawrence's very different positions as, respectively, a literary theoretician seeking 
to verify academic methodologies and technologies, and an imaginative writer 
sketching the failures and possibilities of human society, dispose them to allow for 
correspondingly different measures of indeterminacy. Even so, Lawrence's polemical 
and open-ended poem suggests the limitations of some of Bennett' s assumptions. 
Above all, 'Oh Wonderful Machine!' offers a more radical and profound proposal as 
to where to find sources for 'allow[ing] new knowledges to emerge and transfonn the 
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face of the past', and thus, 'make a material difference to the present'. (17) Lawrence's 
poem points to how new methods of material production, of changing our material 
world, lead to our view of the 'past' being transformed - as industrial capitalism 
changed our views of agrarian, feudal society, which became seen as either primitive 
and undemocratic, or rather, as perhaps suggested in the poem's references to sun, 
moon and hierarchy, as possessing standards acutely needed today; and so too, the 
poem intimates, the transformation of the contemporary labour process, into one free 
from human degradation, is likely to reveal new knowledges of the industrial world. 
Whereas Lawrence's poem readily suggests that history concerns human struggle with 
the material world, for Bennett's post-Marxism it seems that history is about 
intellectual interpretation: 'the past which is produced by the social labour of 
historians' . (18) This idea of historical development is fine, so far as it goes, but it is 
secondary to direct social changes, such as industrial and political revolutions; and the 
proper relation of this form of 'social labour' to wider social concerns is threatened by 
another of Bennett's academic priorities. In the same way that he appears to demote 
material reality beneath academic interpretation, so too, he seeks to reduce the value 
of the 'ethical' dialectics at the heart of much 'traditional' criticism. He proposes 
the development of ... the teacher/critic as a technical rather 
than, say, an ethical exemplar and involving the student/reader 
in the acquisition of particular technical competences rather 
than in an unending process of ethical self-correction. This 
may not, it is true, have the same ring of bravura a b o u ~ ~ it as 
the development of a political aesthetics or a revolutIOnary 
criticism; it would, however, be likely to be a good deal more 
consequential. [19] 
Bennett neglects the point that ethical contention and interrogation is vital when 
considering representations of the world, for, as in Lawrence's poem. such contention 
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reflects, and reflects upon, the conflict within the material process of production. 
(That this may no longer be considered relevant has much to do with the 
'post-industrial' world - replete with Bennett's academic 'labourers' - often 
conveniently forgetting that somebody, somewhere, still has to produce its goods.) 
Bennett's proposal for literary studies does not simply lack 'bravura', it loses, in its 
preoccupation with academic form, due regard for the social 'content', in the widest 
sense, of such studies. It sounds very close to a parody of revolutionary change, 
disconcertingly anticipating Tony Blair's call, during the 1997 UK general election, 
for 'radicalism not of doctrine but of achievement': it represents a replacement of 
political ethics that seek to change the world with an increasingly austere application 
of existing institutional practices. On the other hand, we may observe, in Lawrence's 
poem, satire's capacity as an instrument of radical protest: how a writer such as 
Lawrence, much of whose work resembles postmodernity in expressing scorn for 
systemic political revolution and calling for change in supposedly more 'useful' 
quarters, finds in satire a voice to challenge the fundamental characteristics of the 
social macrocosm. 
For someone who is sceptical of putatively revolutionary ideologies which 
may advance a systematic examination of society and of how to change it, satire offers 
a welcome new angle of attack: from within anarchically seditious representations of 
current social mores as they would present themselves, rather than the full-on smash, 
as it were, of the express alternatives offered by a contending political framework. 
And it is a likely possibility that both Lawrence's liking for satire and the occasionally 
turgid prose of his non-satirical work are consequences of his wariness of 
propounding specific precepts. Indeed, for Lawrence, society's proclivity for doing 
precisely this is symptomatic of its malady. In his essay, • John Galsworthy' (1928), 
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Lawrence summarises the condition of those people who are too ready to accept the 
societal ordinances dictated to them: 
All they can do, having no individual life of their own, is out 
of fear to rake together property, and to feed upon the life that 
has been given by living men to mankind. They have no life, 
and so they live forever, in perpetual fear of death, 
accumulating property to ward off death. They can keep up 
conventions: but they cannot carry on a tradition. There is a 
tremendous difference between the two things. To carry on a 
tradition, you must add something to the tradition. But to keep 
up a convention needs only the monotonous persistency of a 
parasite, the endless endurance of the craven, those who fear 
life because they are not alive, and who cannot die because 
they cannot live. The social beings. [20] 
It may be said that it is in the 'tradition' of satire to mock 'convention'; or, as 
Lawrence puts it in 'John Galsworthy': 'Satire exists for the very purpose of killing 
the social being .... By ridiculing the social being, the satirist helps the true individual, 
the real human being, to rise to his feet again' .[21] Leaving aside, for the moment, the 
recurring Lawrentian chimera that is 'true' individuality, we can see this program at 
work in 'The Lovely Lady'. The acquisitive Pauline, having endured through her 
'Power to feed on other lives' (355), is literally killed; and although there remains the 
doubtful matter of how Cecilia and Robert are to fare in the wider life which they 
have opened up for themselves, that uncertainty presents an invigorating change from 
the secure but straitjacketed life that was determined for them by Pauline. 
Craig Brown's 'way of not making your mind up', seems, for Lawrence, 
to be a way of showing that the mind is properly made up of multifarious attitudes, 
and that to deny this is to risk reducing one's life to a mechanically repetitive and 
narrow affair - a situation illustrated by Robert's habitual evenings spent examining 
220 
seventeenth-century Mexican legal documents (341-2). In a contemporary text to 'The 
Lovely Lady' , Lawrence contends: 
Always and invariably man insists that one meagre and 
exclusive aspect of the great dream is all the dream. Thus he 
casts his own prison within the mould of his own idea, inside 
his own soul, and tortures himself all his life. [22] 
In passing, we may recall Jonathan Swift's famous defInition of satire: 'a sort of Glass 
wherein Beholders do generally discover every body's Face but their Own';[23] and 
later in this chapter, I intend to look at how satire allowed Lawrence's writing to 
escape from some of the prisons of his own ideas; in part, perhaps, because he was 
quite prepared, at times, to behold his own face in satire's glass. But it suffices to note 
here that Lawrence's work, in general, seems to be designed to break out of any 
monomaniacal gaol, always proposing other potentialities, and 'discovering' very 
different things to different people; and thus it would appear that satire, implying 
opposites of wisdom and virtue to the folly and vice actually depicted, is particularly 
suited for Lawrence to draw out the antitheses of his 'great dream', and to hatch a 
multiplicity of ideas. 
If we consider this pluralised quality in Lawrence's texts, then, we see that 
their appropriation by a recently resurgent Bakhtinian criticism is clearly no mere 
fortuity. [24] But the strength of what Bakhtin might have termed Lawrence's 
'carnivalesque' disruption of monological authority is perhaps more immediately 
evinced in its being glimpsed by a contemporary reviewer of Lawrence's work, well 
before Bakhtin' s theories were published, never mind made available to English 
criticism. Lawrence's inclination to dialogical multiplicity is made apparent in Evelyn 
Scott's review (1921) of Women in Love and The Lost Girl, in which she distinguishes 
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Lawrence's work from, what she terms, 'pure art'. The latter, deems Scott, being 'the 
purest expression of what it is, ... renounces the extensive expression of a desire to be 
otherwise' . [25J It is precisely this desire, she says, though, which characterises 
Lawrence's texts; a desire which is possibly marked in my preceding chapters by 
Lawrence's representations of individuality, with Birkin and Somers, locked inside 
their own souls, in introspective self-torture, while longing for otherness. Scott herself 
suggests this dialogic potential of Lawrence's individualism when she writes of how 
Lawrence's art expresses a desire for the 'release of individuality in the confusion of 
sense' . [26J Strictly speaking, Scott means, by this 'confusion', that sensual intoxication 
experienced by Gudrun in the Alps, and by Alvina in the Abruzzi, as they are 
confronted with awesome otherness; but it is perhaps not too great a distortion to see 
also suggested here the Lawrentian impulse to emancipate individuality through the 
confusion of the 'authoritatively' sensible and ordered world, and of its prescriptions 
for our lives. So it is that the women of Women in Love and The Lost Girl confound 
the restrictive courses which society might have expected them take: Gudrun rejects a 
married life with Gerald, and Alvina rejects any number of 'respectable' conventions. 
And, considering satire's analogous 'desire to be otherwise' (portraying one world as 
it hungers for its opposite), it would, indeed, seem highly probable that such 
confusion of authoritative 'sense' is displayed yet more vigorously in Lawrence's 
satire. Thus, in the same way that Voltaire's Candide throws into confusion the 
enlightenment commonsense 'that logic and reason can somehow explain away the 
chaotic wretchedness of existence by grandly and metaphysically ignoring the 
facts' [27J so does Lawrence's 'Dh Wonderful Machine!' disrupt the twentieth-century , 
decree that technology saves labour and puts an end to material want. 
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A not unreasonable objection to be raised at this point, would be that the 
above appeal to the suggestive pluralities of Lawrentian satire is no more than a very 
favourable gloss upon what, after all, propounds little in the form of definite fields of 
action; that the proposition of boundless possible alternatives to the debased subject 
of the satire constitutes, in fact, merely arrant 'spin' for what is the affirmation of 
nothing in particular that could aid human society. Such a view would contend that if 
satire preserves Lawrence's freedom from monomaniacal, dogmatic prisons, it 
nevertheless shows little promise of ideological rehabilitation; and, furthermore, that 
this is surely to be expected of satire, because it does not attempt to solve that 
problem of absent authoritativeness which we saw in Kangaroo, so much as, on the 
contrary, it appears to encourage that void by the sabotaging of supposed authorities. 
There returns the idea of the satirist as a fence-sitter, provided with a spuriously 
elevated position from which he declines to get down and try to fix the holes that he 
proclaims society has dug for itself. 
Support for this persuasion emerges from a reading of Lawrence's 'The 
Last Laugh' (1924). This short story, unremarkable enough as a satire of John 
Middleton Murry, is interesting for what it suggests about the satirical attitude. During 
Lawrence's miserable return to England in 1923-4, Murry was among the circle of old 
friends who rejected his enduring plans to establish a new way of life in a New World 
artists' colony. The story begins with a Lawrence-figure, Lorenzo, wishing good-bye 
at his garden gate to Marchbanks, the counterpart to Murry, and the deaf James, a 
character closely modelled upon Dorothy Brett, the only one of Lawrence's group 
who retained any enthusiasm for his project. Surveying the new-fallen snow, Lorenzo 
remarks, 'ironically', 'Look at it! A new world!'; but Marchbanks is quick to dismiss 
even the faintest suggestion of such an idea: 'No Lorenzo! It's only whitewash!'(28) 
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The story's dialogue is nearly entirely suffused by ironical colour such as this, as 
characters impress their pre-eminence upon others. For the rather ineffectual character 
of Marchbanks, this seems considerably more of a concerted endeavour than for 
James who, increasingly accepting that a new world is possible (and imminent), is 
more quietly assured: Marchbanks's face gleams with 'derisive triumph in all its 
lines' (125), while James's exultation is less dependent upon outward show, and 
instead is kept 'triumphantly, to herself (126). 
There are then, two apparently quite different kinds of 'superiority' being 
compared here: one that, as the story unfolds, we are clearly meant to see as petty and 
commonplace, and another that is vital and rare. The first is spelled out in the 
character of James's housekeeper: 'a rather sad-faced young woman of a superior sort 
- nearly all people in England are of the superior sort, superiority being an English 
ailment' (132). The same, essentially miserable, superiority is evident in Marchbanks, 
a 'slouching' figure who looks 'as if he wouldn't make his legs frrm' (122, 123); and 
its association with conventional England is underlined in the character of the 
policeman whom James and Marchbanks meet on the way home: personable enough, 
he nonetheless provides, in the subsequent fear and meekness which he displays, a 
thumbnail sketch of the real lack of authoritativeness of socially-accepted authority. 
That which turns out to be the true authority is the liberating sentiment of mockery, 
conferred by the spirit of Pan, who has evidently 'come back' to have the 'last laugh' 
on those who would preclude the possibility of there being a better world beyond the 
English present (130). The policeman, who suffers a literal panic at the demonstration 
of Pan's power during a sudden storm, is appropriately rewarded with a similarly 
literal lameness when Pan gives him a club foot; Marchbanks, who neglects to follow 
Pan's voice in order to pursue a more immediate carnal affair, is only attracted to the 
I 
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goatish side of Pan and is thus struck dead at the story's end, realising that 'he has 
made a fmal, and this time fatal, fool of himself' (137). Only James, who fully accepts 
Pan and actually sees him, is able to partake of this 'unaccustomed sense of power' 
(128); her true perception restored, she is cured of her deafuess and of her dependency 
upon spurious relationships; she can therefore disencumber herself of her listening 
machine and of Marchbanks. 
However, although this scheme is neatly set up and played out, the reader 
who seeks to elicit anything significant from it will be disappointed. What it amounts 
to is a bald judgment that 'Life' is a matter of detached amusement, and that those 
such as Murry, who are bent upon 'taking life terribly seriously' (133), effectively 
choose death. There is no further detail as to the things being judged - that is to say, 
there is no development of ideological positions, and, therefore, neither is there any 
necessity, or any means, of justifying the text's definition of 'superiority': life is better 
than death - presumably there is nothing more to add. If we see, in the different fates 
of Marchbanks and James, satire's eschewal of authoritativeness in favour of arbitrary 
privilege, then the ideological hole which (hypothetically) it propagates, is manifest 
too, in the new world that is opened up to James. Despite a central message of the 
story being that one must keep faith in the approach of a better world, the only thing 
offered to sustain this belief is the hollow proposition that the better life will be 
different, somehow, from the present. Rather than laying the blame for this at satire's 
door, we could say that the ideological meagreness is simply due to the thinness of 
this particular story; but, although, undoubtedly, this latter consideration needs to be 
taken into account, the barrenness would appear to be very much an effect of the 
satirical impulse which James embraces to the utmost. She learns to behold the world 
as 'Absurd! Absurd! Absurd!'; and. most notably, she realises 'what fantastic 
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silliness' is the business of 'Saving anybody': 'How much more amusing and lively to 
let a man go to perdition in his own way' (133). There is unlikely to be a much fitter 
example in Lawrence of satire's disposition to mock not merely social ills, but, 
equally, any conscious attempt to seek a remedy. In a flawless reflection of our 
metaphor, the supremely satirical James refuses to get into the ideological hole and 
get her hands dirty in trying to fix it. After all, as she remarks of the world of human 
relationships: 'It's all so messy' (134). 
It is the purpose of satire, of course, to point out holes in current theories 
and practices, and by way of such critique it can be said to contribute to a search for 
'true' meaning and value; but here and elsewhere in Lawrence we fmd that the entire 
social edifice is apparently hurled into one big pit. The figure of Lawrence as 'an 
apocalyptic ironist who says, in effect, a plague on all your houses', [29] looms 
particularly large in the satirical poems of Nettles (1930). 'Change of Government' is 
a typically brusque repudiation of contemporary politics. A dismissive comment on 
the general election of 1929, which had returned a minority Labour government, it 
belittles all the major domestic political parties, before turning, aghast, to the prospect 
of Communist rule. However, despite its wholesale condemnation of insipid politics 
and their trivial institutions, the text's inexorable satire effects a neat, if not decisive, 
riposte to the charge of ideological nihilism. The poem's opening lines may not seem 
to accommodate one jot of ideological succour: 'We've got a change of government/if 
you know what I mean';[30] but the fact that we do know, at once, what the speaker 
means (perhaps better than Lawrence's original readership, whose morsel of Labour 
administration still tasted fresh) indicates a point of ideological corroboration: a 
change of government extends to little change in life generally; conventional British 
politics involves politicians but not the people whom the MPs are supposed to 
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represent. Crucially, however, for the poem's capacity as a contribution to political 
belief, this mere germ of an ideological position is subsequently cultivated in a way 
that challenges, rather than panders to, routinely-voiced prejudices. In short, the voice 
which disparages the political parties is itself subtly undermined in a satiric double 
play. The speaker's declamation against the parties backfires: in the very process of 
decrying contemporary politics the speaker is herself revealed as hopelessly petty; for 
why else, obsessively, but purposelessly, prate about their shortcomings, while 
pointedly refusing to consider any possible alternative? Characterising the different 
political groups as a succession of Aunts who are given the job of keeping house, for 
example, the speaker, presumably referring to the derelict Liberals, sneers that 'Aunt 
Libby's really a feeble lot'; but she immediately illustrates her own feeble-mindedness 
by then confessing: 'And I simply daren't think of [Communism's] Aunt Lou!'[3l] The 
speaker emerges as a shallow snob, conditioned by rumour and a prisoner to her own 
ignorance when faced with 'Aunt Lou's' unfamiliar system: 
I've never seen her, but they say 
she's a holy terror: she takes your best frock 
and all your best things, and just gives them away 
to the char, who's as good as you are, any dayY2] 
The poem's satirising of this ironic voice amounts to nothing that approaches a 
proposal of Communism as an attractive alternative in itself (although there remains a 
faint hint of Communism's negative power as a possible expurgator of stale political 
and social forms);[33] its point is to question whether the prospective arrival of Aunt 
Lou's 'horrible' hordes, 'stamping and swearing/and painting the wood-work red', is 
any worse than the over-refined speaker, appalled at the concept of being 'made to go 
to work, even if/you've got money of your own'.[34J The second filter of irony rescues 
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none of the objects that the speaker dismisses (the conventional parties remain the 
paltry concerns that she draws them to be); but what it does retrieve is a disposition, 
unlike the speaker's, which still entertains the possibility, and urges the necessity of 
real ideological and social change. 
Besides recognising the hollowness of contemporary politics, the poem 
shows, by means of the speaker, how such a recognition commonly leads to an empty 
cynicism that actually complements, rather than tackles, the situation. The garrulous 
idiot which we construe from the body of the poem is wholly different from the 
persona we imagine at the beginning. The opening two lines, 'We've got a change of 
government/if you know what I mean', succinctly mark the political stasis through a 
knowing attitude with which we may readily identify; in the remainder of the poem, 
however, the speaker assumes only the contemptible familiarity of a gossip whose 
further expatiation (thirty lines) adds nothing but speculation - speculation, moreover, 
which now frets against possible substantial change, in the form of Communism, and 
concludes with a whimper: 'Oh, Aunt Louie's the one I dread.'[35] That emphatic "r 
signifies the speaker's sense of self-importance, but it also registers the ideological 
contradiction, indeed disintegration, which has occurred. The contrast with the 
opening 'We' points up the self-inflicted isolation incurred through the speaker's 
complete skepticism, which only leaves her ideologically vulnerable to existing 
realities. Paradoxically, that skepticism fmally serves not to undermine dominant 
ideologies and their institutions, but instead to support them, since, as if incapacitated 
by fear at finding herself snared in an ideological pitfall, the speaker concludes by 
revoking her initial discontent in exchange for a paralysed policy of 4better the devil 
you know'. 'Change of Government', with true satirical brio, holds up 'a sort of 
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Glass' in which is shown the unattractiveness both of present political forms and of 
empty-handed criticism. 
But still, it may be demanded, beyond identifying this last futility, does 
satire itself bring any positive ideological construction to bear on the problem? It 
could be argued that all that this demonstrates is the overwhelmingly negative 
impulses of a literary form which can only operate by disdainfully dismissing its 
subject matter. Whether or not this charge is true, it is worth pointing out that, as 
regards Lawrence's writing about politics, at least, this limitation could not be deemed 
to be a distinguishing attribute of his satire. Lawrence's satire is no different from the 
rest of his work in displaying that contempt for politics (that I remarked upon in my 
Introduction)[36] which conceives political life as a preposterously overblown domestic 
tragicomedy. Somers's contention in Kangaroo, for example, that 'Politics is no more 
than your country's housekeeping' ,f37] perfectly encapsulates the sentiment of 'Change 
of Government'. And yet besides this, mirroring Kangaroo's keen interest with 
Cooley's and Struthers's approaches to household management, the energy invested 
by the poem against its targets suggests a very real concern with the wider social 
fabric. Both novel and poem would seem to insist upon dispelling the notion that 
Lawrence's antipathy for conventional politics precludes any desire to see the world 
changed; but I would maintain a crucial difference between them is that whereas 
Kangaroo, in deference to his residual status as Lawrentian hero, excuses Somers's 
political ineffectuality with the opinion that revolutions constitute 'nothingnesses', (38) 
the satire is licensed to expose much more clearly the nothingness of those who 
effectively disable themselves from genuine social involvement. Thus, it may be said 
that 'Change of Government' does not yield to political quietism so readily as do the 
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supposedly 'responsible' Somers and the poem's speaker, who passively accept 
government by a professional political elite. 
Proposing the submissiveness and confused thinking behind much 
supposed political participation, 'Change of Government' implicitly indicates a 
revolutionary remedy: if the several supposed political alternatives, together with their 
electors, are only the separate heads of one hydra, then evidently the course is to 
reduce the whole thing to ashes and see it buried once and for all. On the other hand, 
considering the lack of any recommendation as to how this is to be effected, it is 
doubtful whether the slaying of such a monster emerges as anything other than a 
fabulously Herculean labour. And a further suspicion must remain regarding the 
possible oversimplification involved in equating British Conservatism and Soviet 
Communism. But the very fact that the poem raises such questions points to its 
engagement with, and contribution to, political debate. Indeed, just as Lawrence's 
detached individuals cannot escape society, Lawrence's poem, even in its ideological 
negation, inevitably partakes in ideological processes; and, in any case, diagnosis of 
the aftliction must precede curative treatment. Above all, 'Change of Government' 
submits that the threat of circumstances being made worse presents a feeble excuse 
for refusing to try to emerge from an already unsatisfactory situation. The poem does 
not, in fact, attempt to obliterate society, but instead fires a broadside specifically at 
that class of people who consider themselves to be 'above' the rest of society and yet 
simultaneously to represent it, whether as politicians or as a self-appointed 
spokesperson. It is further testament to Lawrence's enduring relevance that today we 
may still recognise, as critical obstacles to social change, that class's narrowing of 
230 
politics to a specialist technical affair, and the culture of low expectations that 
develops in turn. 
The accusation of over-simplification, however, is one which is difficult, 
and perhaps pointless, to deny. Lawrence's recurrent dismissal of politics is, to some 
extent, an effect of the vexation caused by a problem he cannot solve and which 
refuses to go away. As if in 'denial', he affects to rise above the fray of competing 
ideologies, when reality shows his inability to fashion his distinctly ideological 
statements into a coherent political framework. Needless to say, what may be regarded 
as a political failure by no means entails an artistic one. What it does mean, though, is 
that we meet with Lawrence's political thought as with a mineral in its raw state, a 
substance which may appear interesting in its variegation, but whose potential is not 
realised. Neither is it the aim of my criticism to bring about such a realisation, in the 
form of a left- or right-wing 'Lawrence', so much as it is to display and interrogate the 
texts' vein of political confabulation;[39] to mine, as it were, the rich ideological seam 
that frequently lies beneath a deceptively barren surface of manifest politics. Put 
another way, in Lawrence we see a deeply-felt concern for the way that society is 
organised, and a profound desire for radical change, all of which, however, constitutes 
a radicalism which remains deeply buried in a hardened distrust of evolving a political 
'ideology': as with a creature held in amber, it proves impossible to remove one 
without disfiguring or destroying both. 
I certainly would not wish this metaphorical fossil to be taken as an 
intimation of Lawrence's obsoleteness, although it does, obviously, concede that he is 
a crucially limited writer. Even then, this last admission has to be considered in a 
political context, which, particularly to an imaginative writer such as Lawrence, may 
quite reasonably have appeared to be of desperately limited scope and decidedly 
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lacking in inspiration. Leaders of the Left, while vowing to represent radical change, 
were proving to prefer a political pragmatism that tended to cultivate their own 
eminence before their revolutionary credentials: in 1926 the general council of the 
ruc had been prepared to compromise with capitalism to the extent of calling off the 
general strike, entirely without condition; and the variation in administration of 1929 , 
which Lawrence's poem implies was not much change whatsoever, saw a 
Conservative government replaced by an ever more moderate Labour party, led by 
Ramsay Macdonald - a man who would soon betray socialism entirely to lead a 
National Government that was dominated by Tories. Further afield, an increasingly 
Stalinised Soviet Union presented a vision of social upheaval that was stifled and 
sanitised enough to make it safe from upsetting the political teacups of the British 
chattering classes. [40J On the other side of the political divide, the general election of 
1929 also witnessed the impotence of the traditional political forms of the British 
elite: despite a short-lived resurgence in votes received, the small number of returned 
Liberal MPs was sufficient testimony to the party being spent as a Parliamentary 
power; the Conservatives, meanwhile, inauspiciously for the transformative potential 
of British politics at large, had polled slightly more votes than the other parties on a 
'Safety First' campaign, thinly veiling the fact that they were 'stuck for a positive 
programme' .[41] If 'Change of Government' offers no clear direction forward, then it 
could simply be the case that this is because it presents such a penetratingly accurate 
picture of politics at that time. 
It is a nice irony, nonetheless, that, to a great degree forfeiting his 
revolutionary optimism, as a price for rejecting the socialist thinking that he viewed as 
antithetical to his concept of spontaneous individualism, Lawrence's individuals are 
left bereft of anything approaching the free autonomous agency that is claimed for 
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them. Stripped of a positive ideology, with no new pathways open to them, and the 
way back blocked by the apparent collapse of past standards, they are cast into a 
precarious no man's land where the only course is to take cover. In the later work. 
certainly, society not only oppresses Lawrence's free individuals directly, through its 
conventions, but, equally pernicious, seems to do so through the very collapse of its 
conventions, which would appear to deprive personal life of any structure against 
which to respond and shape itself. So it is that, in Kangaroo, Somers is left 
bewildered by Australia's anarchic demolition of his notion of 'lordship';[421 and this 
sense of the disintegration of old social forms becomes acute during Connie 
Chatterley's drive around Uthwaite, when the decay of the great country houses is 
lamented as the end of the old England. The mansions become symbolic of a lost 
social structure, of lost rule and authority: 'Look how our ancestors lorded it!', is the 
forlorn message. [43] 
Lawrence's difficulty in maintaining faith in the possibility of progressive 
change is suggested in contrasts between the first and final 'Lady Chatterley' novels. 
In Lady Chatterley's Lover (1928), we find that Lawrence is thrown back into a 
heightened yearning for past social structures. Connie and Mellors no longer look to 
suburbia and industrial work, as do their counterparts in the first version, but plan to 
farm the land. In Lady Chatterley's Lover, Connie's drive through the 'Dukeries' of 
north Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire very much amplifies the sense of decay in 
version one. In the first version (written in 1926), Bolsover Castle is simply 
'powerful-Iooking,;[44] in Lady Chatterley's Lover (in which it becomes 'Warsop 
Castle') we are told more pointedly: 'The powerful old castle was a ruin'.1451 The first 
version's 'great Elizabethan house, Hardwick, noble above its great park' ,[461 becomes 
'Chadwick Hall' of the final version, still noble, 'but out of date, passed over. It was 
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still kept up, but as a show place.' [47) The old world may be doomed in the first 
v e r s i o ~ ~ but the final version emphasises a sense of d e s e c r a t i o ~ ~ of a world much 
diminished, with correspondingly attenuated hopes: the 'proud and lordly' erections 
of the county's great halls are to be exchanged for the 'proud' and 'lordly' erection of 
Mellors's penis: in such circumstances it is perhaps best that 'God alone knows where 
the future lies. '[48) 
The grand constructions of lordly times have lost their social significance. 
In some respects Connie could be said to be living with the consequences of a process 
of individuation whose beginnings are most strikingly rendered in The Rainbow 
(1915). In that novel, the imposing edifice of Lincoln Cathedral is introduced as a 
symbol of complex unity that potentially offers to connect the individual with wider 
mankind and the universe as a whole; but it is very quickly reduced to a defunct 
remnant of a previous social communion from which contemporary individuals are 
trying to extract themselves. Early in their marriage - already depicted in terms of a 
battle, from which Anna is to emerge the 'Victrix' - Will and Anna Brangwen visit 
the cathedral. Once inside, Will immediately gives himself up to ecstatic transports: 
for him, the cathedral is the 'consummation' of' all' and 'everything'. [49] Anna, on the 
other hand, while initially 'overcome', is 'silenced rather than tuned to the place', and 
'would never consent to ... the ultimate confine' (188), but 'claimed the right to 
freedom above her, higher than the roof (189). It is as though Anna, refusing the 
attempt of dominant ideology to secure her consent to submission, perceives a reality 
behind the ideological screen, as it were, of the cathedral ceiling. She seizes upon the 
contradictions, the carvings of faces which seem to dispute the cathedral's 
preponderant allusions to Infinity and Eternity: 
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Apart from the lift and spring of the great impulse towards the 
altar, these little faces had separate wills, separate motions, 
separate knowledge, which rippled back in defiance of the 
tide, and laughed in triumph of their own very littleness. (189) 
Interpreting one such face as being that of the wife of its carver, Anna takes it as a 
pointer to life outside the cathedral, beyond its dominating vision: 
These sly little faces peeped out of the grand tide of the 
cathedral like something that knew better. They knew quite 
well, these little imps that retorted on man's own illusion, that 
the cathedral was not absolute. They winked and leered, giving 
suggestion of the many things that had been left out of the 
great concept of the church. 'However much there is inside 
here, there's a good deal they haven't got in,' the little faces 
mocked. (189) 
Once Anna has dispelled the cathedral's 'illusion', Will, too, has to admit 
that there is 'life outside the church. There was much that the church did not include' 
(191). But the spiritual break, made by Anna, from the insular, self-contained domain 
of the cathedral is double-edged. Anna, who becomes 'absorbed in the child' (Ursula, 
with whom she is already pregnant when she visits Lincoln [191]) is enabled to 
establish the conditions for her daughter's more drastic break with the ideology and 
actualities of social settlement: Ursula completes the progress of human experience, 
from the communal aspiration that is embodied in the cathedral, through the familial 
satisfaction of her parents, towards an indomitable individuation. But, for Will, on the 
other hand, being thus removed from the confines of the cathedral's mystic 
abstractions leaves him only perplexed: 
he was aware of some limit to himself, of something unformed 
in his very being, of some buds which were not ripe in him, 
some folded centres of darkness which would never develop 
and unfold whilst he was alive in the body. (195) 
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That w h i c ~ ~ for Anna, constitutes liberation from ideological constraint, entails only 
dejection for Will, as the old absolutes - his 'vital illusions' - are destroyed: 'Soon he 
would be stark, stark, without one place wherein to stand, without one belief in which 
to rest' (190). It being the case, t h o u ~ ~ that Anna's vein of emancipation is 
maintained through the remainder of The Rainbow, in the self-assertive Ursula, who, 
at the end, envisages the world as 'waiting in pain for the new liberation' (458), it 
seems clear that any distress at the destruction of the old order is to be regarded as 
worthwhile (and even Will discovers a new state of being, through a newfound 
intimacy with Anna, which frees him to turn with fresh interest to public life [220]). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that Lawrence's next novel, 
Women in Love, finds grievous problems in ascertaining just what, exactly, 
supposedly socially-emancipated individuals are to do when those values which they 
have consigned to the past still endure, after all, for the rest of the world at large, and 
seem to deny them a clear prospective destination. Lilly, in Aaron's Rod, attempts to 
dismiss this issue: 'I'm rather sick of seekers .... There is no goal. I loathe goals more 
than any other impertinence. Gaols, they are.' But Aaron knows full well that this gaol 
imprisons Lilly as much as any 'seeker', and points out: 'Wherever you go, you'll find 
people with their noses tied to some goal'. [50] Aaron, has earlier begun his quest for a 
better life by frrst leaving his family, and then England. In thus forsaking both family 
and the broader commitment to the nation, he can be seen as spuming those values 
which were recently shown, in the war, to demand ultimate self-denial, submission 
and sacrifice. They are anaemically present in the socialist cipher, Jim Bricknell, who 
pronounces upon the importance of 'love and sacrifice' - those same banners which 
were so frequently used to justify compulsion and murder in wartime (although which 
now, for the trivial Jim, only serve to excuse a brief pummelling of Lilly).[51) It is, 
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then, possible to view Aaron's abandonment of his family as a bitter parody of the 
millions of analogous separations that were a consequence of war. The striking 
difference between these cases is, of course, that Aaron leaves upon a search for 
self-fulfilment, while the soldiers faced the horrors of conflict and perhaps death; and 
yet Aaron's attempted liberation outrages convention (' I could kill him for it', 
Lawrence has Aaron's wife pointedly say},[52] while what the soldiers endure is 
conventionally considered to be 'heroic'. [53] Lawrence is here once more suggesting 
the brutally repressive nature of the current social ethos, more callous than Aaron's 
behaviour, and which Aaron perceives as 'Self-righteous bullying, like poison 
gas!' .£54] But, crucially, because Lawrence lacks a positive programme for what Aaron 
is to do with his new life, the great irony is that Aaron finally appears no different to 
the most feckless fIrSt-world-war soldier - getting shipped to Europe, to be nearly 
killed by a bomb, and then apparently having to face his 'life-submission' to a greater 
force. [55] As we have seen previously in Lawrence's work, it proves to be one thing to 
cut away from the social ethos, and quite another thing to determine where to go next 
if human society is an imprisoning nightmare. In Kangaroo, Somers believes both 
Labour and the Diggers to be persisting with a dying ideal, [56] and the consequent state 
of being, 'at Sea', with nothing to do but to keep adrift from society, affiicts 
characters throughout Lawrence's later work. In his last novel, Lady Chatterley's 
Lover, sympathetic characters once again seek recourse in enclosures from the outside 
world, but this time private and explicit enclosures (the wood at Wragby, the 
gamekeeper's hut) rather than a cathedral's suggestion of social communion and 
attempted illusion of all-encompassing space. 
Given that it is the mocking, satiric spirit of Anna which brings the 
cathedral's pretensions to authority crashing down, how can satire help to build a new 
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social form? In keeping with satire, Anna perceives that there is a greater truth beyond 
that which the cathedral represents, but which must remain among the 'unknown 
realities' (191). The 'unknown' frequently recurs throughout Lawrence's later work 
and marks, if not always a crisis of faith, then, certainly what threatens to be a crisis 
for a writer - the fact that that in which he has faith remains largely inexpressible. At 
its worst, this problem of trying to communicate the incommunicable sees Lawrence 
resorting to the same religiose bombast that The Rainbow's 'The Cathedral' chapter 
sweeps aside, and his closest political representatives casting forth an indefatigable 
line of unenlightening, and fmally risible, figures of speech. Of particular note, in this 
last respect, is The Plumed Serpent's Don Ramon, who 'explains' his own aspirations 
for revolutionary change thus: 
Politics, and all this social religion ... is like washing the 
outside of the egg, to make it look clean. But I, myself, I want 
to get inside the egg, right to the middle, to start it growing 
into a new bird .... 
We've got to open the oyster of the cosmos, and get our 
manhood out of it. Till we've got the pearl, we are only gnats 
on the surface of the ocean .... [57] 
A clear-cut manifesto, indeed. The Rainbow, however, by concerning itself with the 
transcending of categorical standards, and by letting the 'unknown reality' be 
precisely that, generally escapes this somewhat demanding project of turning gnats 
into pearldivers. So too with satire, one of whose functions is to point out the 
discrepancy between ambitious declarations of intent and the deficient abilities and 
means of those who make them. Satire involves measuring the specimen against the 
standard and revealing the former's deviation. Thus, it may be said that satire works 
to scrutinise the n e g a t i v e ~ ~ the positive, on the other hand, once expressed. 
immediately dies in the hands of the satirist. This is exactly what Lawrence says 
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happens to John Galsworthy in The Forsyte Saga. 'Galsworthy had not quite enough 
of the superb courage of his satire. He faltered, and gave in to the F orsytes', Lawrence 
alleges.[58] That is to say, he breaks from the negative criticism of social convention in 
a failed attempt to offer his positive standard: 'that series of Galsworthian "rebels" 
who are like all the rest of the modem middle-class rebels, not in rebellion at all'. [59] 
In other words, the satire 'soon fIzzles out' ,[60] and worse, is seen by Lawrence to be 
vitiated by this misfIred palliative: in effect, Galsworthy 'put down the knife and laid 
on a soft sentimental poultice, and helped to make the corruption worse' .[61) Whether 
or not we agree with Lawrence's example, we would probably concur with the 
implication of his criticism: that, rather than describe preferable social forms, the 
satirist is best employed to clear the way for them, or perhaps, as it were, to dig their 
foundations (as opposed to a mere hole). A comparison, for instance, between H. G. 
Wells's parodic excoriation of Victorian society and contemporary utopias in The 
Time Machine, together with the stem social prescriptions implied therein, and the 
rudely aborted satire of the tediously expository Men Like Gods, would be proof 
enough. Concrete proposals for improved social organisation are best supplied 
elsewhere, as, for example, in Wells's speculative Anticipations and A Modern 
Utopia. [62] The fact that Lawrence did not pursue this alternative line to any great 
extent is immaterial (and, if we allow The Plumed Serpent as evidence of one such 
positive programme, probably just as well): his satire maintains that sharp edge 
necessary to cut away present ideological 'corruption', and so allow greater possibility 
for those more rehabilitative agendas to be implemented, even if they belong to 
others. [63] 
Besides what may be termed this preparatory quality of satire, however, 
satire's implication that better standards exist takes us a stage further towards their 
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fashioning. For, even if satire does not explicate such standards, it tends to provoke its 
audience to reconsider accepted truths and, so too, to contemplate what the actual 
truth may be. Lawrence himself demonstrates this in John Galsworthy when he asks: 
'What was there besides Forsytes in all the wide human world? Mr Galsworthy 
looked, and found nothing.' But then, this is how satire works, after all (as Lawrence 
suggests when he points out that when Galsworthy 'came back with Irene and 
Bosinney, and offered us that' , he ended the satire ))64] And this is why Lawrence says: 
'Reading Galsworthy ... one feels oneself in need of a standard, some conception of a 
real man and a real woman, by which to judge all these Forsytes' )6S] It does not matter 
that Lawrence's subsequent definition of a real man is not especially well-defined (but 
which is, indeed, suggestive of his own negatory style: 'money does not touch him .... 
He is not divided nor cut off');[66) the important thing is how this unspoken quality of 
satire proves to be so engaging. A similar power runs throughout Lawrence's work, 
which draws us into a response in the same way; as it draws my thesis itself, which 
has been spurred into explorations of the latent content of Lawrence's texts, and of the 
Machereyan significance of the conflict between the texts' explicit and implicit 
meanings. Depending upon one's point of view, the vastness of Lawrence's latent 
significance may be considered as further evidence of his limitations as a writer, or 
rather (as I would contend), as that which makes him all the more interesting. 
precisely because it remains for us to 'distinguish the necessity of this silence', [67] and, 
in so doing, to explain and progressively explode those limitations. 
It is a general characteristic of modernist texts, of course, for them to 
make such demands of the reader. Writing in 1940, David Worcester remarks, not 
altogether approvingly, upon how the reader is burdened with: 
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An ever-increasing responsibility to share the work of 
creation, to apply the satire and to perceive the irony for 
himself. Our most modem writers have succeeded in 
developing a kind of literature in which the reader does all the 
work. [68] 
It is at this point that Lawrence receives his only mention in the book (testimony to 
his long-standing small reputation as a satirist). [69] Yet, in his brief discussion of 
Lawrence, it immediately becomes clear that Worcester is simply not thinking about 
the satirical works as such; Twilight in italy,l1°] perhaps, seems a more likely text 
when he says: 'D.H. Lawrence's search for identity and his hatred of intellectuality 
met in his dark, diminutive, hairy peasants .... Thwarted, frustrated, incapable of 
thought'. Without specifying any texts, however, he goes on to declare that although 
'Machinery for producing irony is present in these writings', it is not set in motion.(7I] 
Modem literature's supposed abhorring of the intellectual is what Worcester takes to 
be the prime cause of so much stillborn satire: 'Distrust of dogmatism has led to a 
horror of all theory, a shrinking from moral responsibility'. [72] The remarks upon 
unfulfilled satire very closely reflect what I have said previously concerning 
Kangaroo, but Somers's persistent cogitation, however fruitless, and assured sense of 
belonging to the 'responsible' class appear directly to contradict Worcester's 
diagnosis. Indeed, it is because of the predominance of Somers's po-faced theorising 
that Kangaroo's potential satire has no chance of emerging. 
From what has been said so far in this chapter, we can see that a healthy 
distrust of all theory is exactly what best enables satire to operate; and we may gain a 
better idea of how effective this stance can be from the views of a theorist who knew 
the limits of theory. In discussing the responses of the Left to the Great War, Lenin 
241 
proposes that British socialists provide the clearest view of the failure of so many to 
oppose the conflict, and this because: 
With their dislike of abstract theory and their pride in their 
practicality, the British often pose political issues more 
directly, thus helping the socialists of other countries to 
discover the actual content beneath the husk of wording of 
every kind (including the' Marxist'). [73] 
In particular, Lenin argues that Robert Blatchford's plain-speaking jingoism provides 
an open view of what hides behind the German 'Marxist', Karl Kautsky's theoretical 
'sophistry' 'p4] I would argue that an analogous relationship exists, respectively, 
between Lawrence's short story, 'The Man Who Loved Islands' (1927) and 
Kangaroo. If Kangaroo's fondness for frequently bewildering abstractions raises 
suspicions of a Kautsky-style attempt to gloss over the concrete conditions which its 
hero has effectively accepted, then 'The Man Who Loved Islands' allows the 
circumstances of the 'free' individual to be apprehended more directly. As the 
islander moves through a series of successively smaller, less populated islands in 
order to secure his vulnerable selfhood against a hostile world, he acts out the 
ultimately self-defeating philosophy of Somers. Although we are usually half-aware 
of Somers's similarly isolated position, his continual theoretical exchanges with 
himself mean that his withdrawn attitude is rarely very apparent. 'The Man Who 
Loved Islands' , on the other hand, unhampered by the philosophising and 
philosophical temporising found in Kangaroo, presents a concise exposure of the 
destructiveness of alienated individualism. (75] 
The islander, Mr Cathcart, begins his adventures not wanting 'necessarily 
to be alone"" but certainly desiring 'a world ofms own')16] To this purpose he buys an 
island and installs a dozen or so people whom he intends to rule benevolently under 
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his new persona, the 'Master'. From the beginning, however, we are aware of the 
improbability of such a scheme ever succeeding. Nowhere is the demonstrative nature 
of Lawrence's satire more evident than in the story's statement of intent: 'this story 
will show how tiny [a world] has to be, before you can presume to fill it with your 
own personality' (151). In an important respect, 'The Man Who Loved Islands' 
attends to the ideological hole opened up by other texts by Lawrence, because it 
satirises the same individualism which proves such an unavailing foundation for all 
other ideological constructions; and, ironically enough, satire's own nihilistic 
tendencies become implements for revealing the most trivial nihilism that lies at the 
heart of Cathcart's individualism. 
Far from ostensibly nihilistic at the outset, though, Cathcart could seem to 
be a downright Utopian as he attempts to establish quasi-feudal harmony. The 
sprinkling of ironic asides from the narrator, however, pointedly propose Cathcart's 
utter misguidedness, and no more so than when informing us: 'He began, as we begin 
all our attempts to regain Paradise, by spending money' (153). Cathcart's recourse to 
gross materialism, establishing himself in the island's main dwelling-house and 
employing others (in strictly specific roles) as fellow, though inferior, islanders, does 
nothing beyond produce a society as money-driven and class-divided as any seen on 
the mainland. And neither is he anymore in control of this 'world' than he could be of 
the world at large. Human society and the material circumstances of the island 
inevitably impinge upon his life as much as he can ever do upon theirs. When both of 
these perceived opponents push him to the verge of bankruptcy, Cathcart sells the 
island to a hotel company who want to develop it into a honeymoon and golf resort. It 
is worth noting that however 'bourgeois' and commercial this latter version of 
paradise appears, it does not impose upon other people what is to be their paradisal 
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vision any more than Cathcart did. His dream of social harmony is every bit as 
counterfeit as that of the proposed resort, for both projects are wholly designed, after 
all, upon principles of naked self-interest. 
This self-interest is shown in sharper focus when Cathcart removes, with a 
smaller retinue, to a smaller island. The corresponding diminution of his status and 
his outlook is plain: although still deferred to, he is called by his name and not 
'Master'; and the island is 'no longer a ''world''', but 'a sort of refuge' (162). This 
brings to mind Birkin's prognosis in Women in Love, of having to live in 'the chinks' 
unoccupied by the inferior masses of humankind;(77) it is also telling that Cathcart's 
thoughts turn to cathedrals and echo Anna's perceptions in The Rainbow when he 
imagines that they 'howl with temporary resistance, knowing they must fall at last' 
(163). For Cathcart, as much as for Birkin and Somers, social ties are severed and 
communal values no longer stand up to scrutiny; but whereas the fates of these other 
characters are held in suspense at the end of their respective novels, the ramifications 
of Cathcart's isolating individualism are fully followed through. Birkin and Somers 
are allowed to maintain uneasy and notably non-progenitive marriages, but, for 
Cathcart, a sexual relationship with his housekeeper's daughter, Flora, turns the island 
into a 'prison' when he is faced with the birth of their child - who, not unsurprisingly, 
arrives like a 'millstone ... tied round his neck' (166))18] Consequently, Cathcart 
decamps once more, this time alone, to a previously uninhabited island. 
In Cathcart's cold rejection of Flora there is something reminiscent of 
Aaron's abandonment of his family, although it could be said that, whereas the 
islander is intent on giving up the world, Aaron's departure marks his determination 
to properly experience it. This is certainly how Aaron's Rod regards its hero's travails. 
because, even while the novel occasionally undercuts Aaron's determined desire for 
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singleness, it overwhelmingly presents autonomous individuality as the one suitable 
basis for negotiating life. Contrariwise, it seems to me that 'The Man Who Loved 
Islands' gives the lie to Aaron's Rod's individualism. Aaron expresses his faith in 
individualism after an especially feckless re-encounter with his wife: 'To be alone, to 
be oneself, not to be driven or violated into something which is not oneself, surely it 
is better than anything.'[79] Indeed, this possibly is best if one relates to people as does 
Aaron: briefly returning to the wife who still repells him, after becoming uneasy with 
the patronage of those whom he knows in London, the episode is typical of a man 
who can never 'yield' [80] to human association. Despite the implication of Aaron's 
nobility and valour in his refusal to accept social realities, his philosophy seems not so 
different from the stupidly craven attitude of Cathcart upon his third island, where 
'The tension of waiting for human approach was cruel' (167). 
In this final, fatal location, Cathcart's story realises the full negativity of 
Aaron's asociality. There is, permissibly, a nascent awareness of this negativity in 
Aaron's Rod itself. Steven Vine argues thus: 
In the pub scene in Chapter II, for instance, Aaron sits 
discontentedly in the bar and refuses to 'give in' (22:26) to the 
warmth of the atmosphere, holding himself in stiffened 
'opposition to his surroundings' (22:22). The language that 
describes his 'opposition' hints that Aaron's very autonomy is 
a state of death, a cadaverous separation from surrounding life: 
'Nothing would have pleased him better than to feel his senses 
melting and swimming into oneness with the dark. But 
impossible! Cold, with a white fury inside him, he floated 
wide-eyed and apart as a corpse' (23:15-18).[81] 
That the self is killed as a consequence of keeping apart from others is an idea frankly 
dealt with by 'The Man Who Loved Islands', which shows Cathcart's total isolation 
from humankind as depriving him of his individuality, and ultimately of life itself: 'he 
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no longer realised what he was doing', 'He ceased to register his own feelings' (169, 
170). Things in Aaron's Rod, on the other hand, are never so straightforward. In the 
above passage analysis, for instance, Vine significantly omits another reference to the 
cadaverous Aaron that directly precedes his quotations: 
Bah, the love game! And the whiskey that was to help in the 
game! He had drowned himself once too often in whiskey and 
in love. Now he floated like a corpse in both, with a cold, 
hostile eye.l82] 
Here, the suggestion is that Aaron's fatal mistake is to have allowed himself to 
become like Somers's 'fly in the ointment', 'floundering round in this easy, cosy, 
all-so-friendly world' .[83] And, however corpse-like, it is precisely his floating apart 
from all this that is seen as necessary to his rebirth, which finds him 'moving almost 
violently away from everything' with the 'exhilarated feeling that he was fulfilling his 
own inward destiny' .[84] 
Aaron's Rod, like Women in Love and Kangaroo, clings to an individualist 
philosophy as though to a life-raft in empty ideological waters, despite its often 
obvious flimsiness. In more openly satirical mode, by contrast, Lawrence is less in 
need of an ideological platform of any kind, and, giving up the contorting exertions 
required to keep it afloat, can swim free. At the end of Aaron's Rod, for example, we 
are presented with an apparent contradiction when Lilly impresses upon Aaron that 
one's supreme responsibility is to fulfil one's individual self, spurning all external 
gods and goals, and yet, at the same time, affirms the need to submit oneself utterly to 
a greater man. In 'The Man Who Loved Islands' this confusion is nicely unravelled. 
We see, simply, that sheer individualism can only find fulfilment in submission 
before the world, because it leaves one so physically and psychologically vulnerable. 
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Thus, the ridiculous Cathcart is pleased that his third island entirely lacks trees, 
because 'They stood up like people, too assertive' (167). Here, surely, he may 
exercise his individuality, unafraid of opposition - and yet, to what purpose? He has 
succeeded in escaping humanity at the cost of rendering all plans, desires, and even 
thoughts, meaningless. There is nothing but a wasteland: 'Only space, damp, twilit, 
sea-washed space! This was the bread of his soul' (170). The story's greatest irony, as 
the external landscape is reflected within his inmost self, is to at last have Cathcart 
establish communion: a communion of desolation, though, which can only properly 
be completed by his death. 
The impossibility of the self-supporting individuality that many of 
Lawrence's other protagonists would hope to live by is made evident early in the text: 
[Cathcart] had reduced himself to a single point in space, and a 
point being that which has neither length nor breadth, he had 
to step off it into somewhere else. Just as you must step into 
the sea, if the waters wash your foothold away .... (153) 
And so the rest of the story provides the perfect retort to Somers's acrobatic project to 
haul himself out of society and on to his separate self; and, similarly, Cathcart's 
predicament reveals in clearer light Birkin's recourse to chopping down the world to 
fit oneself and living in the 'chinks'. [85] Through such proposed measures, these 
Lawrentian heroes only risk exposing themselves to the universe's petrifying infinity, 
the same that Cathcart must contemplate, deprived, as he is, of the intermediary 
screen of definite social circumstance. In chopping down the world, they only chop 
down their abilities to respond to the world, and, therefore, they really hack away at 
their own individuality. 
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Such self-defeating 'defences' of a precarious individual identity are 
familiar phenomena to psychiatrists, and, while not wishing to reduce literary 
creations to psychological case studies, it is worth quoting the existential psychologist 
R.D. Laing, whose work effectively provides a commentary upon the 'breakdown' of 
Lawrentian individuality. Of central interest to Laing is that same condition which 
appears to effect the crises of Lawrence's protagonists - namely, the reality and 
anxiety of human existence as 'being-in-the-world', as the inescapable experience of 
being a subject in a world of non-absorbable, and thus non-controllable, others. The 
ontologically insecure individual's response to this pressure is, says Laing, one of 
continual retreat: 
If the whole of the individual's being cannot be defended, the 
individual retracts his lines of defence until he withdraws 
within a central citadel. He is prepared to write off everything 
he is, except his 'self. But the tragic paradox is that the more 
the self is defended in this way, the more it is destroyed. The 
apparent eventual destruction and dissolution of the self in 
schizophrenic conditions is accomplished not by external 
attacks from the enemy (actual or supposed), from without, but 
by the devastation caused by the inner defensive manoeuvres 
themselves. [86] 
This scorched-earth policy is detectable in Ursula's and Birkin's 
resignations from their jobs, in Aaron's departure from his family, and Somers's 
rejection of social and political commitment; but it requires, in order to enable a 
genuine critique of his heroes' actions and motivations, the negative mechanics of 
satire, which release Lawrence from maintaining an explicit standard (invariably some 
kind of individualism), and allow him to show, however unintentionally, the 
spuriousness of such free individuality; or, at least, to show that one who fashions 
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himself to fit the 'chinks' left to him by others can be said to be neither individual nor 
free. [87J 
Above all, then, 'The Man Who Loved Islands' shows that someone may 
be imprisoned not so much by others as he is by his own philosophy. Lawrence was 
acutely conscious of such a danger: 
Man is a creature of reason, and therefore gets drunk, says 
Byron. But the truth is, man thinks he is a creature of reason, 
and therefore he alone, of all creatures, must needs get drunk. 
Why? Because he has made for himself a prison of his own 
reason, and sometimes, in mad irrational frenzy, he must burst 
out of it, in one form of drunkenness or another. If man could 
once be reasonable enough to know that he is not a creature of 
reason, but only a reasoning creature, he might avoid making 
himself more prisons. [88J 
If the philosophical colloquies of Women in Love and Kangaroo find themselves 
similarly fettered in Lawrence's own ideological contradictions, then Lawrence 
appears to burst free through satire's predilection for displaying the foolishness and 
confusion that often lie behind ratiocination. That Lawrence was well aware of this 
quality, we should have no doubt, because, particularly when employed to such a 
purpose, satire was the favourite instrument of Jonathan Swift, whom the preceding 
quotation paraphrases. Consider Swift's view of the human condition: 
I tell you after all that I do not hate Mankind, it is vous autres 
who hate them because you would have them reasonable 
Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always 
rejected that Definition and made another of my own. 
I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of 
that Definition animal rationale; and to show it should be only 
ration is capax. [89J 
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Swift's fascination with how rational arguments develop given assumptions into 
unacceptable positions is writ large across Gulliver's Travels (1726). His most 
famous work piles example upon example of human reason being used to justify 
patent absurdity.[90] The remorseless logic with which Cathcart pursues his originally 
reasonable aim to shape his environment more closely to his own ideals can be seen in 
the same light. 
But perhaps the most striking connection between these texts is how they 
both pour scorn on the idea of the adventuring, conquering hero. Indeed, we have 
already seen how, besides exploding the image of the rational human being, satire 
provides for a complementary assault upon Enlightenment/capitalist totems in its 
amenability to debunk the idea of the free individual. From the early days of the 
capitalist powers' empire-building to Thatcherism,[9I] satire has shown self-interested 
individualism's detrimental impact upon society and the wider environment;[92] but 
probably its most important function in this respect has been to demonstrate the 
relativity of that individuality (and of the culture whence it springs) which would 
present itself as an absolute. European explorers of recent centuries, for instance, 
would take for granted the relative primitivness of any 'new' land, while manifesting 
their own god-like authority by giving it a proper European name and maybe even 
attempting to transfonn the inhabitants into something closer to the paragon of the 
explorer himself. The ironic treatment of this convention by Gulliver's Travels has 
been neady described: 
The counterpart to the real explorer, the heroic traveller in 
mythological fiction, often commences his journey from a 
point that is not merely a geographical location, but a 
stronghold of culture and tradition. The journey embarked on 
is a movement away from this starting point towards 
experiences in situations deeply alien to the traveller's original 
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environment. In order for the journey to be heroic, the traveller 
must return home having seen and overcome the alien world 
he has passed through, with the precepts of his culture intact, 
his moral vision unaltered, and his personality strengthened 
and confirmed by its trials. Thus Gulliver's Travels ironically 
transforms the archetypal heroic voyage by making the hero 
return deeply altered in vision. He has become the alien, 
shunning his former companions, no longer able to tolerate 
even the smell of his own family. He has become an 
aberration; the voyage has overpowered him completely - it 
has robbed him of his pays. [93] 
Having glimpsed the 'genuine' absolute of the Houyhnhnm's society of pure reason, 
Gulliver's madness is to try to apply those absolute values to the human world. Even 
the supposedly most perfect among humanity can accommodate no such thing, as 
becomes apparent when Gulliver returns home to the hopeless task of civilising the 
English, Houyhnhnm-style. 
It being the case that the typical Lawrentian traveller does not even return 
home, and, indeed, leaves England with little sense of it as 'home', the prospect 
emerges of a surprisingly subversive dimension to the hitherto apparently fruitless 
meanderings of Lawrence's characters. However, Lawrence wrote at a time when the 
imperial adventure seemed to be drawing to an end, and, rather than directly subvert 
the prevailing attitudes of imperialists in respect to this crisis, his non-purposive 
travellers, who lack a clear rationale, only reflect them. Consider the following: 
The British colonial empire in the 1920s ... had no 'policy' in 
the French sense: 'In my day', a colonial servant of the era told 
an American enquirer, 'we had not all forgotten Aristotle. I 
was continually asking, "What is the end or object of this 
endeavour?" But no one would or could give me an 
answer. '[94] 
At best, a work like Kangaroo could be said to expose the malaise at the heart of the 
British Empire by representing it more openly than the Empire's representatives 
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would. And yet Somers, doubtlessly like those same representatives, is nonetheless 
not discouraged whatsoever from perceiving his 'self as an absolute which must be 
maintained above and beyond the canaille of the relative world in which he finds 
himself. 
A crucial distinction exists between traditional imperial attitudes and those 
of Somers, of course, in that Somers shows even greater disdain for England than for 
the 'New World'. But then again, it should be remembered that 'colonies provided 
niches for misfits'[95] - for people such as the explorer Richard Burton, whose lifestyle 
and beliefs did not reside comfortably within the orthodoxies of the mother country. 
Not dissimilarly, Lawrence's characters try to find abroad those 'chinks' in which 
they may escape the pettiness that they associate with conventional English and, more 
broadly, European life; it is just that those chinks have become increasingly straitened 
with the near-complete colonisation of the world, and Lawrentian individualism reacts 
in complementarily extreme fashion, vilifying the claims to superiority of the 
'civilised' at the same time as patronising the 'uncivilised'. This is particularly 
noticeable in Lawrence's travel writing. Thus, for example, at an Italian performance 
of Ghosts, the peasant audience suggests a 'pathos ... of mental inadequacy', while 
Ibsen's work itself is excessively 'mental and perverted' )96] In much the same way, 
Lilly, in Aaron's Rod, can deplore the masses of Africans and Asians while berating 
European colonists for wiping out other races en masse.[97] 
As with Somers and Lilly, while Cathcart may not see England as a 
'stronghold of culture and tradition', certain values are internalised - he spends much 
of his time upon the first and second islands writing a reference book on classical 
literature, using English translations. And even though his difference from those on 
the mainland is marked by his having 'dropped out of the race of progress' (163), this 
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is exactly what the more anxious patriots feared for Britain: Cathcart' s story of 
declining fortune and status is also that of the mother country. [98) Cathcart reflects the 
culture that has made him what he is; it is just that he does not like being part of a 
bigger picture: he refuses to be relative, and, believing he can establish his own 
absolutely individual version of a world, he attempts to break from aggregative, 
monopolistic society. But, testimony again to his inextricable ties to the 'home' 
country, the extremity of his individualism only has a monopolising e f f e c ~ ~ analogous 
to entrepreneurial capitalism's evolution into monopoly capitalism. By the third 
island, though, he is, like Somers, [99) left with a monopoly of nothingness. 
The story then, can be read as one of the debilitating loss of individualism 
to monopoly, and, furthermore, one of ebbing British imperial power. In these 
respects it is not so different from Kangaroo. Unlike Kangaroo, though, 'The Man 
Who Loved Islands' suggests that a conception of freedom which is centred upon 
individual liberty is complicit in the malady of both individual and society. The 
freedom that Cathcart seeks is that of a subject's independence of outside influence, 
of possible oppressions or restrictions, against which the freedom is negatively 
defined; this is a view that is less concerned with positive standards of how to live 
freely, and which reflects the value judgement made in Women in Love, depreciating 
mere 'doing' beneath 'being' oneselfl1OO) - an evaluation favoured among Lawrence's 
individuals in general.[I0l) The deleterious consequences of Cathcart's non-purposive 
freedom is clear in regard to himself, but a similar effect on the social body is 
registered, besides. This is evident not only in the manifest problems which Cathcart 
encounters in his management of the people on the first two islands: in Cathcart' s 
disastrous liberation from mainland Britain, 'The Man Who Loved Islands' proposes 
a crucial problem with the emergent process of national self-detennination - also 
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largely driven by a freedom that is negatively defmed (freedom from domination by 
Imperial powers). The islander can be interpreted as one of those countries seeking to 
break free of the imperial yoke; and his less than egalitarian attitude finds a ready 
counterpart in the specific example of South Africa Upon returning from the 1926 
Imperial Conference (see note 98), South African Prime Minister, Barry Hertzog, 
declared: 'The old British Empire, as it existed in the past, now exists no longer ... all 
h .. fr . '[102] Tha . t at remams IS a ee society. t IS to say, a society in which the Boers were free 
to dominate, especially in regard to the majority black population. This is mirrored in 
the freedom that Cathcart establishes for himself in order to master the population of 
his first island: it is commensurate with both the liberalism and the elitism of 
capitalism, and, in keeping with that system, such freedom is not so easily obtained by 
those who cannot afford it. [103] At the same time, lacking a purposive agenda (because 
it has nothing new to achieve, besides maintaining the status quo and the current 
elites), this freedom seeks its justification in the existence of the non-free: the 
rationale for South African 'free society' could be found in its opposition to and 
SUbjugation of the black majority who, 'naturally', were utterly incapable of being 
free individuals and who threatened decent society. In the same way, Lawrence's free 
individualism is usually defined and justified in the negative, against the subjected 
mass of people who, for the sake of his free individuals, are doomed to be just that: 
subjected masses. In 'The Man Who Loved Islands', however, satire's omission of 
positive fields of action leaves exposed all the more the limitations of this idea of 
freedom: as someone who breaks 'free' from Britain, only to incur a yet more 
trammeled life, Cathcart does not merely end up 'altered in vision' - he can hardly be 
said to have any 'vision' at all. 
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Cathcart, in seeking utopia but fmding only that his single-mindedness 
closes down the world, presents a parallel to satire's tension between its rigorous 
search for truth and the nihilism that it frequently demonstrates. In fact, this same 
tension runs through Lawrence's life and work, particularly after the war, which, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, found Lawrence at one time trying to rescue the world with a 
'revolution of society' and at another time deciding it best to 'fire bombs into if.!J04) 
While it would be fair to assume satire's preference for bombs, we must allow that 
Lawrence generally seems to throw his bombs at the present world in the hope of 
allowing something better to emerge, as in 'Change of Government' and 'Oh 
Wonderful Machine!'. He did not believe the universe to be meaningless so much as 
that the modem world, having driven itself into an ideological dead end, is shut off 
from its meaning and must blast a way through. (lOS] 
And besides, the satirical mode emphasises one truth that applies to all 
cultural production - the same which Raymond Chandler points out about writing in 
my epigraph: that it is, inescapably, a social practice. However negative, Lawrence's 
writing is a reaction to the social formation of which he and his work are 
incontrovertibly fused. Though he may parody the common phrases habitually used by 
others, as in 'Change of Government', the writer's very words are, in a literal sense, 
common property; though he may challenge the possible objections of his readers to 
his work, as in Aaron's Rod, this only attests to the social context in which his work 
must function; and though the world at large may be satirised, as in 'Oh Wonderful 
Machine!', such a text exists only by virtue of its antagonistic reaction to the world 
that it derides: thus Lawrence could write that 'even satire is a form of sympathy", 
sympathy 'in recoil from things gone dead' .(106] 
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All of this should be remembered when considering criticism of 
Lawrence's 'detachment' from the world he describes, such as that of Graham 
Holderness which I briefly mentioned in my Introduction (page 36). For Holderness. 
the opening of Lawrence's The Lost Girl (1920), which describes the mining town of 
Woodhouse, illustrates a view of community as given by an outsider and 'which 
derives from superficial observation or ignorance': 'the community itself is easily and 
lightly held in the ironical consciousness for curious contemplation' .[107J This 
depiction of the narrator's satiric distance is accurate enough, but it fails to account 
for the possibility that it is precisely Lawrence's inside knowledge of small towns in 
the English Midlands which, in this instance, leads him to adopt a detached manner; 
for that manner anticipates the recoil of the novel's heroine, Alvina Houghton, from 
the town and from the social constraints that English provincial life would place upon 
her, and, perhaps more importantly, considering the less than obvious liberation she 
fmds in married life with Ciccio in Italy, it serves to reinforce the sense that her 
departure from Woodhouse is, in spite of all which happens subsequently, the right 
decisiony08] In any case, claims of ignorance often perhaps simply mean that the 
writer is uninterested in what the critic thinks should be written about and how. 
Socialist critics, for example, are rather less likely to complain of the 'superficial 
observation' and crude 'ignorance' that undoubtedly lie at the heart of a socialist 
novel like Robert Tressell's The Ragged Trousered PhilanthropistsY09J 
Still, as I have just shown in my indictment of Tressell, satire's often aloof 
and polemical nature makes it a ready target for such criticism; and the accusation of 
an incapacitating detachment often involves charging the satirist with, not mere social 
ignorance, but a horrifying lack of humanity. Jonathan Swift has suffered this 
denouncement more than most, particularly in respect to Gulliver's Travels. A 
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typically vigorous defence was advanced by William Hazlitt, which could also be 
used to defend Lawrence's apparently more misanthropic statements. In short, Hazlitt 
contends that Swift's contempt is not for humanity per se, but for its false sense of its 
own accomplishments and achievements; he hates humanity for being the poor 
specimen it often is, and for failing to live up to what it could be. Bearing in mind the 
unfulfilled hopes expressed at the end of The Rainbow, that the industrial world will 
evolve into something better, it is possible to see Lawrence's subsequent vituperation 
of humanity, not as evidence of a lack of 'solidarity with his species',[IIO) but, in 
Hazlitt's words upon Swift, as 'an obstinate, constitutional preference of the true to 
the agreeable' .[111] There is an evident problem with this assertion, though, in that it 
merely begs the question as to the accuracy of the writer's statements about the world; 
and, in any case, considering that so many of the 'truths' which Lawrence relates 
about humankind - or, at least, about the massed majority - are so disagreeably 
venomous, and that such a defence could be stretched to vindicate the extremes of 
Sade, for example, it is a moot point as to whether this amounts to any defence 
whatsoever of the writer's 'solidarity', or rather to a concession of his remoteness 
from his 'species'. 
If all this seems to take us no further forward in the knotty question of 
Lawrence's social detachment/engagement then it is no surprise to find that Hazlitfs 
essay is itself entangled in a corresponding issue which concerns the position of the 
satirist. At one point, Hazlitt likens Swift's viewpoint in Gulliver's Travels to that of 
'a being of a higher sphere': 
he has tried an experiment upon human life. ... he has 
measured it with a rule, has weighed it in a balance, and found 
it, for the most part, wanting and worthless - in substance and 
in shew. [112J 
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This inhabitant of an exalted world, pointing out humanity's worthlessness, suggests 
that privileged fence-sitter whom we saw earlier as one possible incarnation of the 
satirist, magically elevated above the ideological desolation and not deigning to 
contribute to the reconstruction. But, soon after, Hazlitt draws an altogether more 
socially committed picture of Swift's satire: 
His feverish impatience made him view the infrrmities of that 
great baby the world, with the same scrutinizing glance and 
jealous irritability that a parent regards the failings of its 
offspring; but, as Rousseau has well observed, parents have 
not on this account been supposed to have more affection for 
other people's children than their own. [l13J 
Perhaps these two positions of the satirist simply point up, once more, the inevitable 
conjuncture that is characteristic of all art, as it registers a connection to the world in 
the process of producing a quasi-external perspective upon it. However much by his 
fingertips, the writer remains connected to society even as he dismissive1y pushes it 
away. [I 14] 
It is the respect in which these two portraits conform, though, that 
conceivably offers more fruitful ground for discussing Lawrence's satire: 'measured' 
and 'weighed', as with the notion of parental scrutiny, indicate the presence of a 
corrective function. This brings us back to satire's implication of normative standards. 
Crucially, the way in which Hazlitt depicts Swift, which I take to be an accurate 
account of Swift's scrupulous gauging of humanity against the Enlightenment ideal, 
does not seem to me to signify how Lawrence's satire operates, after all. Swift's 
appeal, for example, to standards of "Reason', . Virtue, Honour, Truth and good 
Sense', 'Wit, Merit and Leaming',[I15J howsoever abstract they may be, furnishes his 
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satire with the sort of mission statement which finds little correspondence with 
anything in Lawrence's work. It would be considerably more difficult to so succinctly 
state the principles being invoked in, say, 'Dh Wonderful Machine!': Lawrence's 
poem may imply the possibility of something better than the observed specimen, but 
this supplies little, if any, of the motive force of the writing, which is driven instead 
by an instinctual hostility to technology-fetishism. Swift's own hostility to debased 
elements of his world was supported by a relatively clear set of models, just as the 
neoclassical ethos in general was sustained by the standards of the classical past. 
Considering what we have discussed previously, concerning Lawrence's belief that 
the standards of the past have crumbled or become obsolete, it seems evident that 
Lawrence's satire is operating upon a fundamentally different basis. 
In his essay, '[The Good Man]', which deals with what Lawrence saw as 
the fate of an eighteenth-century creation - the ideal of the supremely moral 'man of 
feeling' - Lawrence affirms once more that the ideals of the past are dead; and, with 
neither new ideas nor a 'new feeling-pattern' emerging, violent and chaotic social 
upheaval is imminent: 
There is no choice about it. You can't keep the status quo, 
because the homunculus robot, the 'good man', is dead. We 
killed him rather hastily and with hideous brutality, in the 
great war that was to save democracy. He is dead, and you 
can't keep him from decaying. You can't keep him from 
decomposition. You cannot. . 
Neither can you expect a revolution, because there IS no 
new baby in the womb of our society. Russia is a collapse, not 
a revolution. [1\6] 
Nevertheless, Lawrence does not see this as cause for despair. for there is still hope 
that new ideas will emerge. In the meantime: 'All that remains, since if s Louis XV' s 
Deluge which is louring, rather belated ... is to be a Noah, and build an ark.... for 
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there's one more river to cross' )117] Of course, the state of affairs pictured here is 
highly contentious, but then my point is that this argument determines Lawrence's 
employment of satire - that is to say, his satire is used to assist this argument, to 
advance the cataclysm. 
For my part, I would argue that it is possible to see Lawrence's view of the 
state of affairs, as given in '[The Good Man]', as lending a rather radical aspect to his 
satire. This can be illustrated by a comparison with the work of Raymond Chandler. 
In significant respects, Chandler held beliefs about the world that were in some , 
respects, very close to those of Lawrence: he viewed capitalism as a fraudulent 
business concem,[1l8] while seeing socialism as merely an alternative means to 'abuse 
the power of money';[1l9] suspicious of much abstract theory, he affirmed his trust in 
instinct and intuition.l120] The upshot of all this, personified in the private detective, 
Philip Marlowe, is a Romantic individualism that is 'in revolt against a corrupt 
society' ,[121] - not so very different from the attitudes of Lawrence's questing 
individuals. And yet the impetus for these characters' rebellions would appear to lie in 
opposite directions: if Lawrence's protagonists look to a post-diluvial future, then 
Marlowe rather seems to be Chandler's attempt to keep the 'good man' very much 
alive.[122] 
Chandler's view of the past was far from idealised; he knew full well that 
what we conceive as the 'past' often appears generally superior to the generality of the 
present because 'The past after all has been sifted and strained. The present has not.' 
Yet because of this very selection process, the past. as represented by existing society. 
offers a yardstick with which to measure - and frequently to thrash - the present: 'The 
past is our u n i v e r s i t y ~ ~ it gives us our tastes and our habits of thought. and we are 
resentful when we cannot find a basis for them in the present: I 123) Some of Chandler's 
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own resentment is expressed in his early satirical poem, 'Free Verse' (written in 
1912). A parody of what Chandler perceives to be the lazy, meretricious vacuity of 
vers libre, the poem makes clear reference to those distinct standards which the newly 
popular fonn disregards. Thus, the mock 'modem' poet addresses his more 
conventional counterpart: 'You see, it's such a lot of troublelTo learn metre/And 
rhyming,! ... What is it all worth?N ou have something to saylTo make it tell in that 
cut and dried fonn.! And I haven't. '[124] The satire is similar to that of neoclassicism in 
that it is employed to uphold a fairly specific kind of discourse as the authoritative 
literary voice whilst stigmatising others;[125] it is therefore quite different from 
Lawrence's use of satire and poetry. Lawrence embraced free verse exactly because he 
saw the poet's job as one of breaking through established patterns of thought and 
feeling; as he wrote in '[The Good Man]': 'our true bondage' is that 'we can only feel 
things in conventional feeling-patterns'. [126] In antithesis to this, Lawrence sought to 
discover alternatives which may not be patterns at all, and increasingly approved of 
the potential for 'chaos' in poetry, whereas, on the other hand: 'The poetry of a 
regulated cosmos is nothing but a wire bird-cage. '[127] So too, we may venture, did 
Lawrence prefer a satirical chaos to the regulating satire of corrective norms. If 
normative standards exist for Lawrence's satire, then they cannot be stated as 
concretely as Chandler extolls his beliefs in rhyme and reason because they are never 
as securely known as Chandler's 'past'; instead, they remain prospective, to be 
constructed in a future that has escaped current ideological prisons, assisted by writers 
who 'might break through the blind end of the high-way, with the dynamite of satire, 
and help us out on to a new lap' .[128] 
We may begin to appreciate how satire of the normative type may lend 
itself to a cultural conservatism (without necessarily denying the originality of its 
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producers), and how the satire employed by Lawrence entertains a more progressive, 
or, at least, experimental cultural outlook. We would be mistaken to associate these 
forms, respectively, with political conservatism and radicalism, without regard to the 
ideological content that they are given in particular cases; but we can still say that the 
satire in Chandler's poem predominantly speaks with, or seeks to establish, the voice 
of authority, while the immediate business of Lawrence's satire more often lies in 
destabilising and disrupting authorities and their standard discourses - no better 
displayed than by 'Change of Government', with its simultaneous trivialisation of 
conventional political powers, and ridicule of the commonplace, virtually traditional. 
carping at them. This all-subversive quality should persuade us, once and for all, to 
drop the idea of Lawrence's satire as sitting on the fence. In the spirit of Lawrence's 
analogy at the end of '[The Good Man]', his satire does not simply present a case for 
reposing in the ark and weathering the storm, but for actively calling forth the deluge. 
Daniel O'Hara's contention that Lawrence cries 'a plague on all your 
houses' proves an apt choice of deliberate misquotation in another way besides this, 
however. The curse emitted by the fatally wounded Mercutio reflects something of the 
scope of Lawrence's satiric invective, but it also captures the often damaged and 
desperate condition of Lawrence's leading characters. Chandler's Marlowe, in 
contrast, despite all the sickness and pain that the world gives him, never so warmly 
embraces that wholesale misanthropy to which Birkin and Somers are at times 
susceptibleY29J And although there is usually no easy or wholly satisfactory solution 
to his problems, he is generally safely steered towards a solution by a distinct code of 
justice and morality: he is involved in 'the struggle of all fundamentally honest men to 
make a decent living in a corrupt society' .(130J As 'Free Verse' polices the realm of 
poetic fonn through its reference to convention, so does Marlowe advance 'decent' 
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standards, that presumably originate from an uncorrupted past, in order to provide 
some frrm ground upon which to negotiate and patrol a complex world. Indeed, 
however shabby and solitary he may be, his towering irony enables him to manage a 
shabbier, hostile world in a succession of tidy witticisms: Marlowe's culturally 
degenerate California, for instance, is a place that is better acquainted with (John 
Moses) Browning's automatic rifle than (Robert) Browning's poetry.[13I J 
Contemporary mechanised violence, this would have us believe, has supplanted an 
earlier concern with moral rigour and emotional honesty. Lawrence's heroes, in 
contrast, never so neatly summarise their world's degradation, and rarely rest so 
securely in their assessments. This is not because Lawrence's oeuvre lacks a tough, 
wisecracking detective, but it is due to the fact that his protagonists are so often 
preoccupied with the fundamental question of deciding what standards to live by in 
the first place. Marlowe, on the other hand, not mired in such existential basics, never 
spends long in determining what course of action to take; and Chandler, too, takes as 
little time to clarify Marlowe's specific role in life. On the first page of the first 
Marlowe novel, our hero arrives at the home of his client: 
Over the entrance doors, ... there was a broad stained-glass 
panel showing a knight in dark annour rescuing a lady who 
was tied to a tree and didn't have any clothes on but some very 
long and convenient hair. The knight had pushed the vizor of 
his helmet back to be sociable, and he was fiddling with the 
knots on the ropes that tied the lady to the tree and not getting 
anywhere. I stood there and thought that if I lived in the h o ~ s e , ,
I would sooner or later have to climb up there and help him. 
He didn't seem to be really trying.(132) 
Marlowe is the new and improved knight errant of chivalric romance. and thus. in 
Chandler's novels, the problems of a debased, modem, 'rear world are dealt with by a 
hero who is several steps removed from it, as Chandler readily acknowledged: 
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'[Marlowe] is, as detective, outside the story and above it, and always will be .... 
Obviously this kind of detective does not exist in real life ': 'The private eye of fiction 
. c: d . b '[133] 
IS pure lantasy an IS meant to e. Indeed, much of the sheer enjoyment to be 
derived from Chandler's novels has its source in Marlowe's ironic detachment and 
romantic remoteness from quotidian reality. Lawrence's heroes, on the other hand, for 
all their social alienation, remain embedded, and implicated in the problems of the 
real, contemporary world. Unable to draw succour from the past, romantic or 
otherwise, they necessarily prevaricate and procrastinate rather than dynamically, 
heroically act; and this is because placing faith in normative values emerging in the 
future does not provide the means of resolving the difficulty of what to do in the 
present - Lawrence, after all, was not a prophet. 
Nevertheless, the impasse between Lawrence's idea of pure individuality 
and the necessity of further communal ties was occasionally disposed of with a 
panacean prophetic vision of the future;[134] more frequently, he did, in fact, resort to 
his own version of a mythopoetic individuality which, while not as potent as 
Chandler's, to some degree marks and supports most of the protagonists in his 
novels.[I3S] There is, though, an alternative stream within Lawrence's oeuvre which is 
concerned precisely with the explosion of such mythic constructions; this is to say, 
indeed, not merely that these texts expose what Lawrence sees as bogus ways of 
representing the individual and the world, but that they suggest Lawrence to be 
reassessing his own work and such representations found therein. Thus we have seen, 
for example, Kangaroo's search for singleness reproduced and - with the insecurities 
perhaps already apparent in the novel confidently enlarged upon - subverted in "The 
Man Who Loved Islands' . 
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'The Princess' (1925) is another text which seems to me to interrogate 
aspects of its Lawrentian predecessors, but which, ultimately, is more significant for 
the way that it demonstrates the all-subversive features of Lawrence's writing. The 
story of Dollie Urquhart, who has grown up to accept her Father's romance that they 
are the last of a regal fairy lineage, and that other people are comparatively vulgar and 
not worth knowing or even acknowledging, may be seen as another parody of the kind 
of solipsism that is characteristic of Somers. 'The Princess' may even be read as a 
satirical attack upon fallacious notions of 'phallic power', and, pace Kate Millett, as 
an anticipation of feminist criticism of Lawrence's work. Lawrence's business, opines 
Millett, is 'the transformation of masculine ascendency into a mystical religion' ;(136) 
but 'The Princess' rather appears to this reader to travesty would-be male sexual 
power and to demystify masculine domination. During an overnight excursion to the 
Rocky Mountains, the princess is held prisoner and repeatedly raped by her Mexican 
guide, the dispossessed landowner, Domingo Romero. After an initial sexual 
encounter, following which the princess plainly expresses her distaste, Romero 
avenges himself upon her, for what he perceives as a deliberate humiliation, by 
determining to 'make' her like it. The raping is devoid of detail, and certainly lacks 
any mystical imagery that might have bestowed a religious significance, and perhaps 
Lawrence's sanction, to the act: Lawrence baldly presents Romero's action as one of 
desperate brutality, of 'violent excess' .1 137) The princess is released from her 
incarceration when Romero is killed in a gun battle with two forest rangers. She 
emerges 'not a little mad' (196) from her ordeal, but, importantly, neither is she much 
changed by it. There is no significant development from her previous insane fantasy: 
instead, another romance is spun about her "accident in the mountains' and she is ahle 
to remain as 'the Princess and a virgin intact' (196). Thus, in some respects, the story 
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works as both a de-romanticising and a debunking of the fairy tale of Sleeping 
Beauty. The princess, unconscious of the world around her, due to the spell cast upon 
her by her father, awaits in bed for a prince to waken her, 'for someone [to] help her 
heart to beat' (188); her subsequent rape does no more than restore the fairy-tale 
prince's original device for achieving this, and so too uncovers, at the heart of the tale, 
the violent sexual politics that have been concealed latterly by a bowdlerising kiSS.[138] 
The significant difference here, of course, is that the princess does not 'wake up' - the 
only spell to be broken is that which accords the male member a magic of its own. [139] 
'The Princess', then, could be understood as working upon fairy-tale 
romance in a similar way to that which Simon Dentith proposes of the novel: 
Romance is above all the genre of wish-fulfilment, ruled by 
coincidence and wonder - which are other names for the action 
of Providence. The novel, by contrast, is a more fully secular 
genre, inhabiting the world as it is and not as it might be, and 
consistently debunking the claims of romance by making them 
bump up against the harder, but also more ordinary, facts of 
existence. [140] 
So too does 'The Princess' employ the often bitterly comic spirit of Mercutio against 
the Romeo-like imaginative extravagances of its eponymous heroine, and thus allow a 
healthier view of an often unhealthy world. One could almost imagine that Dentith 
has in mind the princess and her 'mad' father when describing how, in the novel, 
'parodied forms are seen ... as inhabiting the minds of characters', and how the novel 
exposes the 'delusive mentality to ridicule and correction' )I41] 
Significantly, though, while 'The Princess' may suggest to the reader that 
the romance spun by Colin and Dollie Urquhart is somehow 'incorrect', it does not 
actually cure father or daughter of their fantasies. This is to say that neither does the 
text provide a model of a 'correct' mental outlook, nor a correspondingly correct 
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literary mode of representation: there is no straightforward scheme in "The Princess' 
that follows that which Dentith outlines, whereby a normative standard of realism 
offers the antidote to romance. There is, instead, a tangled mesh of competing 
discourses and modes of representation that is further complicated by such ironies as 
that suggested above, when the princess's immersion in her own romance denies the 
fairy-tale, restorative sex-magic of Romero. Rather than privileging any particular 
discourse, 'The Princess' seems to show Lawrence's perception that all discourse, 
satirical or otherwise, is inevitably at some remove from the world that it purports to 
represent, and, consequently, potentially inadequate or untrustworthy. 
If the princess's endless romancing is not appropriate for perceiving and 
relating to the world, then neither, it appears, are more realist modes. The dubiousness 
of the princess's appreciation of non-fairy-like realities is not only a consequence of 
her enthrallment to romance: 'She could look at a lusty, sensual Roman cabman as if 
he were a sort of grotesque, to make her smile. She knew all about him, in Zola' 
(163). In stark contrast to romance's pretematuralism, naturalism's insistence upon a 
probing - but often superficial - investigation of a grossly material world is also 
characteristic of the princess; it is the only way that she can deal with those wild and 
deathly phenomena that refuse to be accommodated by her romantic wish-fulfilment: 
the dark mountains, feral animals, Romero himself - all are met, or rather missed, by 
an attitude of unsympathetic curiosity, fear and disgust. This apparently bizarre 
combination of preposterous romance and grim realities seems consciously to reflect 
the occasional absurdities of Zola: Lawrence's virginal fairy princess, raped by an 
impoverished prince in a shack bought from an impoverished miner, meets with the 
kind of Zola-esque fate that is suffered by Germinal's Catherine Maheu. who enjoys 
an ersatz 'wedding night', trapped at the bottom of a flooded coal mine. shortly before 
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d · [142J 'Th p.' h h' . ymg. e nncess suggests t at t e mevltable deficiencies of a monochromatic 
vision of the world, in whatever representational mode (in this instance, of romance ). 
only invite a compensatory, antithetical counteraction. Thus it is that Zola's strict 
naturalism so often develops a lurid sensationalism. [143J 
This scheme of thesis and antithesis is signalled in the story's opening 
sentences: 'To her father, she was The Princess. To her Boston aunts and uncles she 
was just Dollie Urquhart, poor little thing' (159). Here, the realist counterbalance is 
altogether less sensationalist. However, it is precisely the Bostonians' appreciation of 
decorum that leaves Dollie at the mercy of her father's romances: 'They debated 
having him certified unsuitable to be guardian of his own child. But that would have 
created a scandal' (160). Effectively, their concern with mundane realities renders 
them powerless to handle the real consequences of flights of romance. In fact, if we 
see something of the same decorum in the princess's over-refined sensibility which 
sees 'the real affair [of her rape] hushed up', beneath the invention of an improbable 
adventure story (196), then, once more, it appears that a realist attitude - this time 
more prosaically realist - courts the confections of romance. And if such New 
England propriety calls to mind the world of Henry James, then, I believe, this is 
hardly accidental. Dollie Urquhart is the effigy of Isabel Archer, the chaste but 
presumptuous heroine of James's novel, The Portrait of a Lady (1881).(144] Isabel's 
doting father has hidden reality from her and left her to be educated upon the bad 
things in life via literature. Also like Dollie, Isabel realises, too late, the 
less-than-gentlemanly ethics of the man whom she chooses to · go with' - and, in her 
case, marries. Finally, Isabel's rather implausible self-sacrifice in maintaining her 
marriage on a point of honour signifies a switch in James's novel from an initial 
psychological realism towards a concluding world of romance, foreshadowing the 
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concomitance of romance and realism in Lawrence's story; and while Isabel's 
romantic turn condemns her to a miserable life, the princess's genteel realist heritage 
provides no defence against the consequences of her own damaging romantic flights. 
If, though, we shift our attention from the princess herself, and her 
hotchpotch of romance and literary realism, it may occur to us that it is Romero, after 
all, with his 'spark of pride, of self-confidence, of dauntlessness', burning 'in the 
midst of the blackness of static despair' (168), who is the character to offer a more 
practicable fusion of the worlds of darkness and light, of the mundane and the 
magical. As if to encourage this supposition, the narrative voice, which has previously 
handled the princess's story with ironic deprecation, recounts her trek through the 
mountains with Romero with an eye for the transcendent complexities that she misses, 
but which seem inscribed in Romero himself. However, before we see Romero as 
emblematic of a more comprehensive mode of describing and understanding the 
world, we should bear in mind the lack of authority implied by his useless raping of, 
and impotent raging at the princess. No less significant is the manner in which his 
character is blithely surrendered to the type of cliched melodrama that is so ripe for 
the debunking scourge of parody - and, as Romero meets his end in a shoot-out that 
would befit any Western, it is possible that this is precisely the treatment he gets: he 
does not exactly say, 'You'll never take me alive', but 'I ain't going to Pen .... I'm 
going to shoot' is close enough (194). 
In fact, if any authority is conferred upon Romero's dealings with the 
world, it seems due to his resistance to any kind of utterance. His remote silence. like 
that of the Rocky Mountains, apparently signifies a force that is greater than mere 
words can express. But Romero's trait for 'saying nothing except what had to be said' 
(186) betrays the conundrum which lies at the heart of the text, for it merely begs the 
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question that any text must consider: what does need to be said, or even, what can be 
said? In Romero's profound silence, as with the mountains awesome inhumanity, we 
seem again to be facing that greater Lawrentian reality which exists beyond the 
capabilities of human language and thought - the 'Unknown'. Something of this 
transcendent otherness seems apparent in Romero's appreciation of the princess 
herself, who makes his mind go 'blank with wonder' (183); it is just such an 
unconditioned sense of the inexplicable which is impossible for the princess. and 
which keeps her from ever committing to a genuine human relationship. 
Yet, crucially, the story does not stop at subverting all kinds of discourse, 
but undermines this negation of discourse, too. For, near the beginning of the text we 
are told that the princess herself has learned 'the first lesson, of absolute reticence': 
she will withhold from others, who may not properly understand, her understanding of 
true reality - that is to say, of her fairy-princess fantasy (161). The fact that the 
princess's wise silence signifies nothing but the concealment of inane absurdities 
must throw the significance of Romero's reticence into question - and surely, besides, 
inject an acute dubiety into Lawrence's positing of the portentous 'Unknown'. 
If we appear, here, to be walking into another ideological hole, then we 
must ask if this text is any different from those postmodern texts that I judged above 
(pages 212-13) to consist of paralysed antitheses. And is not all this talk of 
'subversiveness' merely a hopeful gilding of a story which, in the final analysis, has 
nothing positive to say? Considered in isolation, 'The Princess' might well be deemed 
to answer 'no' to the former proposition and 'yes' to the latter. I would, though, on the 
contrary, suggest that 'The Princess' tells us something positive. in a very real sense. 
about Lawrence's attitude to his work and, so too, to the only form of social 
commitment he knew. In this text's overturning of discourse upon discourse. 
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Lawrence is declaring he knows full well that neither character, author, speaker, nor 
writer can lay authoritative claim to the concrete meaning of their words. He is 
perfectly aware of the possibilities of his work being misunderstood, whether 
deliberately or not; but whereas, for example, his letter of 1915 to Bertrand Russell, 
asking for 'patience' and for Russell to understand him when his 'language is not 
1 '[145] 1" . dul d' c ear , so ICltS an m gent au lence, Lawrence's later work flaunts its 
consciousness of the more likely reception and continues apace regardless. (146) He 
continues to write just the same - not least, perhaps, because he recognised that words 
are not mere signifiers, to be analysed and deconstructed contemplatively, as I have 
done above, but do matter and have real substance in a sphere beyond the page where 
the rape of a woman and the killing of a man are more than a matter for aesthetic 
arrangement. 
Above all, perhaps, neither 'blank wonder' nor 'absolute reticence' is 
practicable for a writer. Nor can they be maintained by anyone who would wish to 
live in relation to others, and this seems to be the message of 'The Princess' in form 
and content. Whatever the indeterminacy of language, one must pitch into the melee 
and test your vision against that of others: far from accepting that anything goes, this 
is the only way of ever attaining determinacy. 
In a sense, the abbreviated forms of Lawrence's satirical stories and poems 
are made for a world of abbreviated aspirations: they are analogous to the . spitefully 
humorous' 'bits' of the Sydney Bulletin with which Somers consoles himself in 
Kangaroo. Yet if something of the scale and ambition of the novels is sacrificed, a 
freedom is gained to comment upon that larger world; to point out the things the 
novels miss, and so, like the cathedral's carvings, exist "in triumph of their own 
littleness' . 
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enmity' (Kate Millett, Sexual Politics [1969; London, Rupert Hart-DaVIS. 
1971], pp. 238, and 286, n. 176). . 
D.H. Lawrence, 'The Princess', in St Mawr and Other Stories. ed. B n ~ ~
Finney (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 193. Hereafter In 
[138] 
[139] 
[140] 
[141] 
[142] 
[143] 
[144] 
[145] 
[146] 
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this c?apter, page references to this text will be given following each 
quotatIon. 
See Jack Zipes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Fairy Tales (Oxford Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 476. ' 
The case being that the rape does not 'do' much at all, the story forestalls our 
modem 'new man's' ~ e r s i o n n of mythicised phallic power, whereby rape is 
held to be the worst thing that may happen to a woman, and any 'victim' who 
challenges the convention that her life has been irrevocably damaged as a 
consequence is to be considered mentally ill (see, for instance, Sara 
Hinchcliffe, "'Aren't I allowed to be alright?": Why being raped did not 
destroy one woman's life', Living Marxism 103 [September 1997], pp. 22-3). 
Lawrence's later short story, 'None of That!' (1928), is much more in line 
with this orthodoxy. Ethel Cane, not unlike Dollie Urquhart, believes that to 
master a situation imaginatively is to control and deal with it in reality. 
However, when faced with having to accommodate in this way her 
subjection to a gang rape, she does the 'right' thing after finding that she 
cannot and kills herself. Ethel's demise, through her reliance upon her own 
imaginative powers to cope with a hostile outside world, could be seen as 
another corrective to the introspection favoured by characters like Somers; 
yet such a comparison only draws out the moral lesson in 'None of That!', 
which points up the erroneousness of a solipsistic attitude not so much as the 
mentally uncontainable power of male sexuality; Somers, for instance, 
confronted with otherness, suffers numerous painful encounters, but these are 
nothing as to the necessarily fatal confrontation of Ethel, the previously 
wilfully-independent female, with the all-powerful phallic other (D.H. 
Lawrence, 'None of That!', in The Woman Who Rode Away and Other 
Stories, pp. 211-29). 
Simon Dentith, Parody (London, Routledge, 2000), p. 55. 
Dentith, p. 58. This account is, as Dentith acknowledges, 'a one-sided history 
of the novel'. He goes on to look at the novel in another aspect - as a less 
normative and more generally subversive genre. It is this second viewpoint 
which I consider the best for appreciating 'The Princess'. 
See Emile Zola, Germinal (1885), trans. Leonard Tancock (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1954), p. 486. 
This assessment by 'The Princess' of a representational single-mindedness 
thus places the text as a companion piece to 'The Man Who Loved Islands:. 
which critiques a philosophical mono logic that sees the remorseless purswt 
of singleness only succeeding in destroying individuality. 
Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady, ed. Geoffrey Moore (Harmondsworth. 
Penguin, 1984). , 
D.H. Lawrence, letter to Bertrand Russell, 12 February 1915, Letters: ~ o l l II. 
p. 286. See above, p. 56. . . ,. l' 
A nice example in this self-consclOus mode IS the p o e ~ , , What ~ 1 ~ S S T h e ~ . .
(1929) - which, depending on the reader, can be seen eIther as a tn:lal ~ w ? , ,
or as an astute parody of the absurd dialogue and improbable relatIOnshIp 10 
Lady Chatterley'S Lover (The Complete Poems of D.H. Lawrence: ~ o l l I. ed. 
Vivian de Sola Pinto and Warren Roberts [1964; London. Hememann. 
1967], p. 540). 
CONCLUSION 
'THE END CRACKS OPEN WITH THE BEGINNING': THE FRUITFUL 
SEEDS WITHIN THE FISSURE OF 'LA WRENCE' AND 'SOCIETY'iI) 
Perhaps, as you say, you have wandered outside the world's 
communion. But haven't I as well? Have I not been ripped up 
by the roots, screaming like the mandrake, transplanted from 
country to country only to find the soil arid, or the sun 
unfriendly, the air tainted? Whom should you tell this terrible 
secret to if not to your brother? 
Thomas Pynchon(2) 
Towards the end of the war, a poverty-stricken Lawrence, hounded by the military and 
police authorities, summed up his attitude to the world and to his work: 
I go on working, because it is the one activity allowed to one, 
not because I care. I feel like a wild cat in a cage - I long to get 
out into some sort of free, lawless life - at any rate, a life where 
one can move about and take no notice of anything. I feel 
horribly mewed up. I don't want to act in concert with any 
body of people. I want to go by myself - or with Frieda -
something in the manner of a gypsy, and be houseless and 
placeless and homeless and landless, just move apart. I hate 
and abhor being stuck on to any form of society. (3) 
The depiction here, of an alienated individual who yearns for social detachment, is 
writ large across subsequent accounts of Lawrence, as I noted in my Introduction, 
particularly with regard to Auden, who uses the term 'gypsy' himself (above, page 
22). Contrary to this picture, I have tried to show the extent to which Lawrence's texts 
are inevitably embedded within their contemporary social formation and articulate its 
various ideologies. Besides, while Lawrence may not have been . engage' in the 
strictest sense, one does not . hate and abhor' something with which one has no 
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concern. What 1 take to be a more accurate view of his prevailing postwar attitude can 
be found in another letter, where he writes: 'I don't care for politics. But 1 know there 
must and should be a deadly revolution very soon, and 1 would take part in it if 1 knew 
how.'[4] Lawrence's work persistently resists the kind of political programme that is to 
be found in the writings of a 'committed' author, such as William Morris, for 
example; but it nonetheless continually expresses, however inchoately, the necessity 
of large-scale social change. Furthermore, that very rudimentary quality of 
Lawrence's radical political utterances is itself testimony to the extent to which his 
work is socially involved: Lawrence's express radicalism remains incipient simply 
because his discourse is so beholden to dominant ideologies of the present and the 
recent past. When he writes of individuality and freedom, or to depreciate the 
business of politics itself, his words are hedged, respectively, by the values of 
aristocratic hierarchy, laissez-faire libertarianism, and 'disinterested' patrician 
superciliousness. Not unlike Kangaroo's Somers, he searches for a 'new show' while 
blinded by old perspectives. This does not mean that the wish to transfonn society is 
not genuine, but that any positive attempt on his part to devise how to do so is 
pre-empted by 'society' itself: the social formation of West em capitalism is the reality 
which he detests, while its prevailing ideologies frame his thinking. Rather than 
Lawrence being divorced from social issues or disregarding politics for . higher 
purposes', then, it is possible to see the case is that he is a focal point for a complex 
arrangement of often opposing, contradictory social and ideological forces. 
Lawrence's consequential reticence upon, or impatience with political matters is. 
therefore, a politically induced silence that speaks of his connection to, and not 
detachment from, society. 
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A reasonable interjection at this point would be to declare that it is hardly 
a novel caveat to say that Lawrence must be considered as a social being: the images 
of Lawrence as a romantic outsider or hermitic oddball can surely now be consigned 
to the past. Nonetheless, the predilection for attempting to extricate the writer from 
his world remains powerfully active, most remarkably in the editorial policy of the 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of D.H Lawrence. The Cambridge Edition, with its 
aim to 'provide texts which are as close as can now be determined to those 
[Lawrence] would have wished to see printed',[5] follows the tendency of Lawrentian 
criticism, chopping away supposedly secondary, contemporary quotidian realities, to 
leave, immaculate, the amaranthine 'Lawrence'. Writing and publication are social 
processes and, as suggested in my earlier chapters, provided a vital continuing 
connection between Lawrence and wider society; strikingly, with its mission to 
produce texts that only Lawrence 'himself (might have)[6] wished to see, the 
Cambridge Edition would seem to desire, if it were possible, to sever this link and 
'restore' what we saw Raymond Chandler diagnose as the myth of 'purely individual' 
writing. [7] 
This criticism is not intended to detract from the very real achievements of 
the Cambridge Edition; on the contrary, the textual decontextualisation appears even 
more strange when we consider that the Cambridge Edition thoroughly contextualises 
Lawrence's writing and the publication process in a series of careful, detailed 
introductions which recount as important factors in the texts' production Lawrence's 
social circumstances, financial situation, and dealings with publishers and agents. The 
general editors, however, rather than simply recognise these circumstances, cast the 
. .. f th' . t Lawrence's mistreated hero. publIshers et cetera as the vIllaIns 0 e pIece, agalns 
Their "Preface' notes how Lawrence 'had to accept ... at all times the results of his 
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publishers' timidity' and that 'the fear of Grundyish disapproval, or actual legal 
action, led to bowdlerisation or censorship from the very beginning of his career'. 
Beneath this flurry of indignation lies the sober reality that all publishers have to take 
account of economic viability: legal action costs money and a banned book brings no 
money in. Furthermore, the fact that Lawrence earned his living through his writing 
meant that publisher and writer shared a common interest: hence, Martin Seeker's 
obligation to alter the text of The Lost Girl immediately prior to publication. John 
Worthen ably gives the gist of the situation: 
The three main circulating libraries in England - Boots, 
Mudies and Smiths - refused to take The Lost Girl if p. 256 
(describing the heroine's first sexual encounter with the hero) 
remained in its current state .... The book had been printed, and 
many copies already bound, but Secker urged Lawrence to 
rewrite the page; he had printed 4000 copies, a very large print 
order, and knew he would not sell anything like 4000 without 
the libraries buying the book. He asked Lawrence 
whether it would not be possible for you to rewrite the 
passage in question in such a way as to remove their 
objections. After all these three libraries should account 
between them for some 2,000 copies, possibly more if 
the book should have the success I anticipate, and as well 
as this direct result there is the even greater indirect 
benefit of your work gaining the widest publicity which 
only the libraries can afford. 
The arguments were persuasive, especially for an author trying 
to rebuild a career and make his books profitable .... [8] 
Quite. And yet it is Worthen who, as editor of Cambridge University Press' s The Lost 
Girl, and despite acknowledging Lawrence's agreement to 'modify The Lost Girl to 
satisfy the library demands' ,[9] persists in substituting the passage that Lawrence \\TOte 
in the first place. Presumably the reasoning here is that, if he were free from external 
demands (such as a readership), this is the version that Lawrence would have wanted. 
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This is a rather one-sided view of how a novel comes into being Indeed 't' I 
. ,1 IS sure y 
more accurate to accept that, rather than the Cambridge Edition working the miracle 
of excluding the penumbrae of non-authorial, and therefore supposedly 
non-authoritative, social considerations that are inscribed within a published t e x ~ ~ it is 
simply the case that those considerations change and that the Cambridge Edition is 
here changing the text to fit them. lIDs is to say that today it is not commercially 
dangerous to incorporate explicit sexual matter into fiction, so therefore there is no 
obstacle to use the originally excised passage; and thus, besides, the Cambridge 
Edition responds to another contemporary consideration: the need to present itself as 
fresh goods on the market. 
As might be expected, such a need becomes more apparent at the more 
popular end of the market, where, indeed, the sexual nature of The Lost Girl's 'new' 
material is as much a boon to the publisher as is its authorial authority. We may, for 
instance, compare what, for a period, coexisted as variant editions in Penguin's 
'Twentieth-Century Classics' series: its fITst version of The Lost Girl, which 
reproduces the original English edition of 1920, including the scene that was rewritten 
for the libraries, and the new version, published in 1995, which reproduces the 
Cambridge text, containing the more explicit material. The blurb to the original 
Penguin, giving the bare bones of the narrative, describes its text as "the story of 
Alvina Houghton and the rebellion against ordinariness that drives her into an affair 
with a vaudeville actor and then away, to Italy'. The Cambridge Penguin, on the other 
hand, keen to make capital of the new sexual content, trumpets the • Passionate and 
free-spirited' Alvina's rejection of 'stifling respectability' and 'restrictive social 
" • • • ,( 10J I . 
conventions' as the embodiment of Lawrence s behef III sexual expreSSIOn . t IS 
quite evidently a new and different text for new and different times - and a di tIerent 
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market. This instance of the beginning (or not) of the main protagonists' sexual 
relationship, has much in common with the Cambridge project in general; it is not 
always the case that textual 'corruption' is simply being removed, but often besides, 
we see that a text is being produced from an editor's1publisher's response to a 
different context. In the end, it is never simply a matter of what writers 'want to 
write': 'It's all reaction of one sort or another.'[ll] 
The texts of the Cambridge Edition are, if we ever forget, produced 
according to the logistical limitations of an academic press and the ideological 
standards and procedures of liberal-humanist scholarship; they are a late 
twentieth-century academic construction, besides being the work of an early 
twentieth-century novelist called D.H. Lawrence. The individualist ethos that operates 
within the Cambridge Edition's editorial policy may correspond with Lawrence's own 
attempts to elevate the individual above the merely social; but this confers no more 
authority upon the Cambridge Edition's version of Lawrence than is possessed by 
Lawrence's individualistic representation of the world. Still, all this is nothing more 
than that inevitable reprocessing through which are sifted all of the 'past' and its 
'contents'. Such transformations cannot be prevented - they simply signify the 
'Lawrence' that exists in a particular historical, cultural context. The same applies to 
critical treatments of Lawrence's oeuvre: while Lawrence himself may have been 
ideologically incapacitated from any sustained political involvement, this has not 
prevented his work from being recruited to the services of political and ideological 
interests that have alternately venerated and pilloried it, or, more often the case 
nowadays, as with my own account, conjured something in between. The man who 
died in 1930 has bestowed his name upon a textual body that is endlessly and 
. . d' d rereadl'ngs by writings. films. 
multlfanously resurrected by our rea Ings an . 
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television and radio programmes about his life and work, an<L indeed, by our 
responses to these secondary materials themselves. In this complex and continual 
processing of reprocessings, with so many ideological interests to be fought for. and, 
not least, perhaps, so much potential revenue at stake, we should always be cautious 
of any critical explication or edition that claims to deliver the 'authoritative' or 
'authentic' Lawrence (as promises the Penguin Lawrence Edition).[12] 
On the other hand, in the same way that Lawrence's perception of the 
indeterminacy of discourse did not prevent him from committing himself to print. this 
does not mean that we should refrain from attempting to define a relatively 
determinate Lawrence. In fact, this is what inevitably happens anyway (witness, for 
instance, the preponderance of 'philosophical' or psychological constructions as 
opposed to political expositions). To dispute, then, whether prevailing notions of 
Lawrence wield legitimate authority or not (however it may be defined) is possibly 
immaterial: it is simply the case that all contention centres upon a dominant position, 
be the conflict cultural, political or otherwise. The point to make, perhaps, is that, 
when entering the fray, it is more expedient to the critical process to do so in the 
knowledge, and with the acknowledgment, that one is defending, moderating or 
subverting a dominant view of culture which relates in some way to our view of 
material reality. 
My own version of Lawrence shares in some respects the indetenninate. 
provisory quality that is to be found other recent exegeses marked by the impact of 
postmodernism (and which, collectively, thus proffer the paradox of an authoritative 
'Lawrence' that is equivocal). I hope, however, to have resisted the neutrality - in both 
a political and wider sense - which seems to me to characterise other accounts of 
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Lawrence's ambivalency. I am in entire agreement with Paul E rt c. I gge , lor examp e. 
when he dismisses the tendency of earlier criticism to either construct and condemn a 
'bad' Lawrence, with reference to the fascistic traces and misogynistic elements in the 
oeuvre, or to present a 'good' Lawrence that supplies a 'health-giving philosophy of 
body and mind which assigns his extremist conclusions to a subsidiary place'. (13) 
Eggert rather wishes to appreciate the 'more chameleon, mercurial,' Lawrence: a 
writer 'not casuistical in regard to what he espoused, but changeable in his address to 
it - and thus changeable about the very basis of "espousal'" . (14) All of this provides a 
fine critical starting point, but I would add that, although it is necessary that 
Lawrence's changes of position be reckoned with, it is not sufficient to let those 
changes indefinitely suspend a reckoning of Lawrence's work on the whole. This is to 
say that it befits a critique to 'make its mind up' on certain points, and to render the 
supposed radical indeterminacy of Lawrence's texts tolerably determinate. 
While it is true that much of Lawrence's work itself does not make up its 
mind, this provides no peremptory prescription for a critical reading that rather 
passiVely accepts such ambivalence as a 'natural' Lawrentian condition. The critic's 
job remains in examining the nature of such ambivalence and explaining why it exists 
and what its relevance - that is, its value - may be to us now, if there is to be a 'critical 
discourse which is more than a superficial and futile reprise'(15) of the critical object. 
And besides, there exists an alternative prescription. We have seen, in the subversion 
of discourse in 'The Princess', for example, and in Women in Love's scene of multiple 
perspectives at the railway crossing, support for Eggert' s emphasis upon Lawrence' s 
elusiveness, his postmodern relativity; but we have seen also how Lawrence' s texts do 
not merely anticipate the postmodem condition, but work, or may be worked, to 
challenge it: a subversive reading of Kangaroo yields a sceptical account of 
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postmodemism's own political skepticism; an<L more simply, although La\\-renee 
demonstrates a ready perception of a political vacuum anA as m· 'Th p. 'f , ~ ~ e nncess, 0 
the inadequacies of discourse, he pointedly does not let any of this prevent his 
espousal of forthright political judgments, such as those in the poems of Nettles 
(1930). Nonetheless embroiled in postmodernity's crises of ideological legitimation 
and semantic undecidability, he repeatedly insists upon cutting through its Gordian 
knots, determined to make determinate statements about a world in which, after all, 
words do count. 
Lawrence's own ideological impasse did limit his writing in the respect 
that it often refuses to directly engage with, or even to recognise, the social dimension 
of human life. This limitation, however, has material and political causes whose 
explication grounds Lawrence's work once again within a social context, and allows 
his texts to comment upon their originating social formation in ways more indirect, 
and often more penetrating, than their author might have imagined. The Great War, 
which his work so frequently associates with the rescission of all former ideals, may 
fairly be viewed as the social crisis that precipitated his ideological crisis. Considering 
Lawrence's personal experiences during that period, it is unsurprising that the war 
especially seemed to signify a growing threat to individual liberty. The consequence, 
however, was an increasingly pugnacious defence of the notion of the free 
independent individual, which was effectively a vindication of a principal emblem of 
the entrepreneurial capitalism that, in its monopoly form, had helped lead to the 
international conflict in the first place. Lawrence became caught in a circularity that 
he found difficult to break: in fact, he was rather inclined to take the line that there 
was nothing wrong with individualism that more individualism could not fix - which 
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only tended to spiral towards an ever more fragmented world and increasingly 
alienated individuals. 
But even relatively early in his career, before the full horror of the war 
became apparent, Lawrence's new 'natural' aristocracy is already feeling menaced. 
with Ursula constantly aware of 'the grudging power of the mob lying in wait for her, 
who was the exception'. [16] If Lawrence's aristocrats appear to be as threatened as 
England's actual aristocracy had been for the past three centuries, then this should 
come as little surprise: because it is often rather difficult to tell the difference between 
Lawrence's aristocracy of birth and the conventional aristocracy of money, other than 
that it is precisely a lack of extreme wealth and feudal power that prevents Lawrence's 
individuals from properly lording it over their putative inferiors. Indeed, a critical 
obstacle for these beggarly aristocrats is the question of what they are to do, or are 
able to do, with their free individuality. While denouncing everyone and everything 
that would lay the least claim upon them, they continually flinch from determining 
what their purpose in the world is to be. But then again, we have our answer, or the 
evasion of the issue, in Women in Love, where we are informed by Ursula that to 'do' 
anything is 'plebeian', and that it is the object of the 'patrician' simply to 'be 
oneself. [17] Exactly as to what oneself may be in such reduced circumstances, we are 
never enlightened, but the utter fragility of such self-supporting individuals and this 
self-justifying individuality is clear. Their only sense of self seems dependent on the 
postulation of a loathsome mass of humanity, against which their individuality cannot 
fail to shine - in their own eyes. And their only succour is derived from imagining the 
destruction of everything else. 
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In truth, Lawrence's increasing stress upon an individuality that must 
remain free from society merely puts under stress, to breaking point, that individuality 
itself. In Kangaroo, for example, Somers fears that any attempt to involve himself in 
social life only risks his 'drowning in this merge of harmlessness, this sympathetic 
humanity', leaving him feeling like 'the fly in the ointment'. [18] This metaphor perhaps 
recalls Lawrence's short story of that name, published in 1913. It is the story of a 
young schoolteacher and righteous prig, lodging in suburban London, who encounters 
a would-be thief, one night in the kitchen. His disgust with such a specimen of 
working-class depravity, compounded with his despair of ever inculcating upon this 
deviant some of his own petty-bourgeois values, culminates in his sending the 
intruder away and miserably going to bed. In the first extant version of the story, the 
schoolteacher experiences a waking 'nightmare' at this point, thinking himself to be 
'a blot, just a blot of ink on a page, a black, heavy disfiguring blot, with no 
meaning.'[19] The loss of the a x i o ~ a t i c c sense of his own values, and of the sense of his 
efficacy as a teacher, spoil his earlier enjoyment gained in recollecting his life in the 
midlands and the girlfriend, waiting there, to whom he was writing. The easy 
eloquence upon the letter paper intended to be sent to his beloved is replaced in his 
mind by another ink-slinging projection of himself, as someone as ugly and 
inarticulate as he construed the intruder to be. Like Somers, the schoolteacher feels 
himself to be a fly in the ointment; and yet Somers's attitude appears fundamentally 
different. In the short story the schoolteacher's nightmare is of being rendered 
meaningless in respect to the society in which he must e x i s t ~ ~ in Kangaroo, Somers' s 
'nightmare', made explicit in the chapter of that name, is principally of the 
. . . If h· h 'f h annot struggle out of threatens his mearunglessness of society ltse , w IC ,I e c , 
., h' h"mself as a contaminant onl" 
supposedly independent slgruficance: e envIsages I . 
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while he pictures a society of 'pure' deindividuated ..; S enervauon - omers 
self-conceitedly characterises himself in the struggling activity of the fly crawling out 
of the ointment, which itself effects a d e - c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o ~ ~ so to speak, of society as a 
non-living, amorphous mass. 
If we were to associate the schoolteacher and Somers with Lawrence at 
the respective times of writing, an initial contrast of these texts may thus suggest a 
transition from an insecure sense of individual identity to a much more resolute 
self-assertion. It is nothing so straightforward, though. Such a process may" still, seem 
yet more apparent when one has considered the fmal version of 'The Fly in the 
Ointment', in which the schoolteacher's closing 'nightmare' is not of his own life"s 
meaninglessness, but of the 'blot' that is, in this version, the intruder. Crucially, 
however, the schoolmaster's new self-assurance is gained by his successfully 
identifying himself with an idea of decent society which the intruder threatens; in the 
first version of the story, it is the insecurity of such identification which endangers the 
schoolmaster's sense of selfhood. When it is remembered that, in Kangaroo, Somers 
is actively trying to dissociate from any kind of society, we become aware of a distinct 
possibility that the security of his individuality is facing yet greater peril. Indeed, 
Somers's concern, here, is not for a world which he or another threatens to spoil (as in 
both versions of the short story), but with an engulfmg world which threatens him. 
Both schoolteachers suffer angst in recognising their contingent relation to the often 
refractory world beyond them, but they do not, nevertheless, deny that relatedness. 
Thus the schoolteacher in the final version of the story admits of the intruder: 'I knew 
I could not understand him, that I had no fellow feeling with him. He was something 
beyond me .... I thought he was a blot, like a blot fallen on my mind. something hlack 
and heavy out of which I could not extricate myself. '(20) The schoolteacher has no 
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fellow feeling because he associates himself with society's betters; but he still 
acknowledges his connection, as a social being, to that social corruption to which the 
fIrst schoolteacher feels himself a contributor. In Kangaroo, anxiety at worldly 
otherness expands into something that literally overwhelms Somers, to the point 
where his denial of the reality of social existence presents the only recourse. Whereas 
both versions of the early short story are still wrestling with the nature of individual 
identity as a social construction, Kangaroo would seem to attempt to do exactly what 
the schoolteacher realises is impossible: to 'extricate' the 'good' individual from the 
'bad' society. And Somers, faced with the war's further trammelling of individuality, 
fInds this venture no easier: from the stream of great ideas and grand social schemes 
that has been apparently dammed up by the war, he can only find a dribbling parody 
of aristocracy, that remains ineffably 'spiritual' - that is to say, within his own 
solipsism. 
The flood which sweeps away Tom Brangwen, Senior, in The Rainbow 
and which seems to herald the beginning of a new life of free individuals was, in 
reality, supplanted by the cataclysm of the war, in whose aftermath Lawrence's 
subsequent characters are to be found floundering. To a great extent, though, 
Lawrence's novels seek to shelter his individuals from the deluge, and disconnect 
them from family connections, the world of work and social concerns: thus it is that 
Women in Love concludes with Ursula and Birkin ensconced in their converted 
mill-house. This is not to say that the novels do not indicate the impossibility of social 
extrication (they do, as when Somers and Harriett have their houses blown open by 
warlike winds);[21) it is just that, in satire, Lawrence is discharged from depicting 
anything like a sympathetic hero who perseveres despite the odds, and so is enabled to 
. .. al· . f h ·ty's political and industrial 
engage more directly WIth the quotidIan re ItIes 0 umam 
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subjection, as in the cases of 'Change of Government' and 'Oh Wonderful M hi I' ac ne .. 
And if Lawrence's rudimentary radicalism is retarded by the origin of his 
individualism in capitalist ideology, then satire helps shed such standards anyway, as 
inexorably as it disposes of 'The Man Who Loved Islands'. The islander and the 
characters of the novels share a penchant for solipsistically chopping the world down 
to fit their own illusions and to exclude more obnoxious social realities. Ironically 
enough, on the other hand, it is the shorter satirical works like 'The Princess', with its 
cruel jokes at both Dollie Urquhart's self-perception as a virginal fairy princess and at 
Romero's fatal misperception of Dollie, which pitch barren introspection into an 
external 'world' that involves the most brutal confrontation with repugnant realities. 
There is, of course, abundant evidence of irony in the novels, but I would 
contend that it is usually set to a contrasting purpose. Unlike their counterparts in the 
shorter works, the moments of novelistic irony tend to be far removed from the spirit 
of the carvings in Anna Brangwen' s Lincoln Cathedral, which point out what the 
dominant ideology cannot compass. Many other commentators have argued just the 
opposite, including Eggert, who uses Women in Love as his exemplar in proposing 
how Lawrence employs two voices, 'one, let us say of the Birkin kind, which allows 
Lawrence to philosophise, speculate, even rant', and 'Ursula's sarcastic or 
affectionately ironic kind, which pricks the ballooning implications of Sirkin's 
extremist intellectual positions'. [22] I do not accept this for a moment, but rather see 
Ursula's retorts as functioning less to subvert, and more to shore up the novel's 
dominant thesis of individuality and Birkin as the dominant individual (see above. 
pages 101, 109-10). They actually seem to parody dialogism, making Sirkin easier to 
swallow. 
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Despite all the foregoing, however, I would not wish to contribute to 
oversimplified divisions in Lawrence's oeuvre. I do not see that there is a necessary 
choice to be made between the novels and the shorter satirical works. Rather, I hope 
to have shown the contrasting qualities they have to offer. Their similarities and 
continuities should be more evident. Not least, both satire and novels demonstrate a 
characteristic Lawrentian tension between utopian aspirations and a skeptical 
appreciation of reality. The flux of thesis and antithesis in the generic subversion in 
'The Princess', which offers no synthesis of a more 'genuine' mode of textuality. 
reflects the novels' resolve their own contradictions,; but then, in both cases, this is 
only a consequence of their literary synthesis of their world's contradictions - which 
must be resolved first. 
If it seems that I have already made my 'choice' as to those texts of 
particular significance, in the selection that include in my thesis, then I must stress 
that, while one of my intentions has been to question the conventional Lawrentian 
canon, I have by no means attempted to construct an alternative. My choice of texts is 
a consequence of my aim to chart Lawrence's writing from what has been considered 
a crucial 'break' between Lawrence and England - the war - in the key canonical text 
in which he formulates his own thesis of escaping the world (Women in L o v e ) ~ ~ then 
through the text where the crisis of what to do when one has 'left' society is most 
directly faced (Kangaroo); before trying to assess that mode which, to me, appears to 
represent Lawrence's most conscious attempt to breach the gap between self and 
society (the satire). 
However 'deracinated' Lawrence is perceived to be, a final irony is that 
. . h' t in our supposedh' social1y this may be exactly what continues to connect 1m 0 us, . '
mobile, postmodern world of multiplex identities. But I would contend that the key 
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reason for his contemporary appeal is that, besides Ie d' . If '. 
n mg Itse to the e x p l o s l O n ~ ~ In 
postmodem fashion, of 'bourgeois' determinate . d' . preJu Ices, his w o r ~ ~ unlike 
postmodernism, refuses to rest from searching for a furth'fyin .. e r ~ ~ urn g agent. Inhabltmg 
the 'Unknown' as it does, this last can perhaps be said to posit a solidarity, which if 
not recognisably social, is at least preter-personal and beyond th dl I . I 
e en ess y pomt ess 
introspection of his proto-postmodem individuals. 
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